1 See De Sousa, R., The Rationality of Emotion, Cambridge, Mass., 1990; Wollheim, R., On the Emotions, New Haven, Conn., 1999; Goldie, P., The Emotions. A Philosophical Exploration, Oxford, 2000.
2 See Blum, L., Moral Perception and Particularity, Cambridge, 1994; Stocker, M., Valuing Emotions, Cambridge, 1996.
3 Greenspan, P., Emotions and Reasons, London, 1988; Audi, R., , R., ‘Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, i (1998); ed. Frijda, N. H., Manstead, A. S. R., and Ben, S., Emotions and Beliefs. How Feelings Influence Thought, Cambridge, 2000.
4 Gibbard, A., Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, Mass., 1990, pp. 253 f.
5 Skorupski, J., Ethical Explorations, Oxford, 2000.
8 Such a response-dependence account need not be a version of realism, as in the case of Skorupski's approach it certainly is not. Response-dependence accounts are sometimes associated with dispositionalism which is often presented as a form of valuerealism. Response-dependence accounts can be distinguished from dispositionalist ones, however, and dispositionalism can also be understood in irrealist terms.
9 Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, ch. 5, para. 14, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. Robson, J. M., Toronto, 1963 1991, x. 246.
11 Kant, I., Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Gregor, Mary J., Cambridge Edition of the Works of lmmanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, Cambridge, 1996, § 77. (All references to Kant are to pages in the Prussian Academy edition.)
13 I thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to make this analogy explicit.
15 Skorupski, pp. 152 f. James on ‘cutting dead’ is illustrated in a footnote with the following citation: ‘No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof.’ James, William, The Principles of Psychology, London, 1890, p. 293.
17 Pettit, Philip, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics, New York and Oxford, 1995, p. 331.
31 Korsgaard, C. M., The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge, 1996, p. 99; see also ‘Reply’, p. 237.
32 Kant, I., Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Gregor, Mary J., Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, Cambridge, 1996, p. 435.
35 I would like to thank John Skorupski and the members of the research group in ethics of Erasmus University Rotterdam for their oral and written comments on earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful to an anonymous reference of this journal who urged me to clarify and tighten my argument at various points.