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Functional Explanation and Metaphysical Individualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University
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Abstract

G. A. Cohen defends and Jon Elster criticizes Marxist use of functional explanation. But Elster's mechanical conception of explanation is, contrary to Elster's claims, a better basis for vindication of functional explanation than Cohen's nomological conception, which cannot provide an adequate account of functional explanation. Elster also objects that functional explanation commits us to metaphysically bizarre collective subjects, but his argument requires an implausible reading of methodological individualism which involves an unattractive eliminativism about social phenomena.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1993 , pp. 278 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

Thanks are due to Bob Batterman, Phil Gasper, Don Hubin, Peter King, Calvin Normore, Peter Railton, James Scanlan, J.D. Trout and several anonymous referees.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA.

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