Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF MORAL REALISM*

  • Michael Huemer (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

The essay argues that while there is no general agreement on whether moral realism is true, there is general agreement on at least some of the moral obligations that we have if moral realism is true. Given that moral realism might be true, and given that we know some of the things we ought to do if it is true, we have a reason to do those things. Furthermore, this reason is itself an objective moral reason. Thus, if moral realism might be true, then it is true.

Abstract

The essay argues that while there is no general agreement on whether moral realism is true, there is general agreement on at least some of the moral obligations that we have if moral realism is true. Given that moral realism might be true, and given that we know some of the things we ought to do if it is true, we have a reason to do those things. Furthermore, this reason is itself an objective moral reason. Thus, if moral realism might be true, then it is true.

Copyright
Footnotes
Hide All
*

I would like to thank Iskra Fileva, Paul Bloomfield, and the other contributors to this volume for helpful discussion of this essay and/or its distant and primitive ancestors.

Footnotes
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Values and Morals: Outline of a Skeptical Realism,” Philosophical Issues 19 (2009): 113–30

Niko Kolodny , “Why Be Rational?Mind 114 (2005): 509–63

Richard Joyce , The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Social Philosophy and Policy
  • ISSN: 0265-0525
  • EISSN: 1471-6437
  • URL: /core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 7
Total number of PDF views: 37 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 330 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 19th August 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.