1 I am grateful to John Mikhail and David Wasserman for comments on an earlier draft.
2 Kamm, F. M., ‘Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 21 (1992), pp. 354–89; Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (Oxford, 2007), p. 164. Parenthetical page references in the text will be to the latter work.
3 Kamm, ‘Non-consequentialism’, p. 383.
4 Certain very abstract varieties of consequentialism surely can take it into account. I have in mind the abstract forms of consequentialism characterized in, e.g., Broome, John, Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time (Oxford, 1991), ch. 1 (under the label of ‘teleology’) and Dreier, James, ‘Structures of Normative Theories’, Monist 76 (1993), pp. 22–40. As I will shortly indicate, Kamm defines ‘consequentialism’ more narrowly than does either of these authors.
5 Following Kamm, Intricate Ethics, I will use ‘evil*’ to abbreviate ‘evil and/or the involvement of a person without his consent when foreseeably this will lead to an evil to him’. Kamm is here taking on board a suggestion from Quinn, Warren, ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect’, in his Morality and Action (Cambridge, 1993).
6 Kamm writes that ‘Nonconsequentialism is usually understood minimally as the denial that all that matters to the rightness or wrongness of acts is the goodness of the consequences of the acts. . . . Nonconsequentialism is typically described as focusing on how the greater good comes about’ (140). As I noted in n. 4, consequentialism is not always so narrowly understood.
7 Michael Otsuka's contribution to the present symposium critically discusses Kamm's chapter on state-of-mind theories.
8 Scanlon, T. M., ‘Intention and Permissibility’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 74 (2000), pp. 301–17.
9 I am assuming that the school's roof has been non-negligently maintained.
10 Thomson, Judith Jarvis, ‘The Trolley Problem’, in her Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), pp. 94–116.
11 Thomson, ‘The Trolley Problem’, p. 102; quoted in Kamm, Intricate Ethics, at p. 122 n. 5.
12 This straightening-out of Loop is implicit in John Mikhail's ‘Loop Track’ case, in his article, ‘Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future’, Trends in Cognitive Neuroscience 11 (2007), pp. 143–52. As he describes the case, the switch ‘will temporarily turn the train onto a side track’. The qualification, ‘temporarily’, suggests that it will rejoin the main track at some point. My Bypass Case just spells this out.
13 A causally necessary means? When we say that someone does something to someone ‘as a causal means’ to something, I think we are at least implying that the agent sees the harming as a non-superfluous means.
14 Of course, this was where Elizabeth Anscombe's account of intentions began: see Anscombe, G. E. M., Intention (Ithaca, NY, 1976), secs. 3–5.