Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 6
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    SCHMIDT, ANDREAS T. 2016. Being Good by Doing Good: Goodness and the Evaluation of Persons. Utilitas, p. 1.

    Hartman, Robert J. 2015. Utilitarian Moral Virtue, Admiration, and Luck. Philosophia, Vol. 43, Issue. 1, p. 77.

    Feltz, Adam and Cokely, Edward T. 2013. Virtue or consequences: The folk against pure evaluational internalism. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 26, Issue. 5, p. 702.

    Pettigrove, Glen 2011. Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?. The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 15, Issue. 3, p. 191.

    Peterson, Martin 2010. A Royal Road to Consequentialism?. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 13, Issue. 2, p. 153.

    Clark, Dale L. 2009. Aesop's fox: Consequentialist virtue meets egocentric bias. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 22, Issue. 6, p. 727.


Virtue Consequentialism

  • BEN BRADLEY (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 November 2005

Virtue consequentialism has been held by many prominent philosophers, but has never been properly formulated. I criticize Julia Driver's formulation of virtue consequentialism and offer an alternative. I maintain that according to the best version of virtue consequentialism, attributions of virtue are really disguised comparisons between two character traits, and the consequences of a trait in non-actual circumstances may affect its actual status as a virtue or vice. Such a view best enables the consequentialist to account for moral luck, unexemplified virtues, and virtues and vices involving the prevention of goodness and badness.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *