1 Although most substantive theories are first-order theories, and many procedural theories are second-order theories, the substantive/procedural distinction is not the same as the first-order/second-order distinction. The substantive/procedural distinction characterizes theories according to whether they justify political decisions by reference to independent moral principles or entirely by reference to features of the process. The first-order/second-order distinction classifies theories according to whether they affirm the truth of a single consistent set of (substantive or procedural) principles that exclude other such principles, or whether they refer to the principles in a way that is consistent with a range of potentially inconsistent sets (for example, by prescribing certain attitudes or conduct with regard to the principles and the persons who hold them).
2 Gutmann Amy and Thompson Dennis, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996).
3 The range includes what we call “deliberative disagreements,” which are those in which citizens continue to differ about basic moral principles even though they seek a resolution that is mutually justifiable. The dispute over abortion is an example of a deliberative disagreement because both sides can justify their views within a reciprocal perspective. A dispute about racial segregation is an example of a nondeliberative disagreement because one side can be reasonably rejected within a reciprocal perspective. See Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 2–3, 73–79.
4 Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). See Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 63–69.
5 Galston William, “Diversity, Toleration, and Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberative Politics: Essays on “Democracy and Disagreement,” ed. Macedo Stephen (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
7 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 230–72.
10 Schauer Frederick, “Talking as a Decision Procedure,” in Deliberative Politics, ed. Macedo.
11 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 273–306.