1 The theorem of the second best is often called ‘the general theory of second best’. The theorem was first formalized by Lipsey, R. G. and Lancaster, K. J. in ‘The General Theory of Second Best’, Review of Economic Studies, xxv (1956).
2 Cf. Boadway, Robin, ‘The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economies’, EPRU Working Papers, 1995 (Copenhagen).
3 See e.g. Guesnerie, Roger, ‘General Statements on Second Best Pareto Optimality’, Journal of Mathematical Economics, x (1979); Kemp, Murray C. and Wan, Henry Y. Jr, ‘The Comparison of Second-Best Equilibria: The Case of Customs Unions’, Journal of Economics, Suppl. Vol. v (1986); Blackorby, Charles, ‘Economic Policy in a Second Best Environment’, Canadian Journal of Economics, XXIII (1990); Blackorby, Charles, Davidson, Russell and Schworm, William, ‘The Validity of Piecemeal Second-Best Policy’, Journal of Public Economics, xlvi (1991); Bovenberg, A. Lans and van der Ploeg, Frederick, Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World, Milan, 1993; Lahiri, Sajal and Raimondes, Pascalis, Quotas, Partial Rent Retention and The Second Best, Aarhus, 1993; Beetsma, Roel and Bovenberg, A. Lans, ‘Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in a Second-Best World’, Discussion Paper Series (1995), Tilburg; Orosel, Gerhard O. and Schoeb, Ronnie, ‘Internalizing Externalities in Second-Best Tax Systems’, CES Working Papers (1995), Munich; Baranzini, Andrea, Second-Best Environmental Policy and Nonconvexities, Geneva, 1996; Gaynor, Martin, Haas-Wilson, Deborah and Vogt, William B., ‘Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition and the Second Best in Health Care’, NBER Working Papers (1998), Cambridge; Aizerman, Joshua, ‘Capital Mobility in a Second Best World’, NBER Working Papers (1998), Cambridge; Goulder, Lawrence H. et al. , ‘The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second Best Setting’, NBER Working Papers (1998), Cambridge.
4 Margalit, Avishai, ‘Ideals and Second Best’, Philosophy for Education, ed. Fox, S., Jerusalem, 1983, esp. p. 77. See also Seymour Fox, ‘Theory into Practice (In Education)’, Philosophy for Education.
5 For a discussion on character traits and virtues, see e.g. Foot, Philippa, Virtues and Vices, Oxford, 1978, ch. 1.
6 More and more scholars are actively engaged in studying areas where legal and economic concerns interface, and the leading law schools have at least one full-time economist as a member of the law faculty. For a discussion, see e.g. Hirsch, Werner Z., Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis, New York, 1979; Oliver, John MacDonald, Law and Economics, London, 1980; Samuels, Warren J. and Schmid, A. Allan (ed.), Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective The Hague, 1981; Jones, Kelvin, Law and Economy: The Legal Regulation of Corporate Capital, London, 1982; Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd edn., Boston, 1986; Cooter, Robert and Ulen, Thomas, Law and Economics, Glenview, 1988; Mercudo, Nicholas (ed.), Law and Economics, Dordrecht, 1989.
7 Harrison, Jeffrey L., Law and Economics in a Nutshell, St Paul, 1995, pp. 53–5. See also Markovits, Richard S., ‘A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-than-Second-Best World’, Wisconsin Law Review (1975); Guesnerie, Roger and Roberts, K., ‘Minimum Wage Legislation as a Second Best Policy’, European Economic Review, xxxi (1987); Gollier, Christian and Schlesinger, Harris, ‘Second-Best Insurance Contract Design in an Incomplete Market’, CORE Discussion Papers (1992), Louvainla-Neuve; Monahan, George E. and Vemuri, Vijay, ‘Monotone Second-Best Optimal Contracts’, Research Working Papers (1994), Urbana-Champaign; Ishiguro, Shingo, ‘Incomplete Contracts and Breach Remedies’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, c1v (1999).
8 Coram, Bruce Talbot, ‘Second Best Theories and the Implications for Institutional Design’, The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Goodin, R., New York, 1996. See also Goodin, Robert, ‘Political Ideals and Political Practice’, British Journal of Political Science, xxv (1995). For a discussion on the role of ideals in institutional design, see e.g. van der Burg, Wibren, ‘The Morality of Aspiration’, Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design, ed. Witteveen, W. J. and van der Burg, W., Amsterdam, 1999.
9 This is Goodin's example; ibid., 53.
10 Among others, Beitz, Charles evaluates the argument in his ‘Democracy in Developing Societies’, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits, ed. Brown, P. G. and Shue, H., Totowa, 1981.
11 See e.g. Brink, David, ‘Moral Conflict and its Structure’, Philosophical Review, ciii (1994).
12 Pietroski, Paul M., ‘Executing the Second Best Option’, Analysis, liv (1994). See also Goldman, Holly S., ‘Doing the Best One Can’, Values and Morals, ed. Goldman, A. I. and Kim, J., Dordrecht, 1978; Jackson, Frank and Pargetter, Robert, ‘Oughts, Options, and Actualism’, Philosophical Review, xcv (1986).
13 Bohman, James, ‘The Coming Age of Deliberative Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy, vi (1998), esp. 417.
14 Ackerman, Bruce A., ‘What Is Neutral about Neutrality?’, Ethics, xciii (1983), esp. 385.
15 Streissler, Erich and Neudeck, Werner, ‘Are there Intellectual Precursors to the Idea of Second Best Optimization?’, Journal of Economics, suppl. vol., v (1986), esp. 227. For a history of the second best, see also Guesnerie, Roger, ‘The Genealogy of Modern Theoretical Public Economics: From First Best to Second Best’, DELTA Working Papers (1994), Paris; cf. Boadway.
16 See e.g. Margalit, 77.
17 Here I take it as self-evident that weakness of will is possible.
18 Føllesdal, Andreas, Contractualism and Bargaining, Oslo. 1993, p. 81. Cf. Margalit, 77 f.
19 Sher, George, Approximate Justice: Studies in Non-Ideal Theory, Lanham, 1997, p. 1.
20 Rawls, JohnA Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1972, p. 245 (italics added). Cf. Feinberg, Joel, ‘Duty and Obligation in the Non-Ideal World’, in his Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton, 1980, esp. pp. 256 f.
21 See e.g. Mishan, E. J., ‘Second Thoughts on Second Best’, Oxford Economic Papers, new series, xiv (1962).
22 For such proof, see e.g. Rowley, Charles K. and Peacock, Alan T., Welfare Economics: A Liberal Restatement, London, 1975; Ng, Yew-Kwang, Welfare Economics, London, 1979, ch. 9.
23 Cf. Goodin, , ‘Political Ideals and Political Practice’, 53n.
24 If an agent thinks that the most effective way to reach social justice is to promote civil liberties and construct a welfare safety net, then it does not matter whether we ask the agent to ‘promote civil liberties and construct a welfare safety net’ or to ‘promote social justice in the most effective way’.
25 Yes, there are people who think that socialism may have value in and for itself.
26 Certain theoretical models (in decision theory) deny all interaction effects and interdependence between the various strategies and ideals that different agents happen to hold. However, while these models may have certain mathematical advantages in comparison to models that allow for dependence, perhaps they must nonetheless be rejected, since representations based on them seem to be substantively misleading. Again, cf. Goodin, , ‘Political Ideals and Political Practice’, 52. For an account of ‘multiple objectives’, see Keeney, Ralph L. and Raiffa, Howard, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs, Cambridge, 1993.
27 See e.g. Sen, Amartya, On Ethics & Economics, Oxford, 1987, esp. ch. 2; Kleindorfer, Paul R., Kunreuther, Howard C. and Schoemaker, Paul J. H., Decision Sciences: An Integrative Perspective, Cambridge, 1993; Larmore, Charles E., Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge, 1987, esp. ch. 6.
28 See e.g. Cohen, L. Jonathan, ‘Verisimilitude and Legisimilitude’, What is Closer-tothe-Truth?, ed. Kuipers, T. A. F., Amsterdam, 1987.
30 For a discussion, see Burg, Wibren van der, ‘The Importance of Ideals’, Journal of Value Inquiry, xxxi (1997).
31 I would like to thank Charlotte Beauchamp, Wibren van der Burg, Robert E. Goodin, Bo Pettersson, Mikko Wennberg and the editor of Utilitas and a referee for helpful discussion and written comments on an earlier version of this article, and I am grateful to the European University Institute (TMR Programme) for giving me financial support during my stay in Florence where this article was written.