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Well-Being, Autonomy, and the Horizon Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2008

JENNIFER S. HAWKINS
JENNIFER S. HAWKINS*
Affiliation:
University of Torontohawkins@utsc.utoronto.ca
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Abstract

Desire satisfaction theorists and attitudinal-happiness theorists of well-being are committed to correcting the psychological attitudes upon which their theories are built. However, it is not often recognized that some of the attitudes in need of correction are evaluative attitudes. Moreover, it is hard to know how to correct for poor evaluative attitudes in ways that respect the traditional commitment to the authority of the individual subject's evaluative perspective. L. W. Sumner has proposed an autonomy-as-authenticity requirement to perform this task, but this article argues that it cannot do the job. Sumner's proposal focuses on the social origins of our values and overlooks the deep psychological roots of other evaluative attitudes that are just as problematic for welfare. If subjective theories of welfare are to be at all plausible they may need to abandon or modify their traditional commitment to the authority of the individual subject.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2008 , pp. 143 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

1 L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford, 1996), ch. 6. See also Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life (New York, 2004), ch. 4.

2 John, Christman, ‘Autonomy and Personal History’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991), pp. 1–24Google Scholar.

3 Alice, Walker, The Color Purple (New York, 1982)Google Scholar.

4 Proulx, E. Annie, The Shipping News (New York, 1993)Google Scholar.

5 Peter, Railton, ‘Moral Realism’, Philosophical Review 95 (1986), p. 174Google Scholar; See also, Peter, Railton, ‘Facts and Values’, Philosophical Topics 14 (1986), pp. 5–31Google Scholar.

6 Sumner, Welfare, p. 149.

7 Sumner, Welfare, p. 145.

8 Sumner, Welfare, p. 145.

9 Sumner, Welfare, p. 146.

10 That affective states have a judgmental component is now a widely accepted view. By judgmental component, I do not intend to commit myself to a cognitivist view of emotion per se, but merely to some account that develops a strong link between emotional response and assessments. Appraisal theories, cognitivist theories, and perceptual theories of emotion all fit this bill. For a thorough overview of the literature on emotion, see Ronald de Sousa, ‘Emotion’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion, 2003).

11 Sumner, Welfare, pp. 160–1.

12 This is a common description of the constraints adopted by subjective-attitudinal theorists. See, e.g. David, Sobel, ‘Full Information Accounts of Well-Being’, Ethics 104 (1994), pp. 784–810, esp. p. 791Google Scholar; Connie, Rosati, ‘Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good’, Ethics 105 (1995), pp. 296–325, esp. pp. 300–2Google Scholar. It is worth noting a significant difference between seeking naturalistic definitions of evaluative terms like ‘well-being’ and seeking a subjective-attitudinal theory of well-being. Some theorists combine the two tasks, but that is not necessary. If one seeks a naturalistic definition, then the ideal conditions must be specifiable purely descriptively, i.e. without reference to any evaluative terms. However, if one abandons this further task, then the commitment to value neutrality is simply driven by the search for widely acceptable conditions: conditions most subjects will view as authoritative.

13 The intuition that information is what is needed to improve judgment lies behind a vast number of theories, most prominently informed desire theories of personal good. For example see Brian, Barry, Political Argument (New York, 1965)Google Scholar, chs. 10 and 11; James, Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford, 1986), chs. 1 and 2Google Scholar; Hare, R. M., Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981), ch. 5Google Scholar; John, Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), ch. 7Google Scholar; Joseph, Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986), ch. 12Google Scholar; Peter Railton, ‘Moral Realism’ and ‘Facts and Values’. Richard Brandt develops an account of rational desire along structurally similar lines; and his account has been extremely influential in the literature on well-being. See Richard, Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (New York, 1998)Google Scholar.

14 Brandt, Good and the Right, p. 13.

15 Rosati, ‘Persons, Perspectives’ Sobel, ‘Full Information Accounts’.

16 A few examples are, David, Velleman, ‘Brandt's Definition of “Good”’, Philosophical Review 97 (1988), pp. 353–71Google Scholar; Rosati, ‘Persons, Perspectives’ Sobel, ‘Full Information Accounts’.

17 One exception is Susan Babbitt, Impossible Dreams (Boulder, Co., 1996).

18 Amartya, Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford, 1987), pp. 45–6Google Scholar.

19 Sumner, Welfare, p. 162.

20 Christman, ‘Personal History’.

21 Christman, ‘Personal History’, p. 10.

22 Sumner, Welfare, p. 170.

23 John, Christman, ‘Autonomy, Self-Knowledge, and Liberal Legitimacy’, Autonomy and the Challenge to Liberalism, ed. Christman, J. and Anderson, J. (New York, 2005), p. 334Google Scholar.

24 Sumner, Welfare, p. 170; John, Christman, ‘Liberalism, Autonomy, and Self-Transformation’, Social Theory and Practice 27 (2001), pp. 185–207, at p. 203Google Scholar.

25 I find it plausible to suppose that values formed under such conditions are inauthentic. It is possible that Christman might insist that if she did not feel alienated from these values, even after reflecting on their origin, then the values are authentic. However, it is not important for me to take a stand on this issue here, since what primarily interests me is the role Christman's theory might play in a theory of welfare. Whether or not we think her values are authentic, it is plausible to assume that the woman described is not making prudentially good choices. And that is sufficient to establish that Christman's theory will not help Sumner.

26 Peter, Kramer, Listening to Prozac (New York, 1993), ch. 4Google Scholar.

27 Kramer, Listening, p. 71.

28 Sumner, Welfare, p. 170.

29 I do not mean that subjectivists should reinstate an experience requirement. Some things that add to the goodness of a life might be outside awareness. All I mean is that a subjectivist would reject a theory that says a life is good for a person even though the person who is currently living that supposedly good life neither feels good about it nor judges it to be going well.

30 For helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article I would like to thank members of the 2004 Toronto Workshop on Well-Being and Autonomy and members of the 2004–5 Faculty Fellows Seminar at Harvard University's Edmund J. Safra Center for Ethics. I would also like to thank the following individuals for particularly helpful comments and encouragement: Wayne Sumner, Connie Rosati, Jodi Halpern, Simon Keller, and Norman Daniels.