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Leaving Agent-Relative Value Behind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2020

Christa M. Johnson Open the ORCID record for Christa M. Johnson [Opens in a new window]
Christa M. Johnson*
Affiliation:
California State University
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: christa.johnson@csulb.edu
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Abstract

Commonsense morality seems to feature both agent-neutral and agent-relative elements. For a long time, the core debate between consequentialists and deontologists was which of these features should take centerstage. With the introduction of the consequentializing project and agent-relative value, however, agent-neutrality has been left behind. While I likewise favor an agent-relative view, agent-neutral views capture important features of commonsense morality.

This article investigates whether an agent-relative view can maintain what is attractive about typical agent-neutral views. In particular, I argue that the agent-relative reasons-wielding deontologist is ultimately able to capture those features ordinarily associated with agent-neutral views, while the agent-relative value wielding consequentialist is left with a dilemma. The consequentializer either succumbs to the concerns of her agent-neutral opponents or else abandons the distinctive and attractive features of her view. Either way, I conclude that agent-relative value is best left behind.

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Article
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Utilitas , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 53 - 67
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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