Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 4
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Hartman, Robert J. 2015. Utilitarian Moral Virtue, Admiration, and Luck. Philosophia, Vol. 43, Issue. 1, p. 77.

    MCELWEE, BRIAN 2015. The Value of the Virtues. Utilitas, Vol. 27, Issue. 01, p. 61.

    Feltz, Adam and Cokely, Edward T. 2013. Virtue or consequences: The folk against pure evaluational internalism. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 26, Issue. 5, p. 702.

    Woodcock, Scott 2013. Horror Films and the Argument from Reactive Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 16, Issue. 2, p. 309.


Against Consequentialist Theories of Virtue and Vice

  • TODD CALDER (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 June 2007

Consequentialist theories of virtue and vice, such as the theories of Jeremy Bentham and Julia Driver, characterize virtue and vice in terms of the consequential, or instrumental, properties of these character traits. There are two problems with theories of this sort. First they imply that, under the right circumstances, paradigmatic virtues, such as benevolence, are vices and paradigmatic vices, such as maliciousness, are virtues. This is conceptually problematic. Second, they say nothing about the intrinsic nature of the virtues and vices, which is less than we could hope for from a theory of virtue and vice. Thus, we have reason to reject consequentialist theories in favour of theories that characterize virtue and vice in terms of the intrinsic properties of these character traits. Aristotle and Thomas Hurka have theories this sort.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *