Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-qsmjn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T21:02:47.882Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Lovin on Trigg, Religion in Public Life1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 2009

Robin W. Lovin*
Affiliation:
Southern Methodist University, PO Box 317, Dallas, TX 75275-0317. rlovin@smu.edu

Extract

The relationship between religion and public life is a universal problem, but discussions of it quickly become very local. They begin with the global reality of religious diversity, then the analysis descends into the particulars of the legal and constitutional system immediately in view, assuming always the sociological features of religious diversity most familiar to the audience at hand. French analysts typically take laïcité as the standard for modern solutions to the problem, while they view with alarm the cultural gap which separates older French citizens from recent Muslim immigrants. American writers, by contrast, usually have a more benign view of cultural diversity, which has grown up over generations of immigration. They turn quickly to the ambiguities of church–state law which govern religious expression in public space. Roger Trigg provides a thoughtful alternative to these parochial analyses. His Religion in Public Life explores a variety of national settings and he formulates his questions in terms which avoid legal or religious assumptions that are already in place where the question is asked. At the same time, he makes no premature claims to rational universality or global solutions. Religion in Public Life is primarily an investigation of European and North American contexts, or in other places which share a British legal and cultural heritage. In these places, religion and public life are shaped by the realities of modern law and the modern state and appeals to reason still mean something, even if they cannot mean quite as much as liberal theorists thought they meant only a few decades ago. But even among these nations, linked by culture, commerce and commitment to democracy, there is a surprising range of legal arrangements relating to religious expression and religious institutions and there are considerable differences in the social facts behind the legal differences. This, Trigg suggests, is a large enough world to allow us to discuss real differences without succumbing to the confusion which sometimes results from too much information. It is also a world in which we are acutely aware that public life has problems in need of solutions. Instead of hurrying to keep religion out of sight or under control, we are perhaps more willing to see what it has to contribute.

Type
Article Review
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

2 Trigg makes this point in an extended analysis of the European Court's decision striking down restrictions imposed on a breakaway Orthodox group by the government of Moldova. Religion in Public Life, pp. 141–6.

3 Ibid., pp. 88–9.

4 For Australia, ibid., pp. 186–9.

5 Ibid., pp. 90–109.

6 Ibid., p. 91.

8 Ibid., p. 148.

9 Professor Trigg's questions about prevailing theories of liberal democracy are developed in somewhat more detail in his Morality Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).

10 Notably, the presence of an established church serves in practice to open public discourse to participation by all religious groups, despite the fact that the presence of a religious establishment in a polity implies to some liberal theorists that the system falls short of the ideal of liberal democracy. See Trigg, Religion in Public Life, pp. 25–9.

11 Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 172Google Scholar. Cf. Trigg, Religion in Public Life, pp. 196–7.

12 Galston, William A., Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

14 Trigg, Religion in Public Life, p. 148.

15 Ibid., pp. 113–14, 198–9.

16 Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 133–72Google Scholar. On the role of religion in this ‘overlapping consensus’, see also Weithman, Paul, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 214–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 Trigg, Religion in Public Life, p. 149.

18 It would still be open to a political theorist to try to construct such a theory, but in view of developments in liberalism since A Theory of Justice, that theorist would bear a heavy burden of proof that the new theory did not draw on moral beliefs from other sources.

19 This question is perennial in contractarian political theories, which must explain how future generations, who did not participate in formulating the original agreement, are nonetheless bound by it.

20 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, p. 41.

21 Trigg, Religion in Public Life, p. 148.

22 Ibid., p. 49.