MY personal collection of World Politics begins with the January 1957 issue: volume 9, number 2. It skips to October 1964 and is complete from then on. When I left Princeton to become Northwestern University's fifteenth president, I gave away most of my professional library, envisioning all too accurately the demands of a new life. I never considered parting with any copies of World Politics, however. Perhaps in part this sense of possession came from sentiment arising from my long and happy association with this journal. I think, however, that it stemmed mostly from a recognition that World Politics has been the leading journal of international affairs and comparative studies from its founding until now.

The departure of the French Socialists from the government early in 1950, even though they returned in a few months, marked the end of a stage of postwar history in Europe. For the first time since liberation France was governed by a coalition in which the Socialists were no longer represented. At the same time the Socialists were in the opposition in Belgiumand Western Germany as well and limited to little influence upon the Italian and Swiss governments. Austria, Great Britain, and Scandinavia were the only countries in which the Socialists are strongly represented in their governments. Roughly speaking then, Europe is divided into three zones according to the degree of power of democratic socialism: Eastern Europe—bordered on the West by a line running from Trieste to Lübeck—where the democratic Socialist parties have been absorbed by the Communist parties; Northwestern Europe—Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark)—under predominant Socialist influence; and the rest of Continental Europe where the the Socialists are a more or less powerful opposition group. Spain and Portugal in the South and Greece and Turkey in the Southeast are left outside ofthe scope of our study owing to the peculiar and non-democratic structure of these countries.

For roughly a century—if we take the years from Fourier and Bentham to the triumph of Freud—the study of politics concerned itself mainly with institutions. Fourier, in plotting a Utopia, took his individuals just as they were, expecting by the perfection of social arrangements to turn individual weakness and vice into virtues. Bentham also by-passed the infinite problem of the individual (this was relegated to religion) and concentrated on the finite reform of institutions; the greatest happiness of the greatest number was never the principle of an individual psychology, although since 1832 Bentham's formula has grown ironically appropriate as the individual in a mass society has become, characteristically, a quantity.

Until recently, our best studies ofpoint of departure the systemicthe developinglevel of analysis—theareas tookna- as tional parties,1 the state institutions,2 the cosmopolitan central elites,3the overarching economic and communications networks4—but the particular assumptions and inevitable shortcomings of this approach led to a call for more attention to subsystem levels of analysis. By now it has become commonplace to note the need for studies of politics at the local level to gain a more intimate understanding of the way in which processes such as political development and political integration take place in the villages and small towns of the Third World's agrarian hinterland.

For a variety of reasons, explanations of Cuban foreign policy lack in persuasiveness. Some authors adopt a kitchen-sink approach in which any number of factors are adduced to explain Cuban behavior, but they do not pay adequate attention to how these various pieces fit together into a coherent whole. Other writers concentrate on a single factor to explain Cuba's globalism, but in the process load more explanatory power than it can bear onto a sole variable. Still others have a penchant for prescribing proper foreign policy for the United States, with the result that the study of Cuban policy in its own terms is often shortchanged. Only by studying the character, world view, and charismatic influence of Fidel Castro can a center of gravity be found for the study of Cuban foreign policy.

A consensus seems to have emerged among government decision-makers, military strategists, and scholars that an invulnerable nuclear retaliatory capability is a national goal of high priority, if not top priority. The Kennedy Administration, to a much greater degree than its predecessor, has given indication that the rationale and ingredients of a “second-strike” nuclear strategy are understood and being concretely programmed into defense planning. The agreed-upon goal is for the United States to be able to launch a devastating retaliatory nuclear attack against the enemy regardless of the size of the enemy's first strike against the United States. “As a power which will never strike first,” explained President Kennedy in his March 28 defense budget message, “our hopes for anything close to an absolute deterrent must rest on weapons which come from hidden, moving, or invulnerable bases which will not be wiped out by surprise attack. A retaliatory capability based on adequate numbers of these weapons would deter any aggressor from launching or even threatening an attack—an attack he knew could not find or destroy enough of our force to prevent his own destruction.”

There have been repeated generalizations that support of the United Nations is a cornerstone of United States foreign policy. On February 22, 1950, the President, in a major address dealing with foreign policy, indicated that the United Nations was the proper forum in which to seek an international agreement for the control of atomic weapons. In so doing he reaffirmed a previous statement of policy of “unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies,” the first of the “four points” of his inaugural address of January 1949. The President in this fashion sought to reassure the public that he had confidence in the United Nations and that he proposed to utilize its machinery to the full in the conduct of United States foreign relations.

Studies of state institutions in socialist countries demonstrate the inadequacy of current paradigms of the state. Political reforms within these states—like those examined in the works on Yugoslavia that are under review—present opportunities to develop new approaches. Arguments about the democratizing pressures of economic reform or the attempts to legitimize the state by resolving the national question are contrasted to a view of the state as primarily managing its international boundary. Leaders respond to changes in foreign finance, trade, and security with policy shifts that are institutionalized by altering budgetary jurisdictions and rules about spending decisions in both state and economy. The ensuing political conflicts are bounded by the leaders' Marxian project to socialize the state as well as capital, in effect reducing the scope of the federal budget.

Whether we articulate them or not, the assumptions that we make concerning the future development of the Soviet system are fundamental to our thinking about American foreign policy. The objectives toward which we can reasonably direct our efforts, the philosophy of our situation, are in a very large measure a function of the image we have in our minds of the changes we discern or anticipate in the character of the society and the government of the Russian people.

In the underdeveloped countries—where live most of the world's people—the hope for economic progress now flames with great intensity. The new international capital facilities of the postwar period, the new programs for sharing modern science and technology, the new interest of wealthy lands in progress in the poor countries—all these present the latter with an opportunity to be rid of the poverty and squalor of their material existence. Their eyes naturally turn to the more developed countries for capital and technical knowledge, and for ideas.

This article deals with bomber disarmament as a partial measure which might be agreed upon by the two major powers in the absence of more general progress toward disarmament. However, much of it is relevant to the suggestion that bomber disarmament be linked to the U.S. proposal for a freeze on procurement of strategic weapons. The relationship between a strategic freeze and bomber disarmament is very close.

A Wave of rising expectations has engulfed the underdeveloped areas of the world, and in its wake there remains an intense desire for economic advancement and national recognition. Until recent years the relatively luxurious level of living in the West, particularly in the United States, served as a natural focal point in the search for a pattern of economic life that would lead to growth in these areas. Since World War II, and particularly since about 1955, when the USSR adopted a stepped-up “trade and aid” program among the less-developed areas, increasing attention has been directed to the Soviet pattern of growth and the Soviet answer to “imperialism.”

Time was when a nation, at the pinnacle of its might, asked itself the question: “In the relation of states, what is the right thing, which ought to be done, and what is the wrong thing, which ought not to be done?” It was Spain, a worldconquering power, which thus approached problems of policy in the light of rational choice and raised a crop of great and lucid minds who laid the foundations for what later became international law. But the particular principles to which these men looked for their answers have been proved inadequate, first in the practice of statesmen and then in the theory of jurists. Hopes that international relations could be ordered by the relatively simple moral rules which we recognize in the organized societies of men have been repeatedly and cruelly disappointed. The failure of this one great historic attempt to apply rational concepts to international relations has evidently made us despair of any possibility even of different rational systems in this field.

How stable, how deep, or how genuine is German democracy? The only answers we can provide at present are almost embarrassingly simple; but if instead of trying to arrive at answers we go into the further questions that the questions above raise, the picture becomes more complex—and more interesting.

Since World War II, a number of advances have been made in theories of revolution and political change. One approach not yet utilized is moral development theory, which adds a normative dimension to existing structural and psychological concepts. In this paper, moral development variables are related to the positive and negative rights that modern men seek within the dominance structures in which they live. Dominance patterns may become perverted due to social change and the amoral behavior of dominant individuals. Political movements characterized by demands for positive or negative rights arise as a reaction to these perversions. Whether change is restorative, accommodative, or transformative depends upon the subsequent patterns of interaction among individuals who are amoral, allegiant, or morally mature.