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Aggregation and Numbers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2004

University College, Oxford


This article considers the reach of arguments for saving the greater number without interpersonal aggregation, and argues that interpersonal aggregation is useful to encompass the proper respect due to each separate person. I first give a precise definition of interpersonal aggregation, which many non-utilitarians try to avoid. Then, I show that consequentialism and Scanlon can justify the case for the greater number without interpersonal aggregation. However, I propose the Aggregation Approach, which justifies the case for the greater number in some cases and the case for tossing a fair coin in other cases. I conclude that interpersonal aggregation does not disrespect the separate person.

Research Article
© 2004 Cambridge University Press

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