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PARADOXES OF EGALITARIANISM: PRACTICE, MORAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 December 2023
Abstract
This essay seeks to answer the question of how the behavior of wealthy advocates of some version of socialism can be reconciled with their advocacy of those ideas. The answer is that the conception of egalitarianism under which they choose to live is one that redistributes income, not wealth, while the egalitarianism that they advocate for others is that in which all wealth is the property of one person who decides how much will be distributed to others.
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- © 2023 Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation. Printed in the USA
Footnotes
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Social Philosophy and Policy Center, John Chambers College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University, jpaul@sppfbg.org. Competing Interests: The author declares none.
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