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Value, Interest, and Well-Being

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2006

TIMOTHY MACKLEM
Affiliation:
King's College Londontimothy.macklem@kcl.ac.uk
JOHN GARDNER
Affiliation:
University of Oxfordjohn.gardner@law.ox.ac.uk

Abstract

In this article we consider and cast doubt on two doctrines given prominence and prestige by the utilitarian tradition in ethics. According to the interest theory of value, value is realized only in the advancement of people's interests. According to the well-being theory of interests, people's interests are advanced only in the augmentation of their well-being. We argue that it is possible to resist these doctrines without abandoning the value-humanist doctrine that the value of anything has to be explained in terms of its potential to contribute to human lives and their quality.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Cambridge University Press 2006

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