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  • Cited by 13
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    VESSEL, JEAN-PAUL 2016. Against Securitism, the New Breed of Actualism in Consequentialist Thought. Utilitas, Vol. 28, Issue. 02, p. 164.

    Pettit, Philip 2015. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences.

    Silva, Paul 2015. The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, p. n/a.

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    Jenkins, C.S. and Nolan, Daniel 2010. Maximising, Satisficing and Context*. Noûs, Vol. 44, Issue. 3, p. 451.

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    Portmore, Douglas W. 2008. Dual-ranking act-consequentialism. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 138, Issue. 3, p. 409.

    PORTMORE, DOUGLAS W. 2007. CONSEQUENTIALIZING MORAL THEORIES. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 88, Issue. 1, p. 39.


Against Satisficing Consequentialism

  • BEN BRADLEY (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 June 2006

The move to satisficing has been thought to help consequentialists avoid the problem of demandingness. But this is a mistake. In this article I formulate several versions of satisficing consequentialism. I show that every version is unacceptable, because every version permits agents to bring about a submaximal outcome in order to prevent a better outcome from obtaining. Some satisficers try to avoid this problem by incorporating a notion of personal sacrifice into the view. I show that these attempts are unsuccessful. I conclude that, if satisficing consequentialism is to remain a position worth considering, satisficers must show (i) that the move to satisficing is necessary to solve some problem, whether it be the demandingness problem or some other problem, and (ii) that there is a version of the view that does not permit the gratuitous prevention of goodness.

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  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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