Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 7
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Qizilbash, Mozaffar 2014. ‘Incommensurability’ and Vagueness: Is the Vagueness View Defensible?. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 17, Issue. 1, p. 141.

    Carlson, Erik 2013. Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 16, Issue. 3, p. 449.

    GUSTAFSSON, JOHAN E. 2013. Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument. Utilitas, Vol. 25, Issue. 04, p. 433.

    Constantinescu, Cristian 2012. Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 15, Issue. 1, p. 57.

    Rabinowicz, Wlodek 2009. I—Wlodek Rabinowicz: Incommensurability and Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 83, Issue. 1, p. 71.

    Espinoza, Nicolas 2008. The small improvement argument. Synthese, Vol. 165, Issue. 1, p. 127.

    Peterson, Martin 2006. Indeterminate Preferences. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 130, Issue. 2, p. 297.


Broome's Argument against Value Incomparability

  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 July 2004

John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing.

Corresponding author
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *