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  • Cited by 4
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Hartman, Robert J. 2015. Utilitarian Moral Virtue, Admiration, and Luck. Philosophia, Vol. 43, Issue. 1, p. 77.

    Feltz, Adam and Cokely, Edward T. 2013. Virtue or consequences: The folk against pure evaluational internalism. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 26, Issue. 5, p. 702.

    Feltz, Adam and Cokely, Edward T. 2012. The Virtues of Ignorance. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 3, Issue. 3, p. 335.

    Clark, Dale L. 2009. Aesop's fox: Consequentialist virtue meets egocentric bias. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 22, Issue. 6, p. 727.


Driver's Virtues

  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 March 2004

Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue offers a theory of virtue and the virtues without being an instance of virtue ethics. It presents a consequentialist challenge to recent virtue ethics, but its positive views – and especially its interesting examples – have great significance in their own right. Driver's defence of ‘virtues of ignorance’ has force despite all the challenges to it that have been mounted over the years. But there are also examples differing from those Driver has mentioned that favour the idea of such virtues. Perhaps certain virtues of religious faith and the virtue necessary for dealing as best one can with moral dilemmas both require ignorance. However, some of the examples Driver does discuss raise the question whether virtue status is based solely on consequences, rather than perhaps having (in addition) a motivational component.

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  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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