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National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Abstract

This article investigates the impact conceptions of national identity have on mass support for political and economic reform in Ukraine. After laying out the theoretical linkage between national identity and models of political and economic development, it uses a 2001 mass public opinion survey to assess the influence of two competing versions of national identity—Eastern Slavic and Ethnic Ukrainian—on reformist attitudes in Ukraine. Bivariate and multivariate statistical analysis demonstrate that an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity is associated with pro-democratic and pro-market orientations, while the Eastern Slavic national identity is associated with antidemocratic and antimarket orientations. Furthermore, the apparent effect of national identity is stronger than that of other factors that scholars have typically argued promote backing for democracy and capitalism in the postcommunist region, including education, age, urban residence, and economic well-being.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 2005

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39. Note that the qualitative studies discussed earlier on the relationship between “Ukrainian nationalism” and reform are actually referring to one version of such Ukrainian national identity—the Ethnic Ukrainian one.

40. The survey consisted of 1,500 face-to-face interviews of respondents in ten oblasts of Ukraine plus the Republic of Crimea and the city of Kiev. The ten oblasts were Donets'k, Dnipropetrovs'k, Kharkiv, Kiev, L'viv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Zakarpattya and Vynnytsya. Respondents were chosen using a three-stage regionally stratified address sample. A weighting variable adjusting the sample to state-wide demographic characteristics was applied to all analysis. Details available upon request.

41. Respondents needed to answer at least three of the four questions to be included in the index.

42. Unless otherwise noted, all the data in this article exclude the small portion of respondents who could not or did not answer the survey questions.

43. Again, respondents were included in the index only if they answered at least three of the four questions.

44. The terminology for the cell names of the two-by-two table follows that used by Kullberg and Zimmerman, “Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses,” 333.

45. The survey also permitted respondents to indicate other ethnicities or languages. The extremely few respondents that did were excluded from the analysis of ethnicity and language in Table 4 and from the regression analysis below.

46. The western region consists of Rivne, L'viv, and Zakarpattya oblasts; the central region of Kiev, Vynnytsya, and Poltava oblasts; and the south-eastern region of Donets'k, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs'k and Odesa oblasts.

47. Many analysts use a standard of .70 to justify the combination of separate measures into a new one. Thus an alpha of .68 is deemed here sufficiently close to this standard to warrant the creation of a composite measure of national identity from the seven survey questions.

48. The average z-score was calculated only for those respondents for whom data was available for at least five of the seven questions.

49. The scaled index thus permits identification of not only those individuals with strong Ethnic Ukrainian or Eastern Slavic national identity preferences but also those who favor a mixed version of ethnic national identity or are ambivalent towards it.

50. In the regression equations in Tables 7 and 8, collinearity diagnostics indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem for any of the models. The variance inflation factors for all independent variables, for example, are all well under 4 in each model.

51. The standardized coefficients for the dummy variables for region and sex cannot be compared to those of the other independent variables, however.

52. Shulman, “Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine.“

53. Thinking that the ability to speak Ukrainian is unimportant for national membership is also consistent with a civic national identity. But since the purpose of the index is to distinguish between support for two alternative types of ethnic national identity, low scores on this variable are interpreted as support for an Eastern Slavic national identity.