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  • Cited by 9
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2016. Money Pumps, Incompleteness, and Indeterminacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 92, Issue. 1, p. 60.

    Peterson, Martin 2016. Do pragmatic arguments show too much?. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6, Issue. 2, p. 165.

    HALSTEAD, JOHN 2015. The Impotence of the Value Pump. Utilitas, Vol. 27, Issue. 02, p. 195.

    Peterson, Martin 2015. Prospectism and the weak money pump argument. Theory and Decision, Vol. 78, Issue. 3, p. 451.

    Rossi, Mauro 2014. Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences. Les ateliers de l'éthique, Vol. 9, Issue. 2, p. 82.

    Fröding, Barbro and Peterson, Martin 2012. Virtuous Choice and Parity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 15, Issue. 1, p. 71.

    Rabinowicz, Wlodek 2012. VALUE RELATIONS REVISITED. Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 28, Issue. 02, p. 133.

    STEGLICH-PETERSEN, ASBJØRN 2012. Clumps and Pumps: Clumpiness, Resolution and Rational Choice. Utilitas, Vol. 24, Issue. 01, p. 118.

    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2010. A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences. Dialectica, Vol. 64, Issue. 2, p. 251.


Parity, Clumpiness and Rational Choice

  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 December 2007

Some philosophers believe that two objects of value can be ‘roughly equal’, or ‘on a par’, or belong to the same ‘clump’ of value in a sense that is fundamentally different from that in which some objects are ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, or ‘equally as good as’ others. This article shows that if two objects are on a par, or belong to the same clump, then an agent accepting a few plausible premises can be exploited in a money-pump. The central premise of the argument is that value is choice-guiding. If one object is more valuable than another, then it is not permitted to choose the less valuable object; and if two objects are equally valuable it is permitted to choose either of them; and if two objects are on a par or belong to the same clump it is also permitted to choose either of them.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Ruth Chang , ‘The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics 112 (2002), pp. 659–88

Nien-He Hsieh , ‘Equality, Clumpiness and Incomparability’, Utilitas 17 (2005), p. 184

Frederick Schick , ‘Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps’, The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), p. 117

Edward F. McClennen , Rationality and Dynamic Choice (Cambridge, 1990)

Wlodek Rabinowicz , ‘Money Pump with Foresight’, Imperceptible Harms and Benefits, ed. Michael J. Almeida (Dordrecht, 2000), pp. 123–54

Ruth Chang , ‘Parity, Interval Value, and Choice’, Ethics 115 (2005), pp. 346–7

Amartya Sen , ‘Internal Consistency of Choice’, Econometrica 61 (1993), pp. 495521

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  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
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