Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 6
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Smith, Matthew Noah 2016. One dogma of philosophy of action. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, Issue. 8, p. 2249.


    Darwall, Stephen 2014. On Sterba’s Argument from Rationality to Morality. The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 18, Issue. 3, p. 243.


    MARUŠIĆ, BERISLAV 2010. THE DESIRES OF OTHERS. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 91, Issue. 3, p. 385.


    Way, Jonathan 2010. Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 147, Issue. 2, p. 213.


    Phillips, David 2007. Mackie on Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 10, Issue. 5, p. 457.


    Sobel, David 2005. Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 8, Issue. 4, p. 437.


    ×

“Because I Want It”*

  • Stephen Darwall (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002934
  • Published online: 01 January 2009
Abstract

How can an agent's desire or will give him reasons for acting? Not long ago, this might have seemed a silly question, since it was widely believed that all reasons for acting are based in the agent's desires. The interesting question, it seemed, was not how what an agent wants could give him reasons, but how anything else could. In recent years, however, this earlier orthodoxy has increasingly appeared wrongheaded as a growing number of philosophers have come to stress the action-guiding role of reasons in deliberation from the agent's point of view. What a deliberating agent has in view is rarely his own will or desires as such, even if taking something as a reason is intimately tied to desire. Someone who wants to escape a burning building does not evaluate her options by considering which is likeliest to realize what she wants or wills. She is focused, rather, on her desire's object: getting out alive. The fact that a successful route would realize something she wants is apt to strike her as beside the point or, at best, as a trivial bonus.

Copyright
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Philip Pettit and Michael Smith , “Backgrounding Desire,” Philosophical Review 99, no. 4 (1990): 565–92

J. David Velleman , “The Possibility of Practical Reason,” Ethics 106, no. 4 (1996): 707–26.

Samuel Scheffler , The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)

David McNaughton and Piers Rawling , “Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes,” Utilitas 7, no. 2 (1995): 319–25.

John Broome , “Normative Requirements,” Ratio 12, no. 4 (1999): 398419.

Patricia Greenspan , “Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives,” Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 10 (1975): 259–76

Stephen Darwall , “Empathy, Sympathy, Care,” Philosophical Studies 89, no. 2 (1998): 261–82.

John Rawls , “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 9 (1980): 543.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Social Philosophy and Policy
  • ISSN: 0265-0525
  • EISSN: 1471-6437
  • URL: /core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×