The Parties to the Paris Agreement have committed to communicate successive ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) to the global response to climate change. Each NDC is expected to reflect the Party's ‘highest possible ambition’ (HPA) on the mitigation of climate change. This article envisages the possibility of taking HPA seriously: that is, of approaching it as an effective legal standard. It shows that, in some circumstances, the HPA standard can help to assess whether a State has complied with due diligence obligations on climate change mitigation.

This article aims to reflect on ‘ecological vulnerability’ – which makes evident the relationship, flows and interactions between the human being/body and the environment/non-human world – as applied in the context of environmentally induced migration. In particular, the dual role of the law vis-à-vis environmentally displaced migrants as a generator and exacerbator of their vulnerability as well as potential antidote, valuable for attaining protection, will be highlighted. Namely, on one hand, the analysis will show how a lack of conceptualisation of the notion to understand the spatial and temporal patterns of climate change-related migration, as well as its consequences for societal well-being, contributes to generate and exacerbate the vulnerability of that category of migrants. On the other hand, the critical understanding of vulnerability, as developed in some recent legal reasoning of international and national jurisdictions, will be proposed as a key element for ensuring the resilience of both environmental migrants and the law itself, for both virtuously expanding traditional asylum norms and flexibilising access to international protection for those migrants.

Exploitative mining in the deep seas is coming, and with it will arrive a new wave of international disputes. Numerous stakeholders will be interested in these disputes, such as those seeking to profit from exploitative mining activity; developing states seeking to benefit from equitable sharing of wealth and lessons learned; and environmentalists all over the world worried about environmental catastrophes that could result from such activity. Stakeholders include the mining contractor, the sponsoring state of the contractor, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) created by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to control mining activity in the deep seas, states (both states parties to UNCLOS and those that are not) and affected communities, which includes Indigenous peoples and climate activists. However, the dispute settlement system of UNCLOS treats these different stakeholders unequally in terms of whether they may be parties to a dispute proceeding and, if so, what claims they may bring. Unsurprisingly, the system excludes non-states parties and non-state entities (apart from the International Seabed Authority and the contractor), such as Indigenous peoples and climate activists, from serving as parties (claimant or respondent) to a dispute. This essay explores the limited ways in which excluded stakeholders nonetheless may be able to participate in a dispute initiated under UNCLOS. Specifically, they may serve as witnesses, experts, or amicus curiae in proceedings before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Seabed Disputes Chamber, or a commercial arbitral tribunal. This essay also advocates for the ISA to establish administrative processes for ongoing monitoring and whistleblower complaints. Such processes would allow excluded stakeholders to submit relevant evidence and information that could—and should—be used in any formal dispute settlement processes initiated by those stakeholders who enjoy direct participatory rights.

The global climate crisis response envisioned by the Paris Agreement is commonly understood as demanding transformative change. International law, however, lacks a holistic conceptual framing for making sense of what such change would entail, how it might unfold, and who and what it will involve. Moreover, there has been little critical engagement with the question of what is at stake when invoking the notion of transformation. Contributing to the broader debate about what the climate crisis demands of international law, this article offers a critical conceptual appraisal of the notion of ‘transformation’. Conceptually, it describes transformative dynamics as processes which work towards radically different states of affairs that seem practically impossible under the status quo, but which could arguably be realized if different conditions were in place. Developing an ontology of transformative change, the article identifies heterogenous temporality, the actualization of impossible possibilities, and distributed engagement as three central features of transformations in climate crisis. Having laid the conceptual groundwork, the article then takes a critical turn and foregrounds unresolved tensions that run through transformation thinking. The aim here is to connect to critical discourses and show how these tensions can serve as entry points for international law to meaningfully engage with the notion of transformation. The article closes by offering some reflections on what engagement with the notion of transformation might mean for international law’s disciplinary identity, rationale, and sense of purpose.

While many investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) proceedings based on international investment agreements have dealt, directly or incidentally, with environmental issues, state measures relating to the mitigation and adaptation to climate change have been subject to a small number of reported cases. This article demonstrates that there is a significant gap between the number of investor-state disputes having a direct relevance with climate change, on the one hand, and the number of such cases that have actually raised climate change as a material legal or factual issue. In addition, arbitral tribunals faced with disputes related to measures or sectors that are of direct relevance to climate action have, to date, virtually never engaged in any sort of substantial analysis of international climate change treaties and related instruments, rules, or practices. Against this backdrop, this article will explore ways for arbitrators and parties to ISDS proceedings to better consider the climate regime — in particular, the Paris Agreement and instruments arising therefrom — in ISDS proceedings beyond its current limited role as an element of context. While the literature has mostly focused on integrating climate change concerns in ISDS, this article goes further by exploring how states’ international climate obligations could play a greater role in the adjudication of investor-state disputes, including by providing states with a justification for implementing more ambitious regulations as well as tribunals with guidance for interpreting substantive obligations in investment treaties.

This article argues that the Rights of Nature (RoN) framework is compatible with various ideological outlooks and political options. As a result, those initiatives may translate into extremely diverse institutional implementations with contrasted outcomes in terms of power distribution. The institutional design of RoN has deep political implications for various social groups who hold conflicting claims over certain territories. Hence, rather than transforming human-nature relations, RoN primarily transform the power relations between human communities. I delve into three conceptual frameworks that could shape the recognition of RoN and explore their respective distributive implications: green colonialism, environmental justice, and the focus on Indigeneity. Through this critical engagement, I wish to warn against the illusion of a post-political ecology where an ecocentric legal declaration would deliver human-nature harmony without deep political battles, social tensions, and economic confrontations. RoN as an abstract notion does not offer a ready-made toolkit to dismantle the legal architecture of fossil capitalism; nor does it provide clear guidance on the distribution of costs and benefits of the green transition.

This article examines how carbon dioxide (CO2) removal credits can be integrated into the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS), focusing on questions of permanence and climate liability. It identifies challenges within the integration process and analyzes approaches from practice and literature to cultivate learning. These approaches apply different strategies to address the issue of permanence, including temporary credit issuance, granting credits once a certain number of carbon tonne-years have been accumulated, or issuing credits at the beginning of the project period and relying on liability instead. Drawing from the findings of this research, the article presents legal considerations that may inform a proposal for an EU legislative act on the integration of carbon removal credits into the EU ETS. It suggests that only credits issued for permanent CO2 removal should be integrated to ensure the environmental integrity of the system. Furthermore, the liability of the project operator should transfer to the Member State under certain conditions to make liability risks more predictable.

To avoid penalizing exporters that already paid carbon prices, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism credits carbon taxes and Emissions Trading Schemes in third countries. By excluding instruments of traditional regulation (e.g. emission standards) and indirect carbon prices (e.g. fuel excise taxes) from this crediting mechanism, the EU is criticized for discriminating against countries that do not follow its climate model, in breach of international trade and climate law. This article seeks to nuance this criticism by arguing that the calculation of actual emissions (instead of default values) under the EU CBAM allows exporters to reflect compliance with foreign emission standards, and thus respects states' right to pursue emission reductions through traditional regulation. However, amendments of the CBAM Regulation are necessary to recognize the positive and negative impact of indirect carbon prices on decarbonization, and the role of carbon-crediting mechanisms in equalizing carbon costs in a more flexible and equitable way.

The Hague District Court in the Netherlands faced a novel tort law issue in 2021 in Milieudefensie et al v Royal Dutch Shell plc – namely, whether Shell is liable in tort for the reduction costs of carbon dioxide produced in the end use of energy-carrying Shell products. The civil lawsuit aims to make Shell (re)search for adequate substitutes so as to enable Shell’s customers to reduce their consumption of energy-carrying Shell products. It is argued here that Shell’s liability should be assessed within Guido Calabresi’s “cheapest cost avoider” framework.

In recent years, some scientists have called for research into and potential development of ‘solar geoengineering’ technologies as an option to counter global warming. Solar geoengineering refers to a set of speculative techniques to reflect some incoming sunlight back into space, for example, by continuously spraying reflective sulphur aerosols into the stratosphere over several generations. Because of the significant ecological, social, and political risks posed by such technologies, many scholars and civil society organizations have urged governments to take action to prohibit the development and deployment of solar geoengineering techniques. In this article we take such calls for a prohibitory or a non-use regime on solar geoengineering as a starting point to examine existing international law and governance precedents that could guide the development of such a regime. The precedents we examine include international prohibitory and restrictive regimes that impose bans or restrictions on chemical weapons, biological weapons, weather modification technologies, anti-personnel landmines, substances that deplete the ozone layer, trade in hazardous wastes, deep seabed mining, and mining in Antarctica. We also assess emerging norms and soft law in anticipatory governance of novel technologies, such as human cloning and gene editing. While there is no blueprint for a solar geoengineering non-use regime in international law, our analysis points to numerous specific elements on which governments could draw to constrain or impose an outright prohibition on the development of technologies for solar geoengineering, should they opt to do so.

On June 19, 2023, the Intergovernmental Conference on an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Intergovernmental Conference) adopted, by consensus, the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine BioLogical Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement or Agreement). The Agreement, which is grounded in and builds on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), specifically addresses issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of the marine biodiversity of the high seas. The adoption of the Agreement was the culmination of nearly two decades of work under the auspices of the UN General Assembly.

Legal rules aimed at compensation for the harm caused by a particular state, individual, or legal entity (for example, oil pollution of the sea due to a tanker accident) are well studied and constantly used in scientific literature and international law practice. Meanwhile, every year, the number of cases of harm when the particular guilty party cannot be established grows; this is why it is almost impossible to compensate for the harm caused. Such cases include collisions of satellites causing space debris; the consequences of climate change for agriculture, forestry, and the health of citizens; and the pollution of the World Ocean with plastic debris, ballast water, and abandoned nets.

There are more such cases at the national level. After studying acts of international environmental law, national legislation, and several examples from judicial practice, we show that compensation for the harm caused to life, health, or property in the absence of a particular harm-doer is difficult or impossible to prove. This is why actions that can prevent subjectless environmental harm are taken at the national level in certain countries by developing measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change, licensing space activities, and taking preventive measures against the formation of plastic debris and its pollution of the seas, etc. This trend should be continued, and the experience gained by certain states should be used in developing new acts of international environmental law. This will ensure the next step towards preventing environmental harm where it is impossible to establish the doer’s name.

Over the course of 2021, several local councils across the island of Ireland introduced motions recognizing the ‘Rights of Nature’. To date, little research has been conducted into these nascent Rights of Nature movements, even though they raise important questions about the philosophical, cultural, political, and legal drivers in pursuing such rights. Similarly, much remains unclear as to the implications of such initiatives, both in their domestic context and for Rights of Nature movements around the world. This article contributes to addressing this gap by exploring these themes through an analysis of interviews with key stakeholders conducted across the island of Ireland in June 2022. In particular, it explores the impact of international movements, colonial legacies, cultural heritage, and years of inadequate environmental governance, in motivating local councils to pursue a Rights of Nature strategy.

As societies become more concerned with their impacts on future generations, the question of how to translate that concern into greater consideration in contemporary decision-making is coming to the fore. Despite growing societal acceptance of the ethics of obligations to the future – as reflected in record-high number of future-sensitive constitutions and international treaties – present generations’ promises to future generations remain unfulfilled. This article explains why and offers an alternative approach to future-proofing. After providing a systematic account of the multiple efforts at aligning the actions of decision-makers with the interests of future generations, it argues that achieving the inclusion of future generations’ interests in contemporary policymaking requires more than their legal codification and the establishment of new and typically scattered institutions, mechanisms and procedures. It rather calls for a more holistic, future-orientated and proactive approach by all public authorities. These must increasingly be expected to create the conditions not only for policymakers to consider the temporal dimension of their decisions, but also for all stakeholders – including new dedicated institutions – to hold present people accountable to currently non-existent future generations. To do so beyond the environment and climate space is a matter of urgency. This is the spirit animating this Special Issue devoted to long-term risks and future generations: to nurture a more imaginative theorisation and operationalisation of the recognition of future generations’ interests in contemporary policymaking beyond today’s institutional and conceptual models.

In search of a climate-neutral Europe, the EU Green Deal presented agroecology as an alternative guide for food system transitions through explicit policy and regulatory actions. While the term agroecology is used in Green Deal policy documents, its meaning remains elusive in both policymaking and academic legal research. To explore existing regulatory frameworks’ potential to align with agroecological perspectives for food system transitions, this article analyses pesticide regulation, a core area of agricultural governance, using an agroecological framework. This article aims to contribute to the current legal debate in two ways: it presents agroecology as a framework capable of guiding and assessing law and regulation and illustrates, via a study of EU pesticide regulation, how this framework can be deployed in practice to evaluate legal frameworks.

This article offers a comprehensive analysis of rights-based climate litigation aimed at addressing climate change-induced loss and damage, underlining its potential as a transformative force amid the minimal progress towards a coordinated global response on this topic. It builds on literature highlighting the potential of rights-based climate litigation to fill the gap in accountability for climate change and its consequences, noting that research to date has not systematically analyzed the remedies that plaintiffs have sought or secured. By focusing on remedy claims, this study illuminates the capacity and the limitations of such litigation to unlock redress for loss and damage while highlighting its reciprocal relationship with international negotiations. This synergy implies a promising trajectory towards a more equitable climate governance framework, despite the complexities and challenges inherent in this rapidly evolving field.

Taking Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia as a focal point, the author argues that the legal framing of Indigenous sacred land claims in terms of religious freedom carries significant costs. It impels courts to bracket consideration of sovereignty and territorial rights, while positioning Indigenous worldviews as nonrational rather than as dynamic intellectual traditions and ways of life that are respectably different from those embodied in settler systems of law. Genuinely fair adjudication of such claims requires not religious exemptions from general laws but recognition of the sui generis rights of Indigenous nations in relation to lands they never ceded (acknowledging historical injustice); deep differences between dominant European settler and Indigenous cultures (acknowledging that settler law is also cultural); and the validity of Indigenous environmental philosophies (acknowledging that they are no less rational than Western ones).

The limited use of dispute settlement mechanisms under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement explains the recent upsurge in requests for advisory opinions on issues specific to climate change to international courts, namely the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, it is still unclear how these courts will answer the questions posed, and in particular whether they will coordinate or compete with each other. As the requesting states and bodies are well aware of this uncertainty, requesting an advisory opinion from three courts simultaneously was an ingenious (not ingenuous) strategy to clarify states’ obligations to mitigate or adapt to climate change through the international judiciary. This essay assesses how the parallel jurisdiction of courts in these cases presents an opportunity to enhance states’ obligations concerning climate change through requesting concurrent views on the same rules and obligations. It considers the potential for contradictory views between courts on the same obligations. Finally, the essay analyzes the extent to which these courts may compete or cooperate in their approach to the resolution of these issues.