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  • Cited by 4
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Hartman, Robert J. 2015. Utilitarian Moral Virtue, Admiration, and Luck. Philosophia, Vol. 43, Issue. 1, p. 77.

    Feltz, Adam and Cokely, Edward T. 2013. Virtue or consequences: The folk against pure evaluational internalism. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 26, Issue. 5, p. 702.

    Feltz, Adam and Cokely, Edward T. 2012. The Virtues of Ignorance. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 3, Issue. 3, p. 335.

    Clark, Dale L. 2009. Aesop's fox: Consequentialist virtue meets egocentric bias. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 22, Issue. 6, p. 727.


Response to my Critics

  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 March 2004

This essay is a rejoinder to comments on Uneasy Virtue made by Onora O'Neill, John Skorupski, and Michael Slote in this issue. In Uneasy Virtue I presented criticisms of traditional virtue theory. I also presented an alternative – a consequentialist account of virtue, one which is a form of ‘pure evaluational externalism’. This type of theory holds that the moral quality of character traits is determined by factors external to agency (e.g. consequences). All three commentators took exception to this account. Therefore, the bulk of my response focuses on defending the externalist account of virtue presented in the final chapters of Uneasy Virtue.

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  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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