1 The Heidelberg Catechism, question 1.
2 Reality and Scientific Theology, Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985 (Hereafter RST), p. 13.
3 Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988 (Hereafter WJ), pp. 357–358.
6 See MacIntyre's account on pp. 79–80.
14 RST 109. For specific application of this insight to the theologian and the church community, see also p. 121.
15 RST 26. For a striking parallel to Torrance's points concerning the necessity of openness in framing dialectical questions and the ability of such questions to disclose objective reality, see MacIntyre's discussion of Plato's dialectic (which forms the foundation of his own understanding) in WJ, p. 78: ‘To avoid this latter risk of failure it is necessary to frame one's theses so that they are as open to refutation as adequacy of formulation will allow: that is to say. so that we may have as much opportunity as possible to discover whether or not they are false. And what we want to learn is indeed whether or not they are false and not merely whether or not they are false from such and such a point of view, or in such and such circumstances, or if exemplified in such and such a way.’
16 RST 78. See pp. 85–86 for a description of the dialectical refinement of such axioms in the context of theological inquiry.
19 That notwithstanding Torrance's occasional sloppiness in his use of the language of ‘fact’ (cf. the quote reproduced on page 1 above!). Torrance's tendency to ride roughshod over the sorts of fine semantic distinctions which MacIntyre would like to maintain in this area I would attribute to fundamental differences between his and MacIntyre's intellectual agendas — see the discussion in Section IV below.
20 WJ 224. See also 356ff.
23 See, Tor example, RST 58, 77ff.
28 Consider for example this quote from page 144: ‘The truth of signification, then, is noi located in the statement itself, for since it signifies what is the case, it depends for its truth on the truth of what it signifies independent of it. It signifies rightly when it signifies what it ought by signifying what is in accordance with the facts.’
32 WJ For his rejection of truth warranted assertibility, see his discussion of Hilary Putnam, 169. His critique of relativism and perspectivism can be found on 352ff., and his case for the rational resolution of conflict among competing traditions can be followed through chapters I, X, XVIII, XIX, and XX.
33 cf. his discussion of the advance of the scientific outlook in the west, 148ff.
35 For a sampling of MacIntyre's work in this area, see his discussion of epistemological crises (361ff.); his account of Aquinas’ theology as a dialectical resolution of the conflict between the Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions (ch. X); and his treatment of the problem of translation among rival traditions (ch. XIX).
38 RST 152. See the general discussion on 147ff.
40 WJ 252. Cf. also MacIntyre's argument (WJ 172) that the rational confidence which Aquinas places in individual answers can be stronger than what would be warranted by the arguments he adduces in their support — that by virtue of the fact that they derive their force from the overall strength of the theoretical structure to which they contribute.
43 MacIntyre also offers historical arguments to justify his choice of tradition centered ethics over the a-rational accounts of relativism and perspectivism. See pp. 352–369, esp. 366–7.
44 See the arguments in RST ch. 1, esp. pp. 20–22.
45 WJ 1–6. Cf. also his discussion of the modern university in ch. XX.
46 RST ch. 1 is devoted to an exposition of this characteristically ‘modern’ attitude.