The burgeoning China–Africa debates often fail to consider questions of African agency and, in particular, the role played by non-state actors (NSAs)—such as civil society organizations (CSOs), the media, and local groups—to give greater voice to African agency in Sino–African relations (SRA). Drawing on qualitative methods (i.e., interviews and content analysis), this study examines the relationship and focuses primarily on the case of Ghana to investigate how these NSAs engage, negotiate, influence, and resist Chinese actors’ involvement in Africa. It answers the question: “To what extent do NSAs (i.e., CSOs, the media, and local groups) exert agency in Sino–Ghana relations?”
The study focuses on events that occurred between 2005 and 2019. In addition to several events, two key cases that attracted local and international outcry are considered: (1) the Bui Hydroelectric Dam construction and the Ghanaian laborers; and (2) Chinese involvement in “galamsey” (i.e., illegal mining) in Ghana. The regime theory (RT), which underpins the analysis, views NSAs as regimes that regulate, challenge, and monitor interstate (and/or non-state) engagements to ensure that states’ laws and sovereignty are not violated (Bradford Reference Bradford2007).
Whereas prolific articles continue to debate the discourse about contemporary SAR, the question of whether Africa has agency receives less focus except for the pessimistic accounts that posit a passive, inept relationship—with Africa on the receiving end (Halper Reference Halper2010). Agency in the context of this study is the capacity of governments, local and international institutions, CSOs, and individual players to exercise influence over foreign entities to maximize value and achieve a set of goals (Coffie and Tiky Reference Coffie and Tiky2021). “A person, [group] or thing that wields power or achieves a particular goal is referred to as an agent” (Nunoo and Adu-Boateng Reference Nunoo and Adu-Boateng2022, 401).
Notably, Sino–African engagement predominantly occurs at the governmental level. The role and influence of NSAs largely have been overlooked and underexplored. Yet, as noted by Aidoo (Reference Aidoo2016), the relationship involves different actors, including both states and non-state thespians (i.e., organizations, private and public enterprises, individuals, and groups) that impact such engagements in diverse ways. Aidoo’s observation further makes this study that focuses on the role of these NSAs in the SAR imperative.
NSAs are non-sovereign institutions and organizations but they possess substantial power at the local and, in some cases, the international levels (National Intelligence Council 2007). Wijninga et al. (Reference Wijninga, Oosterveld, Galdiga, Marten, van Esch, Bekkers, De Spiegeleire and Sweijs2014) added that NSAs include powerful individuals such as oligarchs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, lobby groups, the media, multinational corporations, terrorist organizations, international crime syndicates, and organized ethnic minorities. In this study, NSAs are operationalized as CSOs (including NGOs and labor unions), local communities, individuals, and the media, which possess the ability to influence Sino–Ghana relations at both the local and state levels.
Ghana and China have enjoyed positive diplomatic and economic relations. In the post-independence era, the two countries’ relations have progressed beyond political ideology to include economic cooperation (Aidoo Reference Aidoo2016). This largely cements the win-win policy espoused in SAR (Hanauer and Morris Reference Hanauer and Morris2014). However, in Ghana, NSAs such as CSOs, local communities, individuals, and the media often accuse China of unfair competition that potentially disrupts local businesses and the national economy as a whole. Ghana was one of the first African countries to create diplomatic relations with China in the early 1960s. Ghana joined the ranks of oil-producing countries in Africa and has a trade deficit with China; it also is a recipient of foreign aid. Hence, Ghana becomes a compelling case for assessing the viability of African states to exert agency in negotiations and other types of engagement with the Chinese.
This study argues contrary to the pessimist view that suggests lack of agency in SAR by showing how NSAs in Ghana constantly monitor the activities of Chinese people to ensure that state sovereignty is not violated. These NSAs persistently encourage the Ghanaian government to act to preserve Ghana’s interests and sovereignty and to prevent the deterioration of Ghana–China relations (GCR).
RT focuses on the function of regimes to reduce global anarchy and resolve several collective-action issues among nations (Bradford Reference Bradford2007). RT emerged as a counterargument to the realist approach to international relations (IR). The realist focus on state power and interest was considered by regime theorists to be overly narrow, highlighting common interests shared by all states and their rising interdependence (Bradford Reference Bradford2007).
RT is related to neoliberal institutionalism, which is based on the view that regimes are critical in fostering international cooperation and restricting the conduct of states (Bradford Reference Bradford2007). Regimes were established to reduce anarchy in IR and, as a result, to enable cooperation among states and other possible actors. In the IR literature, RT is frequently mentioned interchangeably with the terms “institutionalism” and “neoliberal institutionalism.” There are several meanings of the term “regime”; however, Stephen Krasner’s model developed in the 1980s has become the de facto standard: “systems of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given sector of international relations” (Little 2001, 373–74; cited in Stoyanov Reference Stoyanov2012). According to Krasner, a regime unifies expectations, defines behavioral standards, and fosters a broad sense of obligation. Regimes help states and other prospective actors to cooperate by reducing the anarchy that otherwise would rule in international affairs (Bradford Reference Bradford2007).
RT contends that states are the primary actors in international politics. States are assumed to be “rational,” “unitary” actors seeking to pursue their “national self-interest.” Cooperation, conversely, occurs when states adapt their policies in circumstances that present both competing and mutual interests. States contemplate the long-term effects of their current activities and take a long-term approach to their interactions with other countries (Bradford Reference Bradford2007).
Power is distributed across several diverse agents, including governments, international organizations, and multinational corporations, working as inferred coalitions with comparable considerations of the procedures and desired results (Verbeek Reference Verbeek2011). States have long been regarded as the building blocks of regimes. However, recent studies accept that regimes comprising NGOs or individuals also can direct and regulate the conduct of states and diverse non-state players (i.e., firms, groups, and individuals) (Bradford Reference Bradford2007). According to this study, the previous assumption made by Bradford allows NSAs such as the media, CSOs, and individuals to affect bilateral GCR.
METHODOLOGY
This study was conducted using the triangulation method. Primary data were gathered from policy documents and in-depth interviews with relevant academics and actors from the business community—especially the Ghana Union of Traders Association (GUTA) and the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GNCCI); CSOs (including NGOs); and opinion leaders from various communities in Ghana. Secondary data were gathered from books, journal articles, newspapers, and Internet sources. The study explored several cases on China–Africa relations—including the Bui Hydroelectric Dam construction and Ghanaian laborers; Chinese involvement in galamsey and resistance from NSAs; GUTA and the Chinese in the informal trading sector; and the Sinohydro–Atewa Forest deal—and focused on a detailed analysis of two cases to establish elements of both agency and actors involved in exerting such agency. These two cases were selected because they were characterized by local, national, and international concerns.
The study involved a total of 12 respondents. A qualitative study requires only five to 25 respondents to achieve saturation (Creswell and Poth Reference Creswell and Poth2016). Kuzel (Reference Kuzel1992) suggested six to eight and/or 12 to 20. “Saturation” refers to the condition in which no further data are required or thought to be necessary. The interviews were conducted between October 15, 2022, and October 25, 2023. The recorded data were transcribed verbatim and arranged by themes, such as the role of NSAs as agents in GCR and the effectiveness of NSAs in prompting government agency. The themes also were guided by the two cases: (1) the Bui Hydroelectric Dam construction and Ghanaian laborers; and (2) Chinese involvement in galamsey and resistance from NSAs. The thematic and descriptive analytical methods were used for analysis and presentation of the results (Nunoo Reference Nunoo2024).
Respondents’ anonymity was respected and the study followed the standards established in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki (i.e., a set of ethical principles for medical research involving humans) and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents the two cases and analyzes them based on the data gathered.
Case Selection
The study explored several cases but focused on only two key cases: the Bui Hydroelectric Dam construction in Ghana and Chinese involvement in galamsey in Ghana. These cases were selected because they were characterized by legal, diplomatic, and international attention as well as national outcry.
Case 1: Bui Hydroelectric Dam Construction
The Bui Hydroelectric Dam is one of the major projects funded by China in Ghana. It is situated on the Black Volta River, which forms the border between “the Savannah and Bono regions” (Bui Power Authority Reference Authority2024a). The project’s goal was to provide a source of electricity for remote communities around the border region. Unfortunately, the project experienced setbacks because Ghana’s partners, including the World Bank, declined to finance it. The Chinese government expressed interest in the project in 2005–2006 and Sinohydro—a Chinese state-owned company—agreed to build the dam.
In 2007, the BPA Act (Act 740) was passed by the Parliament of Ghana, which established the Bui Power Authority (BPA). The BPA plans, executes, and manages the Bui Hydroelectric Dam project (Bui Power Authority Reference Authority2024b). Sinohydro commenced construction of the dam in 2009 and the entire project was commissioned on December 19, 2013, with a capacity of 400 megawatts. Its operations, however, were not without labor–management frictions, described in subsequent sections.
Case 2: Chinese Involvement in Ghana’s Mining Sector
Chinese involvement in the Ghanaian mining sector has increased significantly since the early 2000s. The involvement in this sector has resulted in confrontation with state actors and NSAs. For instance, in 2012, Chinese miners in Ghana fired warning shots at local residents who were protesting their presence in the community. Some of the furious youth retaliated by returning fire. In May 2013, a Chinese teenager reportedly was killed during a police raid; two local miners also were shot dead, purportedly by Chinese miners.
Following incessant protests by NSAs, since June 2013, the Ghana Immigration Service has deported more than 4,000 illegal Chinese miners operating in different parts of the country (Hirsch Reference Hirsch2013). A specific case in the mining sector occurred on July 20, 2012, in the Ghanaian local village of Manso-Nsiena; the subsequent actions taken by NSAs and the state are discussed in another section.
The Bui Hydroelectric Dam Construction and Ghanaian Laborers
In a 2009 report, the African Labour Research Network and the Labour Research and Policy Institute of the Ghana Trades Union Congress (TUC) voiced their concerns regarding the Sinohydro labor situation at the Bui Hydroelectric Dam construction site.
Sinohydro employed the majority of Ghanaian workers on an informal contractual basis and without any formal legal contracts. As a result, job security was nonexistent and benefits were minimal. Threats and victimization were used by the Chinese employers as anti-union strategies. Sinohydro’s conduct clearly violated the Ghanaian Constitution and other laws. According to Section 24 (3) of the Ghanaian Constitution, “every worker has the right to create or join a trade union of his (or her) choice for the promotion of his(/her) economic and social interests.” Furthermore, workers have the right to create or join unions under Section 70 (1) of Labor Act 651. Labor disputes arose frequently due to the project’s lack of regard for employees’ rights, thereby attracting significantly more media attention than the project’s economic value.
Workers at the Bui Hydroelectric Dam construction site began pressuring for the ability to organize a union in mid-2008. Two public protests were held by the workers: (1) in response to Chinese management’s indifference to the fate of three employees who drowned in the river where the dam was being constructed; and (2) in response to an unjust and discriminatory increase in wages for mechanics (Baah and Jauch Reference Baah and Jauch2009).
The Ghana TUC and BPA both came out in support of the workers. Ultimately, the BPA requested that Sinohydro management allow the workers to organize a union. These demands and efforts of the laborers led to the formation of a union in 2009, which is associated with the TUC’s Construction and Building Materials Workers Union (CBMWU). Sinohydro and the CBMWU signed a Collective Agreement (Ampratwum et al. 2013, cited in Odoom Reference Odoom2016). As noted by Participant 10:
[T]his was a clear example where Ghanaian workers and their unions challenged their Chinese management or employers—and it’s a big thing. (October 15, 2023)
Communications involving dismissals, warnings, and contract abrogation were copied to TUC representatives and posted on the construction site’s information board. Ultimately, peace was restored between the workers and the management.
Chinese Involvement in Galamsey and Resistance from Non-State Actors
Anti-galamsey actions by the Ghanaian government began in 2013 in response to mounting public pressure to address the widespread involvement of Chinese migrants in these operations (Aidoo Reference Aidoo2016). On July 20, 2012, Manso-Nsiena youth staged a large demonstration (Odoom Reference Odoom and Aidoo2019, 115). In the Manso-Nsiena area, about six separate groups of illegal Chinese miners were operating. The Chinese and the youth exchanged gunshots. The situation was dramatic, but armed police officers from a neighboring town helped to calm the situation.
The demonstration was covered by the media, and the messages of the protest and resulting weak security in the area spread throughout Ghana. After video footage of the incident and the magnitude of environmental damage was made public, Ghanaians were angered and agitated by the harm caused from illegal mining. President John Mahama eventually formed an Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Illegal Mining in May 2013 after a long period of mounting public pressure. The task force’s mandate was to “seize all the equipment the illegal miners use” and apprehend and sue the culprits—both Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians (Odoom Reference Odoom and Aidoo2019, 116).
Campaigns such as #StopGalamsey—which was spearheaded by Citi FM, an Accra-based radio station—gathered a large media coalition of support from various “local media outlets.” This resulted in a lengthy petition with signatures from major national leaders “both past and present,” which was submitted to Parliament on April 7, 2017, by officials from City FM (Gavin Reference Gavin2017). “Life Is More Precious Than Gold,” “Help End Galamsey Now,” “Stop Unlawful Mining,” “Preserve our Water Bodies,” and “Preserve our Rich Forests,” among other headlines, were used by #StopGalamsey to draw attention to the insidious nature of galamsey. Prominent officials from the Christian Council of Ghana and media houses also signed the #StopGalamsey Campaign (Gavin Reference Gavin2017).
Moreover, Ghanaian CSOs (e.g., OccupyGhana) chastised the government for failing to adequately handle the situation of the Chinese national Aisha Huang (also known as the “Queen of Galamsey”). “When…Huang was first arrested, she was charged with some absurd, risible, and insignificant administrative infractions of immigration restrictions” (Joynews 2019). It took a demonstration and a petition on May 16, 2017, by OccupyGhana for her to be charged with (as some believe) the appropriate offenses under the Minerals and Mining Act, which imposes severe penalties for illicit mining. However, the lawsuit was dropped and deportation was considered. Pressure from the media, CSOs, and other advocacy groups compelled President Akufo-Addo to recognize that dropping the case was a mistake (Zurek Reference Zurek2019). Reacting to the endeavors undertaken by the NSAs, Participant 3 stated that:
[T]he media is [sic] doing a good job; we’ve seen several documentaries from Joy FM and their sister organization[s].
Other participants concurred with this assertion, underscoring that to a significant extent, the media effectively serve as a catalyst in alerting the government and the general populace about the illicit conduct of Chinese nationals in Ghana. Participant 4 opined that:
[T]he media has [sic] been playing a major role in exposing the activities of the Chinese. In fact, I dare say that they are the most effective
Nevertheless, some participants voiced their dissatisfaction regarding the efficacy of community members and CSOs. Participant 4 divulged that:
[J]ust like the local communities, the CSOs, I see them as more of a press conference organizer…they speak about it and nothing happens…but some are doing very well.
Participants 3, 4, 5, and 12 also expressed concerns about local residents collaborating with Chinese individuals to conceal the environmental damage inflicted on mining communities. Participant 3 indicated that:
Unfortunately…I think local communities actually aid them because like the former Chinese ambassador said, the Chinese nationals do not know our villages, they don’t know…where we have gold….It is the Ghanaians who show them….The community members work for them in those mines and they don’t expose them enough. Because they protect them, that’s why they are able to carry out their nefarious activities. (August 29, 2023)
This observation suggests that although local residents occasionally expose Chinese illegal activities within the mining industry, more often than not, some collaborate with them for their selfish interest.
Regime Theory and Agency in Ghana–China Relations
RT recognizes the media, civic groups, and individuals as regimes that direct and regulate or serve as a “third eye” in monitoring interstate engagements to ensure that the laws and sovereignty of states are not abridged (Bradford Reference Bradford2007). Whereas China assists Ghana with infrastructural, economic, and essential development, Ghana reciprocates by providing minerals and other natural resources for China’s industrial development. This cements the win-win policy espoused in SAR (Hanauer and Morris Reference Hanauer and Morris2014). Moreover, it is consistent with RT, which holds that states frequently share mutual interests and collaborate to achieve common goals (Bradford Reference Bradford2007).
On the contrary, however, participants in the study maintained the belief that whereas the relationship between Ghana and China is mutually beneficial, it lacks balance. This is due to China leveraging its powerful position in international affairs to exploit the vulnerable institutions in Ghana and, by extension, Africa. Participant 1 indicated that:
The relationship between China and Ghana, for example, is mutual but not balanced….China’s GDP, economic power, China’s international power, compared to Ghana, Ghana is only 10% of China’s global power. So, for China to sign, let’s say, a two-billion infrastructure agreement with Ghana, it’s just like Ghana signing an agreement with a city in China. (October 15, 2022)
The public’s outrage and disappointment—along with the widespread recognition and courageous mobilization of Ghanaian youth to expose Chinese illegal activities in the country’s mining industry and other sectors—align with the tenets of RT. For example, the government is equally pressured to make public the Sinohydro–Atewa Forest deal and assure the nation of a better local content, nonpartisan appropriation of the loans, and—above all—measures for environmentally friendly activities in and around the Atewa Forest by the coalition of CSOs, the media, and local communities in the catchment area (Larnyoh Reference Larnyoh2019).
A Rocha Ghana, a Ghanaian environmental NGO supported by 20 other CSOs, took the mining project to court in an attempt to halt it, and the court ruled in their favor. Participant 6 expressed that:
Civil societies such as A Rocha Ghana have been a consistent voice when the issue of Atewa came up. They should be given credit for holding the government on the issue of Atewa and the Sinohydro deal….The civil society groups and the citizenry are doing well in exposing the activities of the Chinese for the government to act. (September 20, 2023)
Thus, state agencies have been encouraged to intervene in similar scenarios involving youth protests against Chinese illegal mining activities to shape relations between the two countries.
The abuse of workers’ rights in the instance of the Bui Hydroelectric Dam construction and the Ghanaian laborers sparked a protest against the Chinese company’s management. According to RT, the state is viewed as the building block of regimes; therefore, the aggrieved workers and the media staged a protest to draw the attention of relevant state agencies to resolve their problems. Also, regimes facilitate relations between states and other potential actors by decreasing the chaos that otherwise would reign in international affairs (Bradford Reference Bradford2007). Consequently, the Ghana TUC intervened to assist the NSAs in cooperating to reduce tensions between the employees and the company’s management. Similarly, GUTA exerted pressure on the government of Ghana to pursue legal action against the Chinese in the informal trading sector. Constant pressure from GUTA and other CSOs compelled the government in 2013 to update the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC) Act 478 by an Act of Parliament, which regulates all foreign businesses in the country. A task force composed of officials from the Social Security and National Insurance Trust, GUTA, Registrar General’s Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and GIPC was formed. Its mandate was to ensure compliance with the law and to address any emergent difficulties, such as tax evasion and noncompliance with immigration restrictions (Odoom Reference Odoom2016). Following weeks of education and “crackdown,” some illegal non-Ghanaian–owned businesses folded. Reacting to the incident, Participant 7 from the GNCCI intimated:
The business community has always challenged suspicious activities of nationals of other countries involved particularly in the retail sector. There have been demonstrations, strikes, court actions, and media briefings—all aimed at discouraging such conduct by the Chinese and also to draw the attention of the government to address the issue head on. (September 30, 2023)
Despite the numerous activities of CSOs, participants categorized GCR into two distinct levels: intergovernmental and individual. Some participants believed that given China’s global status and hard-power capabilities, Ghana—when exercising its agency—lacks the effectiveness to significantly influence its engagement with China. However, at the individual and informal levels, the activities of these groups do impact the actions taken by the state in response to the Chinese presence. As Participant 1 stated:
At the individual level, they (NSAs) play a critical role in suggesting to government how to go about Chinese activities in Ghana. However, I doubt how they’ll be able to do that in our formal relations with China….Sometimes …you just hear that the President is on a state visit to China, and by the time the President comes back, an agreement is signed. (October 15, 2022)
This suggests that African agency is effective in managing Chinese businesses and individuals operating in many African countries, but its role is less significant in the context of IR with China. However—and notably—during the implementation of such agreements, NSAs may challenge any attempt to marginalize the state or its actors and prompt a reaction by the government. Thus, regimes composed of various NSAs can direct and regulate the behavior of states and other NSAs (Bradford Reference Bradford2007).
CONCLUSION
NSAs in Africa including Ghana, such as the media, local groups, and CSOs, constantly monitor the activities of Chinese people on the continent to ensure that state sovereignty is not violated. Thus, this debunks the pessimistic viewpoint that SAR can be interpreted as nothing more than neocolonialism and unethical profit seeking.
NSAs in Africa including Ghana, such as the media, local groups, and CSOs, constantly monitor the activities of Chinese people on the continent to ensure that state sovereignty is not violated.
The majority of respondents agreed that these NSAs constantly encourage the Ghanaian government to act to preserve Ghana’s interests and sovereignty and to prevent the deterioration of GCR. For example, as noted by the respondents, in the case of the Sinohydro–Atewa Forest deal and the illegal Chinese miners in Ghana, protests, demonstrations, and a court action by more than 20 NSAs (including NGOs and the media) compelled the government to disclose the details of the deal. The government also promised to avert mining in reserved parts of the forest and formed an Inter-Ministerial Task Force to enforce regulations in the mining sector and flush out illegal foreign miners including the Chinese. These actions have resulted in the deportation of more than 4,000 Chinese miners since June 2013. Aisha Huang’s arrest, prosecution, and subsequent deportation would not have happened without national outcry led by the media, CSOs, and other local groups. This case study analysis gives credence to the assertion that NSAs provide first-level agency and prompt governmental action; they are crucial in exerting agency in GCR.
NSAs affect GCR by (re)negotiating with and challenging their Chinese counterparts. For example, a concerted effort by the Ghana TUC, the BPA, and the media culminated in the formation of a union in 2009, with CBMWU and Sinohydro signing a collective agreement to ensure that workers’ rights were not be violated. Indeed, as noted by Participant 10:
[T]his was a clear example where Ghanaian workers and their unions [together with the media] challenged their Chinese…employers—and it’s a big thing.” (October 15, 2023)
This was deemed a success despite the fact that the Sinohydro’s multinational laws do not sanction the formation of labor unions, as it is in their mother country, China. This challenges the claim that African states are passive in their engagement with China.
The findings of this study have several implications for Africa and the Ghanaian society in particular. The analysis reveals that Chinese companies in Africa sometimes flout national rules and disregard labor laws and human rights. However, these behaviors often do not go unpunished or challenged by other social forces (i.e., the NSAs) in Africa, which also prompts African governments to act. This can result in diplomatic disputes, which can be avoided by ensuring that local content and national laws are observed at all times by the Chinese counterparts. Issues of illegal mining and human rights abuses have the potential to negatively impact African and, in particular, Ghanaian society as well as the local and national economy because it also affects the environment.
These findings also posit that Ghanaians believe typical actions such as organizing demonstrations, taking legal action against foreign actors and the national government, and holding conferences and workshops for sensitization purposes are crucial for the struggle for agency in GCR.
However, whereas the media are viewed as the major actors in this struggle for agency in GCR, some of the local communities and groups are accused of ineptitude and being complicit in the struggle for agency in GCR (Participants 3, 4, 5, and 12). These individuals and groups may be employees of or have an interest in Chinese businesses as shareholders; therefore, they protect and conceal information regarding illegal Chinese activities. Notably, their behaviors do not have significant impact on the overall goal of the NSAs. This observation raises the question of “checks and balance.”
The Ghanaian government should take NSAs seriously in its attempt to exert agency in GCR. The drafting of the country’s “local content” necessarily should include broad-based consultation with both state actors and NSAs. The findings suggest that future research should examine the extent to which African NSAs also are complicit in the entire Sino–Africa agency debate.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author acknowledges Justice Kwabena Atenka for his contribution to data collection.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Research documentation and data that support the findings of this study are openly available at the PS: Political Science & Politics Harvard Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FXQZOX.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The author declares that there are no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.
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