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  • Cited by 3
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Bramble, Ben 2013. The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 162, Issue. 2, p. 201.

    Tanyi, Attila 2011. Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 14, Issue. 1, p. 101.

    CRISP, Roger 2006. Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 73, Issue. 3, p. 619.


Pleasure as a Mental State

  • David Sobel (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 January 2009

Shelly Kagan and Leonard Katz have offered versions of hedonism that aspire to occupy a middle position between the view that pleasure is a unitary sensation and the view that pleasure is, as Sidgwick put it, desirable consciousness. Thus they hope to offer a hedonistic account of well-being that does not mistakenly suppose that pleasure is a special kind of tingle, yet to offer a sharp alternative to desire-based accounts. I argue that they have not identified a coherent middle position.

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  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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