Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Against Equality and Priority

  • MICHAEL HUEMER (a1)
Abstract

I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y, then x is better than y; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that equality lacks intrinsic value, and that benefits given to the worse-off contribute no more to the world's value than equal-sized benefits given to the better-off.

  • View HTML
    • Send article to Kindle

      To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

      Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

      Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

      Against Equality and Priority
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Dropbox

      To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

      Against Equality and Priority
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Google Drive

      To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

      Against Equality and Priority
      Available formats
      ×
Copyright
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Robert Young , ‘Egalitarianism and Envy’, Philosophical Studies 52 (1987), pp. 261–76

Shelly Kagan , ‘The Additive Fallacy’, Ethics 99 (1988), pp. 531.

Jan Narveson Moral Problems of Population’, The Monist 57 (1973), pp. 6286

John Broome , ‘The Welfare Economics of Population’, Oxford Economic Papers 48 (1996), pp. 177–93

Charles Blackorby , Walter Bossert and David Donaldson , ‘Critical-Level Population Principles and the Repugnant Conclusion’, The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics, ed. Jesper Ryberg and Torbjorn Tännsjö (Dordrecht, 2004), pp. 4559

Thomas Hurka , ‘Value and Population Size’, Ethics 93 (1983), pp. 496507

Ted Sider , ‘Might Theory X Be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value?’, Analysis 51 (1991), pp. 265–71

Stuart Rachels , ‘Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998), pp. 7183

Larry Temkin , ‘A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (1996), pp. 175210

Bill Anglin , ‘The Repugnant Conclusion’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1977), pp. 745–54

Robin Attfield , The Ethics of Environmental Concern, 2nd edn. (Athens, Ga., 1991), pp. 127–30

Jesper Ryberg , ‘Is the Repugnant Conclusion Repugnant?’, Philosophical Papers 25 (1996), pp. 161–77

Nick Fotion , ‘Repugnant Thoughts About the Repugnant Conclusion Argument’, Contingent Future Persons, ed. Nick Fotion and Jan C. Heller (Dordrecht, 1997), pp. 8597

Chrisoula Andreou (‘Environmental Damage and the Paradox of the Self-Torturer’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2006), pp. 95108

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Utilitas
  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 3
Total number of PDF views: 29 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 201 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 25th May 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.