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A HIGHER-ORDER APPROACH TO DISAGREEMENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2017

Mattias Skipper Rasmussen ,
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen  and
Jens Christian Bjerring
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Abstract

While many philosophers have agreed that evidence of disagreement is a kind of higher-order evidence, this has not yet resulted in formally precise higher-order approaches to the problem of disagreement. In this paper, we outline a simple formal framework for determining the epistemic significance of a body of higher-order evidence, and use this framework to motivate a novel interpretation of the popular “equal weight view” of peer disagreement – we call it the Variably Equal Weight View (VEW). We show that VEW differs from the standard Split the Difference (SD) interpretation of the equal weight view in almost all cases of peer disagreement, and use our formal framework to explain why SD has seemed attractive but is in fact misguided. A desirable feature of VEW, we argue, is that it gives rise to plausible instances of synergy – an effect whereby the parties to a disagreement should become more (or less) confident in the disputed proposition than any of them were prior to disagreement. Lastly, we show how VEW may be generalized to cases of non-peer disagreement.

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Episteme , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 80 - 100
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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