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Wouldn't It Be Nice If p, Therefore, p (for a moral p)

  • DAVID ENOCH (a1)

Instances of the argument-schema ‘Wouldn't it be nice if p, therefore, p’ are usually fallacious, but for a moral p they are not clearly as bad as they are elsewhere. I offer a diagnosis of this phenomenon, arguing that in some conditions – specified in terms of a logical property of the relevant normative operator – such arguments are actually valid (for a moral p).

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T. Nagel , ‘Personal Rights and Public Space’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 24.2 (1995), pp. 83107

M. Urban-Walker , ‘Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency’, Metaphilosophy 22 (1991), pp. 1427

D. McNaughton , and P. Rawling , ‘On Defending Deontology’, Ratio 11.1 (1998), pp. 51–2

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  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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