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Optimal control of a reaction-diffusion epidemic model with non-compliance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 April 2025

Marcelo Bongarti
Affiliation:
Weierstrass Institute for Applied Analysis and Stochastics, Berlin, Germany
Christian Parkinson*
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics and Department of Computational Mathematics, Science and Engineering, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA
Weinan Wang
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA
*
Corresponding author: Christian Parkinson; Email: chparkin@msu.edu
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Abstract

In this paper, we consider an optimal distributed control problem for a reaction-diffusion-based SIR epidemic model with human behavioural effects. We develop a model wherein non-pharmaceutical intervention methods are implemented, but a portion of the population does not comply with them, and this non-compliance affects the spread of the disease. Drawing from social contagion theory, our model allows for the spread of non-compliance parallel to the spread of the disease. The quantities of interest for control are the reduction in infection rate among the compliant population, the rate of spread of non-compliance and the rate at which non-compliant individuals become compliant after, e.g., receiving more or better information about the underlying disease. We prove the existence of global-in-time solutions for fixed controls and study the regularity properties of the resulting control-to-state map. The existence of optimal control is then established in an abstract framework for a fairly general class of objective functions. Necessary first–order optimality conditions are obtained via a Lagrangian-based stationarity system. We conclude with a discussion regarding minimisation of the size of infected and non-compliant populations and present simulations with various parameters values to demonstrate the behaviour of the model.

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Papers
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Figure 1. A list of state variables, control maps and parameters for (1).

Figure 1

Figure 2. The flow diagram for (1). Any arrow flowing out of a population indicates flow proportional to the population it leaves. Here$I_M = (1-\alpha )I + I^*$denotes the actively mixing infectious population (i.e., those who contribute to disease spread).

Figure 2

Algorithm 1 Projected Gradient Descent Algorithm for (10)

Figure 3

Table 1. Baseline parameter values for the simulation in figure 3. We vary the cost weights $\zeta, \lambda _1,\lambda _2$ in figures 5, 6, and 7

Figure 4

Figure 3. Dynamics of the model with baseline parameters (Table 1) in the absence (top) and presence (bottom) of controls. We notice that in the controlled case, the optimal$\alpha (\cdot, t)$is primarily used near the beginning of the dynamics to decrease the first wave of infections. The optimal$\mu (\cdot, t)$is hardly used at all, and the optimal$\nu (\cdot, t)$is used throughout. This has the effect that the total non-compliant population settles at a lower portion of the population. The variation in the controls as the end of the dynamics should be seen as artificial: they are there because the policymaker is aware of the time-horizon$T = 200$and can slightly decrease costs by drastically altering controls for the final few time steps. Overall, with these values of$\lambda _1,\lambda _2,\zeta$, the optimal controls achieve a$9.64\%$relative cost reduction against the uncontrolled scenario, reducing the cost from$\mathcal J(y,\underline \alpha, 0,0) = 1.4071$to$\mathcal J(y,\alpha ^\circ, \mu ^\circ, \nu ^\circ ) = 1.2715$. Snapshots of the control maps$\alpha (x,t),\mu (x,t),\nu (x,t)$at different times are displayed in figure 4.

Figure 5

Figure 4. Snapshots of the optimal control maps$\alpha (x,t),\mu (x,t),\nu (x,t)$for different times$t$for simulation with baseline parameters the time$t = 1.75$corresponds to the first peak in infections seen in figure 3. The control efforts are concentrated near the origin because$b(x,y)$and$S_0(x,y)$are Gaussians centred at the origin, meaning this is where the bulk of the population is. Note that as the infection dies out over time$\alpha (x,t)$and$\mu (x,t)$seem to decrease. However,$\nu (x,t)$decreases at its peak, but grows elsewhere. This is the primary mechanism used to decrease the final asymptote for the non-compliant population, and thus achieve a decreased total cost, despite the increase in the cost of the control.

Figure 6

Figure 5. When we decrease$\zeta$to$0.1$(top), the controls are cheap enough to implement that the optimal strategy is now to significantly suppress the initial outbreak and to suppress non-compliance initially. Eventually non-compliance spreads and a small, more gradual outbreak occurs. In this case, the relative cost reduction against the uncontrolled scenario is$17.32\%$. When we increase$\zeta$to$0.4$(bottom), the results look qualitatively similar to the baseline case except the control maps are significantly scaled down because controls are more expensive to implement. In this case, the relative cost reduction against the uncontrolled scenario is only$4.66\%$.

Figure 7

Figure 6. We consider a public-health-oriented policymaker by increasing$\lambda _1$ to $30$. In the top panel, we use baseline parameter values and the optimal policy is to use large control values to suppress the infection. In this case, the policymaker is sensitive to small changes in the total infected population, leading to more oscillation in the control strategies. In the bottom panel, we increase$\lambda _1$to 30 (so the policymaker is health conscious) but also increase$\zeta$to 0.4 (so controls are costly to implement). Interestingly, in this case, the optimal use of$\alpha (\cdot, t)$does not qualitatively change much from baseline (though it is larger), but non-compliance is suppressed more strongly. This demonstrates some of the synergy between the desire of the policymaker and the use of controls: here the policy maker is health conscious, but lowers infections by increasing control of both infections and non-compliance.

Figure 8

Figure 7. We consider a compliance-oriented policymaker by increasing$\lambda _2$fivefold to$\lambda _2 = 0.1$. In this case, the optimal strategy is to increase$\mu$and$\nu$so as to eliminate non-compliance entirely. However, having done so,$\alpha$is more effective as a control since everyone is compliant, so the policymaker still uses$\alpha$as well, thus significantly slowing the spread of the disease. This once again demonstrates the strong potential for synergy between the control variables.