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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
In 1971 John Rawls remarked that ‘During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism.’ Although utilitarianism is no longer the dominant school of moral philosophy, it continues to flourish, generating new defenses and reformulations. Yet with the notable exception of Joseph Fletcher, there have been very few Christian ethicistswho have been prepared to declare themselves to be utilitarians or consequentialists.
1 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), vii.Google Scholar
2 See Fletcher, Joseph, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966)Google Scholar, and ‘What's In a Rule? A Situationist's View,’ 325–350 in Outka, Gene H. and Ramsey, Paul, editors. Norm and Context in Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968).Google Scholar
3 Anscombe, Elizabeth, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy,’ originally 1958Google Scholar; reprinted as 26–42 in Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. III: Ethics, Religion and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 33–34Google Scholar; emphasis in original.
4 Geach, Peter, ‘The Moral Law and the Law of God,’ 117–130 in God and the Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).Google Scholar
5 Meilaender, Gilbert, ‘Eritis Sicut Deuy. Moral Theory and the Sin of Pride,’ Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986), 397–415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 In what follows, I am particularly indebted to the discussions by Williams, Bernard in ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism,’ 77–150 in Utilitarianism for and Against, with Smart, J.J.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 82–93Google Scholar, and by Williams, Bernard and Sen, Amartya in the ‘Introduction’ to their Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1–21.Google Scholar
7 Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Macmillan, 1948Google Scholar; originally 1789).
8 Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 71–92.Google Scholar
9 Bentham, 2.
10 Ibid., 29–32.
11 Ibid., 70, 170.
12 Most notable of these is the theory developed by Moore, G.E., in Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).Google Scholar
13 See Glover, Jonathan, editor, Utilitarianism and Its Critics (New York: Macmillan, 1990). 193–198.Google Scholar
14 Scheffler, Samuel, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 14–40.Google Scholar
15 Sen and Williams, 8.
16 I take the expression, ‘common morality,’ from Donagan, Alan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 26–31.Google Scholar
17 For a helpful discussion of the relevant arguments, see Haber, Joram Graf, editor, Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), 1–13.Google Scholar
18 Most notably Anscombe, Geach, and Grisez, Germain, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Volume One: Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983)Google Scholar; however, for a different interpretation of Anscombe, see Haber, 4–5.
19 These would include Ramsey, Paul, ‘The Case of the Curious Exception,’ 67–138 in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, Outka, Gene H. and Ramsey, Paul, editors (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968)Google Scholar; Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’; Donagan, The Theory of Morality; Fried, Charles, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Meilaender.
20 For an example of this line of argument, see O'Connell, Timothy E., Principles for a Catholic Morality (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990), 180–181.Google Scholar
21 Although O'Connell himself does not draw this conclusion; see 172– 173.
22 As Donagan apparently believes; see his ‘Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems,’ The Joumal of Philosophy 81 (1984), 291–309Google Scholar, and compare his remarks in The Theory of Morality, 52–74.
23 In what follows, I draw on the discussions of Kovesi, Julius, Moral Notions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967)Google Scholar; Ramsey, ‘The Case of The Curious Exception,’; and Brennan, J. M., The Open-Texture of Moral Concepts (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
24 A similar argument is developed by MacIntyre, Alasdair in ‘How Can We Learn what Veritatis Splendor Has to Teach?’ The Thomist 58 (1994), 171–195CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see in particular 179–181.
25 Geach, 124; emphasis in the original.
26 Adams, Robert Merrihew, ‘A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,’ 318–347 in Religion and Morality: A Collection of Essays, Outka, Gene and Ramsey, Paul, editors (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1973), 328.Google Scholar
27 Although Adams traces this argument to Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, it is much closer in structure to Suarez's analysis of obligation in Book II of On Law and God the Lawgiver, see Adams, , ‘A Modified Divine Command…’ 333Google Scholar, and compare Francisco Suarez, On Law and God the Lawgiver, originally 1612, excerpted and reprinted as 68–85 in Schneewind, J. B., editor, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, Volume One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), particularly 77–78.Google Scholar
28 Geach, 124.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 For example, see Mouw, Richard J., The God Who Commands: A Study in Divine Command Ethics (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 9.Google Scholar
32 Summa theobgiae II–II 45.
33 See Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics, Volume II, Part 2, originally 1942, translated by Bromiley, G. W. et al. , (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1957), 583–630.Google Scholar
34 For a collection of relevant texts from the first five centuries of the Common Era, together with helpful commentary, see Swift, Louis J., editor, The Early Fathers on War and Military Service (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1983).Google Scholar
35 On this point, see Swift, 110–149.
36 In addition to Meilaender and Mouw, see Adams, Robert Merrihew, ‘Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation,’ Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987), 262–275.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
37 See Adams, , ‘Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation,’ and Mouw, 150–175.Google Scholar
38 ‘Eritis Sicut Devs…’ 400; he is quoting Scheffler, 4.
39 Ibid., 402.
40 Ibid., 405.
41 Ibid., 407.
42 Ibid., 407–410.
43 Ibid., 408.
44 See Fletcher, , Situation Ethics, 57–102, 120–133.Google Scholar
45 Meilaender, 409.
46 See Fletcher, , Situation Ethics, 134–145.Google Scholar
47 See Glover 85–88 for a helpful summary of this argument.
48 Rawls, 26, 27.
49 Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 275.Google Scholar
50 Ibid., 275.
51 Parfit argues this point in some detail; see 321–347.
52 In addition to Rawls, cited above, see Ramsey, Paul, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 123–144Google Scholar; Outka, Gene, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), 7–54Google Scholar, 291–312; Donagan, , The Theory of Morality, 57–74Google Scholar, 210–243; and Fried, 28–53.)
53 Fried, 14.
54 Ibid., 20–21.
55 Parfit, 453–454. For a more extensive argument, see Dumont, Louis, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 23–59.Google Scholar
56 On this much-discussed topic, see Outka, , Agape and more recently, ‘Universal Love and Impartiality,’ 1–103 in Santurri, Edmund N. and Werpehowski, William, editors, The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992) for helpful and influential treat-ments.Google Scholar
57 Agape, 311–312, emphasis in the original; compare Ramsey, , Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 104–122.Google Scholar
58 Mouw offers a helpful discussion of these objections, and possible responses to them, in The God Who Commands, 43–54.
59 Adams, , ‘A Modified Divide Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,’ 328.Google Scholar
60 Veritatis Splendor (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana; distributed through the Catholic Resource Network, Trinity Communications, Manassas, Virginia, 1992; no pagination). Paragraphs 80, 82.Google Scholar
61 Ibid., paragraph 80.
62 Grisez, 184; more generally, see 173–204.
63 Donagan, , The Theory of Morality, 64.Google Scholar
64 Ramsey, , ‘The Case of the Curious Exception,’ 92.Google Scholar
65 I am grateful to Joseph Blenkinsopp and Diane Yeager for many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
