1 Two states of nature
The hypothesis of the state of nature is the ground zero of modern political thought. Social contract theorists seek to elucidate the foundations of political authorityFootnote 1 by hypothesizing about a state of nature in which no government keeps free and equal individuals in check (L 13:1–9; ST 2:4–8)Footnote 2. They believe that by examining the behavior of unrestrained individuals in the absence of political institutions, the problems that governments must address to become legitimate can be identified (Schmidtz Reference Schmidtz1990, 95–96; Vanderschraaf Reference Vanderschraaf2018 198–199). The hypothesis is straightforward.
However, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke depict the state of nature very differently. For Hobbes, the state of nature is necessarily a state of war due to the widespread distrust that arises from self-centered individuals with no incentive to cooperate (L 13:3). For Locke, individuals spontaneously cooperate, establishing a fragile peace that is eventually disrupted by conflicts arising from divergent interpretations of the law of nature and the absence of impartial enforcers (ST 2:13). The two dissimilar depictions of the same hypothesis highlight distinct problems and, hence, lead to two different views on the legitimate form of government. Whereas for Hobbes, absolutist regimes solve the problem of widespread distrust, for Locke, the solution to the problems of the state of nature lies in a collective agreement about the meaning of the laws and the creation of impartial enforcement mechanisms—namely, a regime of separated powers. Often a question arises: Who is right?
Political philosophers often hold that Hobbes and Locke begin with distinct assumptions, which unsurprisingly lead to different conclusions (Simmons Reference Simmons1989, Zwolinski 2010, Bruner Reference Bruner2020). Their primary differences, it is typically believed, stem from contrasting views of human psychology. Some argue that Hobbes presents a realistic view of human egoism, while Locke offers an optimistic view of humanity, a “rosy picture” of unrestrained human actions (Bruner Reference Bruner2020, 722). Therefore, it is commonly believed that Hobbes’s state of nature presents a more credible depiction than Locke’s: Hobbes offers an intuitively correct and theoretically robust view of unrestrained human behavior.
This paper challenges this common belief and argues instead that Locke presents more plausible conjectures of human behavior in the state of nature. To do so, I will highlight the role of the family as a spontaneous institution for moral education in Locke’s state of nature. An important corollary of my thesis is that the main difference between Hobbes’s and Locke’s depiction of the state of nature lies not in their psychological assumptions, but in different institutional frameworks.
Despite the recent attention to the importance of the family and human reproduction in contractualist thought (Schochet Reference Schochet1967; Held Reference Held1987; Okin Reference Okin1994; Pfeffer Reference Pfeffer2001; Sreedhar Reference Sreedhar2019), the role of the family in the state of nature has been mostly disregarded. This paper intends to correct this problematic omission. The dialectic between Hobbes and Locke will highlight why Locke’s depiction is persuasive, while Hobbes’s is flawed. Hobbes’s view of the state of nature makes no room for the family as a pre-political institution. Only if individuals appear in the world as equally capable of killing each other, Hobbes’s conclusion follows. But this is not the human condition. We appear in the world as neonates, nurtured and educated within a familial structure. For Locke, throughout the process of growing up, individuals learn to cooperate; for Hobbes, they appear in the world as and remain unrestrained self-centered agents.
Underlining the importance of the family in Locke’s state of nature has three main implications. Exegetically (3.4), it explains why individuals in Locke’s state of nature (imperfectly) follow the law of nature. Normatively (5.1), it makes Locke’s view of political legitimacy more convincing than Hobbes’s. Speculatively (5.2), it invites social contract theorists to think seriously about the degree in which political institutions are determined by informal institutions—especially, child care institutions.
In the next section, I consider the reasons that lead many social contract theorists to conclude that Hobbes’s conjectures are intuitive, sound, and robust. The following sections challenge these conclusions. Section 3 explains why Locke’s conception of the family as a pre-political institution for moderation makes his depiction of the state of nature more credible than Hobbes’s. In Section 4, I argue that the family may play an additional role as a signaling mechanism that facilitates cooperation in the state of nature, enabling individuals to collectively punish those who violate the law of nature. The next section addresses the normative and speculative implications of this reading of Locke’s state of nature.
2 Hobbes’s robust conjectures
The contrast between Hobbes’s and Locke’s views of unrestrained human behavior allows us to understand why Hobbes’s conjectures about human behavior in the state of nature seem more intuitive and more robust than Locke’s.
First, Hobbes’s view of individuals’ relationship to the law of nature appears more intuitive than Locke’s. For both, the law of nature includes rational principles that guide actions to preserve one’s life (L 14:3; ST 2:6). However, these principles give rise to different strategies in the state of nature. For Hobbes, individuals understand that restricting their actions can lead to peace, which is the best way to ensure survival (L 14:4). However, since they cannot be certain that others will also restrict their actions, they must be prepared to do whatever it takes to achieve their goals and protect themselves. It is typically accepted that Hobbesian individuals in the state of nature are fundamentally egoistic.Footnote 3
Egoistic individuals will act without restraint and use any means necessary to advance their interests, including violence against competitors (what Hobbes calls competition, L 13:3), preemptively attacking them to avoid potential harm (what he calls diffidence, L 13:3), and, in some cases, engaging in conflict simply for the pleasure of dominance (what he calls glory, L 13:4). Hobbes’s description of the state of nature appears intuitively plausible. People’s behavior in civil wars provides reliable evidence of this kind of behavior. The Hobbesian conjecture that war inevitably arises from interactions between unrestrained egoistic agents equally capable of killing each other seems rather intuitive.
In contrast, for Locke, the law of nature imposes rational obligations and limits on personal behavior. In the state of nature, an individual “has not Liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but where some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it” (ST 2:6). The law of nature “teaches all Mankind [… that] no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions” (ST 2:6). Insofar as it restricts actions that harm others, for Locke, the law of nature fosters cooperation. Individuals know that the best way to preserve their lives is through self-restraint: they limit their own actions so that others do the same. If there is no voluntary restraint, individuals collectively force those who fail to limit their actions to do so. There is a duty to enforce the law of nature and sanction those who don’t respect rational limits on behavior. “When his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind” (ST 2:6). Hence, individuals in the Lockean state of nature foster cooperation not only because they limit their own behaviors, but because they help each other keep in check those who violate the law of nature (ST 2:7).Footnote 4
At this point, most readers have a question: Why would unrestrained individuals spontaneously cooperate with each other? Especially in a world in which there are limited resources, no rights, and no power to enforce the law of nature, why would individuals opt to restrain themselves in the face of competition and the danger that the others’ represent to their wishes? Locke’s view of unrestrained human behavior does appear as a “rosy picture” of humanity (Bruner Reference Bruner2020, 722) to anyone familiar with human egoism under conditions of scarcity. Intuitively, the Hobbesian conjecture that, in a state of scarcity, unrestrained egoistic agents become wolves to one another is more intuitively compelling than Locke’s vision of self-constrained agents.
Beyond intuitions, formal models of the state of nature suggest that the dynamics leading unrestrained rational agents to engage in continuous conflict are theoretically well-founded. In recent decades, game theorists have confirmed Hobbes’s conjectures about human behavior in a state without government. It has become standard to model the Hobbesian state of nature as a scenario where individuals predominantly play a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This implies that agents, lacking trust in each other to follow the law of nature, choose to attack preemptively rather than abide by it. By contrast, Locke’s state of nature, where individuals voluntarily restrict their actions, is modeled as an assurance game, where peace is achievable if individuals coordinate to avoid attacking one another (Vanderschraaf Reference Vanderschraaf2006, 244–245). However, it remains unclear why individuals would voluntarily restrain their actions according to the law of nature and peacefully cooperate without assurance that others will do the same. Thus, even if the state of nature resembles an assurance game, war seems the likely outcome unless there is more to Locke’s account than voluntary self-restraint. Even with the use of formal models, war appears to be the most probable result in both cases. Hobbes’s conjectures about the state of nature are not only intuitive but also theoretically compelling.
An even more convincing approach to determine which view of the state of nature is more plausible would be to model both Hobbesian and Lockean players in the same state of nature and analyze the result. Some political philosophers have pursued this using various variables (Vanderschraaf Reference Vanderschraaf2006; Chung Reference Chung2015; Schaefer and Sohn Reference Schaefer and Sohn2022). They represent agents as characterized by Hobbes (dominator types) and Locke (moderate types), place them in the same state of nature, and examine whether widespread conflict or a fragile peace emerges. The uncertainty of encountering a dominator prompts moderates to play prisoner’s dilemma rather than assurance games to avoid being dominated.Footnote 5 As Peter Vanderschraaf concludes, “the presence of a few dominators can lead others to imitate their example […], so that they all ultimately end up at war” (Reference Vanderschraaf2006, 271). Their findings largely confirm prevailing intuitions about the state of nature: without political institutions, society would eventually descend into war, even when the risk of encountering dominators is minimal. The verdict seems clear: Hobbes’s depiction of the state of nature is not only intuitive but also robust.
It is not surprising, then, that the Hobbesian depiction of the state of nature has come to dominate social contract theory. By contrast, philosophers tend to find Locke’s view of the law of nature perplexing. Why would anyone believe that people would cooperate without a guarantee that others will do their part? Beyond intuitions, however, the game-theoretical treatment of the state of nature seems to demonstrate that Locke’s view of self-restrained human behavior in the state of nature is not only naïve but also theoretically defective.
The next sections aim to show that Hobbes’s conjectures about unrestrained human behavior in the state of nature are specious and theoretically defective. First, I will demonstrate that his depiction is puzzling because it overlooks a fundamental feature of human existence: we do not come into this world equally capable of killing each other. Second, I will show that the models employed by social contract theorists to validate the robustness of the Hobbesian state of nature contain a critical flaw: they fail to account for the informal institutions that allow people to signal trustworthiness and enforce cooperation in the state of nature.
3 The family in the state of nature
We all come into this world as defenseless neonates who need more than a decade of care and education before entering a society of equals. Call this uncontroversial fact the inescapable human feature. A convincing state of nature should take into account this stage of human life. Yet, social contract theorists tend to disregard this feature. It is surprising that the inescapable human feature was largely overlooked by most scholars of the state of nature until feminist philosophers called attention to the distinctive role of women in society and the importance of the family as a pre-political institution. Virginia Held, for example, observes that “the contractual model was hardly ever applied, as either description or ideal, to women or to relations within the family. The family was imagined to be ‘outside’ the polis…” (Reference Held1987, 112).
And yet, Hobbes and Locke do take into account the importance of the inescapable human feature. However, they give dissimilar accounts of its importance and role in the state of nature. Locke shares the Hobbesian psychology as a starting point: human beings enter this world as purely egoistic individuals. For Hobbes, this feature never changes; for Locke, families moderate their behaviors in the state of nature. Through a long process of moral education, individuals learn to restrain their actions in accordance with the law of nature. This moral education occurs within conjugal societies.
3.1 Hobbes and the inescapable human feature
Hobbes’s neglect of the political importance of the family may not be accidental. He intends to differentiate himself from the champions of the patriarchal power of the monarch, like Sir Robert Filmer (Reference Filmer and Sommerville1991). Gordon Schochet notices that Hobbes goes as far as offering an original basis for parental authority beyond blind obedience and attempts “to derive the father’s power over his children from their consent” (Schochet Reference Schochet1967, 444).
Nevertheless, Hobbes deals briefly with the inescapable human feature. Babies are cared for until they become adults. However, he does not attribute special importance on the family or education as a process that shapes human conduct. His main interest lies in figuring out the custody of children (L 20:4–5). Given that, in the state of nature, “there are supposed no laws of matrimony, no laws for the education of children, but the law of nature, and the natural inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to their children” (L 20:4), it is undecided whether the father or the mother (but not both) has parental dominion.Footnote 6 The mother, Hobbes concludes, generally has dominion over the children since, in the absence of laws of marriage and other special contracts, “it cannot be known who is the father unless it be declared by the mother” (L 20:5).Footnote 7
Hobbes does acknowledge, nonetheless, that parents and children have a distinctive relationship that leads to particular obligations. He considers the parental correction of their children’s behavior (L 11:21), but he does not mention whether such corrections, in the aggregate, shape the behavior of the children when they become adults. Hobbes, therefore, does not attribute particular relevance to the conditions of reproduction or the process of growing up as a way of shaping adult behavior. The distinctiveness of childhood lies in obeying parents in exchange for their help, but once that help ceases, obedience ceases, and war begins.Footnote 8
Hobbes’s depiction of the state of nature suggests that human beings appear in the world as babies, are helped to survive by whoever is in charge of them, and eventually become self-centered individuals capable of fighting. Once they grow up, they are ready to engage in war with their peers—and arguably lose any attachment to their parents. Put simply, there is no moral education in Hobbes’s state of nature. Maturing does not play a transformative role. In light of this uncanny portrayal of human development, Hobbes’s description of the state of nature may no longer seem as intuitive as it once did.
3.2 Families as moderating institutions
A description of a hypothetical state of nature would be more credible if it took into account that parental education is not only a moment of dominion that leaves intact individuals’ personalities, but a transformative process that shapes children’s behavior and profoundly influences adult conduct. Locke carefully takes into account the process of being born and growing up in the state of nature, which explains why people follow the law of nature and are able to live in a fragile peace.
Locke underlines the fact that, due to our biological features, people in the state of nature are born and educated within conjugal societies (ST 7:78). Locke highlights the duties and obligations that parents have towards their children.Footnote 9 Unfortunately, scholars interested in Locke’s state of nature tend to pay little attention to the fundamental social and behavioral role of the family (Nozick Reference Nozick1974; Simmons Reference Simmons1989; Vanderschraaf Reference Vanderschraaf2018; Barrett Reference Barrett2020; Bruner Reference Bruner2020; Chung Reference Chung2022). I argue that Locke’s view about the family makes his picture of the state of nature more credible than Hobbes’s.
Locke starts with a mundane observation: individuals are not born free or equal. First, babies don’t obey the law of nature since we are all born “ignorant and without the use of Reason” (ST 6:57). And since freedom in the state of nature is defined by respect to such law, children are not born free (ST 6:57). Second, “Children […] are not born in this full state of Equality, though they are born to it” (ST 6:55). This gives a certain authority to the parents over their offspring. “Their Parents have a sort of Rule and Jurisdiction over them when they come into the World…” (ST 6:55). Since parents are necessary to the survival of their children, they govern their children and impose rules until they become equal members of the society. Nevertheless, parental powers over their offspring are limited by their obligations to “give such strength and health to their Bodies, such vigor and rectitude to their Minds…” (ST 6:64). Contrary to a Hobbesian leviathan, which would impose the rules that they choose for the sake of peace, parents have an obligation to help the children survive and also to impose the laws of nature on their children for the sake of their future survival in society: “Parents [are], by the Law of Nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the Children, they had begotten, not as their own Workmanship, but the Workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them” (ST 6:56).
We are born into a condition of dependence. Therefore, parents have a moral obligation to help their children transition from weaker creatures to responsible adults, to unfree beings to free and equal members of society. The first parental obligation is plain and simple: helping their children survive. Parents ought to nurture their children until they become self-sufficient. However, Locke believes that parents have a further obligation: to help their children become free, which can only be achieved when they follow the law of nature. “The First part then of Paternal Power, or rather Duty, … is Education…” (ST 6:69). Education is the vehicle through which human beings have passed on the laws of nature from generation to generation ever since “God had implanted [them] in [Adam]” (ST 6:56). In Locke’s theory, all the generations that follow Adam had to be taught the laws of nature because they have “another way of entrance into the World, different from [Adam], by a natural Birth, that produced them ignorant and without the use of Reason.” (ST 6:57). The parental “Guardians” have dominion over their children to educate free and equal human beings that are accountable to their peers when they grow up.
Therefore, the family puts the law of nature in motion. Parents’ dominion over their offspring serves to fulfill the moral obligation of education by guiding them since the “… Law allows the Son to have no Will but he is to be guided by the Will of his Father or Guardian, who is to understand for him” (ST 6:59). Parental restrictions during childhood become self-restrained actions in adulthood. Parents function as an informal micro-disciplinary mechanism in Locke’s state of nature to create free adults who intuitively follow the law of nature once they become adults. This mechanism is limited in time. At a certain age, “the Father’s Empire […] ceases” (ST 6:65). When their children grow up, they are considered rational beings, educated in the laws of nature, and capable of moderation on their own, hence they become accountable for their actions within a society of equals.
The importance of the family as an intermediate institution between children and society cannot be overstated in the real world or in Locke’s state of nature. The family is the first and primordial source of enforcement of basic rules of cooperation. What explains Locke’s description of self-restrained individuals in the state of nature is not an optimistic view of human psychology or a “rosy” picture of human behavior, but a mundane observation: parents teach their children how to and how not to behave before they become accountable for their actions. As a result, when they grow up, they are moderate adults who (even if imperfectly) abide by the law of nature. Once we understand the educational role of the family, it is more credible to believe that individuals in the state of nature voluntarily restrain their actions to achieve peace.
3.3 Families as pre-political institutions
The observation that the family is the “first Society” (ST 7:77) is not to be taken for granted in the state of nature with no marriage laws, as Hobbes notices. Why should we believe that there is more than natural sexual inclinations in the state of nature, as Rousseau (Reference Rousseau1971 [1755]) believes? Why would there be a long-lasting conjugal union despite the absence of legal obligations?
Locke’s description of a state of nature populated by moderate individuals who punish wrongdoers to keep peace depends on the spontaneity of long-lasting conjugal societies. Yet, this is not a mere assumption: Locke offers empirical and rational evidence to justify his conjectures. First, biological facts suggest that human families are lasting and spontaneous (i.e., independent of political institutions) due to the animal features of human beings. A form of conjugal association emerges in nature to aid the survival of offspring. This pattern of behavior is not unique to humans but is also observed throughout the animal kingdom. Locke affirms that “for the end of conjunction between Male and Female, being not barely Procreation, but the continuation of the Species, this conjunction betwixt Male and Female ought to last, even after Procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young Ones […]” (ST 7:79). Yet, these conjugal associations take different forms depending on the needs of each species. “Viviparous animals which feed on Grass” (ST 7:79), for example, do not form lasting unions, as the mother can nourish the offspring independently. Conversely, the offspring of “Beasts of Prey” and birds require the male to remain with the female for as long as she is unable to feed herself and the young. For Locke, the biological characteristics of human beings are such that the male must assist the female and the infants for many years to ensure their survival.Footnote 10 The family, therefore, emerges as a lasting and spontaneous human institution grounded in our animal nature.
Second, Locke also provides reasons (not only facts) to believe that human conjugal societies are particularly long-lasting:
And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the Male and Female in Mankind are tyed to a longer conjunction than other Creatures, viz. because the Female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with Child again, and Brings forth to a new Birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his Parents help […]: whereby the Father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an Obligation to continue in Conjugal Society with the same Woman longer than other Creatures (ST 7:80).
Human conjugal societies are distinctively long-lasting due to the particular characteristics of human reproduction and the prolonged dependency of human infants. In the state of nature, we can reasonably imagine that the continuous and extended cohabitation of a man and a woman after a first child will result in the birth of a second one before the first becomes independent. This process is likely to repeat multiple times, making conjugal societies endure far beyond the period required for the first offspring to reach independence. More precisely, families persist from the first pregnancy until the last child becomes self-sufficient; this process might span many years, and even decades. Thus, for Locke, families are spontaneous and enduring institutions.
In light of these observations, Locke concludes that human males and females in the state of nature form a long-lasting association “where Procreation and Education are secured” (ST 7:81).
3.4 The exegetical implication
Locke provides reasons to believe that the family forms spontaneously in the state of nature, as human biological conditions of survival and reproduction require. Yet, reproduction is not the only outcome of this pre-political institution; education in the law of nature emerges as a byproduct. Even if individuals first appear in the world as egoists, as Hobbes suggests, it is within the family that human children grow up, are educated, and acquire a moral compass. While Hobbes and Locke may share the same psychological starting point, Locke emphasizes the role of pre-political institutions in shaping individuals’ preferences and behavior, whereas, for Hobbes, people remain as egoists as they were at birth. The difference between Hobbes’s and Locke’s state of nature is primarily institutional, not psychological.
This highlights the exegetical benefit of recovering the importance of the family in Locke’s theory: it explains his purportedly perplexing claims about the spontaneous respect for the law of nature in the state of nature. In light of this inescapable human feature, it is no longer Locke’s view of the state of nature that appears puzzling, but Hobbes’s. Why would anyone believe that we come into the world equally capable of killing each other? How could anyone think that the way we grow up does not shape our moral compass? At this point, Hobbes’s hypothesis seems rather naïve. The lack of relevance attributed to human reproduction and upbringing highlights the deficiencies of his reasoning.
Whether Locke is correct about the specific form of the family, however, is a separate question.Footnote 11 Yet, by taking into account the inescapable human feature and explaining the role it plays in the state of nature, Locke offers a more credible hypothesis of the state of nature than Hobbes’s.
4 Families as a source of coordination
The mere fact that individuals internalize the laws of nature through education, however, does not solve the core problem in the Hobbesian state of nature: distrust. For Locke, trust is possible because individuals keep each other in check by punishing those who violate the law of nature. Scholars recently have been interested in the punitive dimension of Locke’s state of nature (Barrett Reference Barrett2020; Bruner Reference Bruner2020; Layman Reference Layman2020). Punishing wrongdoing is not an exclusive right of governments, but “every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and be Executioner of the Law of Nature” (ST 2:8). Put simply, in the state of nature, punishment is decentralized. How is this possible? Is it enough that most people internalize the law of nature to voluntarily punish violators?
4.1 Decentralized punishment
Even if most individuals are moderate in the state of nature, Locke does consider the existence of some “degenerates” (ST 2:10) who violate the law of nature and should then be treated as “dangerous and noxious Creatures” (ST 3:16). Degenerates are self-centered individuals who disregard the law of nature, while the rest of the individuals in the Lockean state of nature understand that cooperation is the best way to survive and restrain their actions accordingly. Following Kavka (Reference Kavka1986), let us call the degenerates dominator types and the Lockean individuals moderate types. What would result from the interaction between dominator and moderate types?
As mentioned earlier, formal models of Hobbes’s state of nature demonstrate that his conjectures are robust given that even the presence of a very small number of dominator types can transform a state of nature predominantly composed of moderate types into a state of war (Vanderschraaf Reference Vanderschraaf2006; Chung Reference Chung2015; Schaefer and Sohn Reference Schaefer and Sohn2022). In other words, a few degenerates in the Lockean state of nature trigger a Hobbesian war. Does this imply that, despite his deficient views on the inescapable human feature, Hobbes ultimately provides the right conjecture about the state of nature?
Locke suggests that spontaneous collective punishment can control degenerates. Moderates are responsible for protecting peace in the absence of political institutions. In the presence of degenerates, moderate types have the duty to “preserve the rest of Mankind” (ST 2:6), which may involve treating those who violate the law of nature “as Beasts of Prey” (ST 3:16) and killing them “for the same reason that [one] may kill a Wolf or a Lyon” (ST 3:16). The obligation to punish violators of the law of nature appears to be part of the law of nature itself, as it is a necessary condition for protecting the social order (ST 2:7). Nevertheless, a single moderate individual might not be sufficient to control dominator types. Locke claims that “any other Person who finds [a punishment] just, may also joyn with him that is injur’d, and assist him in recovering from the Offender…” (ST 2:10). Law enforcement is likely to be more effective when multiple moderate individuals engage in collective punishment. If this interpretation is correct, spontaneous mechanisms for decentralized collective punishment would be essential to maintaining peace in the absence of centralized authority (Pettit Reference Pettit2023, 201).
At this point, Locke encounters a similar problem to the one Hobbes identifies in the state of nature: the problem of collective action. If the fundamental thesis of the state of nature is that collective action is not possible due to generalized distrust, how can collective decentralized punishment be possible? Are we sure that moderate types will pay the cost of cooperating with each other to punish wrongdoers? Perhaps, at the end, Locke’s picture is too rosy: he believes that moral education is enough to protect peace in the state of nature. If there were a way for moderates to coordinate in punishing dominator types, Locke’s conjectures might become more convincing.
I argue that families play a further role in Locke’s state of nature. They open the possibility of spontaneous cooperation for collective punishment by providing a mechanism through which unknown moderates can identify one another. This is not an argumentative move that Locke explicitly makes to alleviate the concern of a Hobbesian war, but it is available to those theorists seeking to understand how a fragile peace is possible in the state of nature.
4.2 A Lockean answer: cooperation for collective punishment
Some scholars remark that in the state of nature people might form small groups. Even Hobbes envisions the possibility of confederacies of moderate types in the state of nature (L 15:5). Studying the Hobbesian state of nature, Michael Moehler holds that “rational individuals may trust other individuals in the state of nature, for example, individuals who are close to them, such as their family members and good friends” (Reference Moehler2009, 310). Likewise, Jacob Barrett stresses that “friends and family members may identify each other as moderates, so there may be room for small ‘confederacies’ in the state of nature” (Reference Barrett2020, 339). Identification of moderates appears fundamental for cooperation. Formal models supporting the robustness of Hobbes’s conjectures also highlight the inability to identify player types as a key factor triggering war in the state of nature (Chung Reference Chung2015; Schaefer and Sohn Reference Schaefer and Sohn2022). However, if moderates can communicate trustworthiness and identify one another as moderates, they may be able to avoid war by collectively punishing dominator types. What kind of mechanism could be in place to render this identification successful in the state of nature?
As said, Locke does not address this point explicitly. Yet, he provides the basis to develop an account of the family as a signaling mechanism. In his depiction of the state of nature, there are cases in which cooperation is sustained because “a Family was numerous enough to subsist by it self […] without mixing with others” (ST 8:105), and other cases in which societies, composed of more than one family, are yet small enough that everyone “ha[s] some Acquaintance and Friendship together, and some Trust one in another” (ST 8:107). Hence, Locke does suggest that cooperation appears when moderates identify each other. However, he does not seem to make explicit the mechanism that enables such cooperation, namely signaling moderation through family affiliation. We can only speculate as to why Locke does not pay much attention to this mechanism, even when he mentions it. One possible explanation is that “degenerates” who violate the law of nature are isolated anomalies in small societies where everyone knows each other (ST 8:107), and thus collective efforts to monitor and punish wrongdoing are easily mobilized (ST 2:11). Another possible explanation is that interactions with strangers are only possible once “Families increases, and Industry inlarge their Stocks, their Possessions inlarged with the need of them” (ST 5:38), cities appear, money emerges, and property runs scarce (ST: 5:38; Ashcraft Reference Ashcraft1968); but, at that point, a commonwealth is required to regulate interactions among strangers. In the state of nature, by contrast, where people only interact with those that they know, there is no need to elucidate the mechanism that allows them to identify each other.
Identifying this mechanism proves particularly important in light of current theoretical models of the state of nature, which support the robustness of Hobbes’s conjectures (Vanderschraaf Reference Vanderschraaf2006; Chung Reference Chung2015; Schaefer and Sohn Reference Schaefer and Sohn2022). When signaling moderation is possible in the state of nature, cooperation and control of dominator types become credible. A state of nature populated primarily by moderate types and only a few dominators can thus lead to peace, contrary to the conclusions of game-theoretical models that disregard the role of the family. Locke’s depiction of the state of nature offers conceptual resources for addressing the broader problem of cooperation: the family serves as a mechanism for identifying moderate types in the state of nature by enabling individuals to signal their affiliation to a moderate family.
This mechanism might function as follows. Consider two possible ways individuals might identify types in the state of nature: through friendships or family membership (Barrett Reference Barrett2020). In Locke’s state of nature, family members recognize one another as moderate types because they have known each other since childhood. But how can one determine that unfamiliar individuals are also moderate? Every friend that does not come from one’s family starts by being a stranger. The ways of meeting strangers in the state of nature are limited by hypothesis to (R) random encounters or (F) unknown members of a different family of moderates. R is unlikely to lead to friendship in a state of nature because there is uncertainty about whether one is running into dominators or moderate types. If Chad (a moderate type) runs into Danielle (another moderate) and does not know whether she is a moderate or a dominator, but he is aware that a few dominators occupy the area, he would opt to preemptively attack. As said, moderates would prefer to attack even in the presence of a minimal number of dominators (Schaefer and Sohn Reference Schaefer and Sohn2022). A credible way that two moderate strangers can cooperate in the state of nature is if they run into (F) an unknown member of another family of moderates. In the state of nature, moderate individuals may cooperate with unknown members of other moderate families if they can communicate that they are members of a moderate family themselves. This would give both individuals reasons to think that each follows the law of nature.
If Chad belongs to the moderate family M1 and Danielle to the moderate family M2, they need to communicate their membership when they encounter each other in the state of nature. This communication enables them to cooperate peacefully and, if necessary, to jointly punish wrongdoers. Family markers could serve as a stamp of approval for moderation, enabling others to monitor the reputation of family members. In this framework, families would act as reputation trackers, fostering an environment conducive to enforcement in the absence of political institutions (Boehm Reference Boehm2012; Pettit 2023).
There are multiple ways to communicate one’s belonging to a family: salutations, clothing, jewelry, heraldic symbols, crests, accents, and so on (Mauss Reference Mauss1990 [1954]; Sahlins Reference Sahlins1972; Boehm Reference Boehm2012). More costly markers have been developed in history to prevent deception, such as jewelry, gifts, or body modifications (e.g., tattoos, circumcision). The more costly the marker, the stronger the assurance others have that individuals belong to certain families.Footnote 12 Families can develop distinctive markers to identify each other as moderate groups and their members as moderate individuals. Therefore, the family in the Lockean state of nature can be seen not only as a spontaneous institution for moderation but as a mechanism to signal moderation, track reputation, foster cooperation, avoid dominator types, and enable collective decentralized punishment for wrongdoing. The sophisticated models that assume the impossibility of effectively signaling moderation in the state of nature might offer good models of the flawed Hobbes’s state of nature, but they are not useful for reaching a verdict regarding the dialectic between Hobbes and Locke. Their results are misleading. Hobbes’s conjectures are not robust.
5 Liberalism and informal institutions
Underlining the importance of the family in Locke invites us to reconsider how we think about his political views in general. Exegetically, as noted, it solves the puzzle of obedience to the law of nature. Locke does not conceive liberty and peace in the state of nature as a mere assumption but infers it from observing the process of maturation. Thus, Locke is neither naive nor overly optimistic about human nature; rather, he observes the existence of pre-political institutions of education and collective punishment. In what follows, I briefly examine the normative and speculative implications of emphasizing the role of the family in Locke’s state of nature.
5.1 Normative implication: reasons for liberalism
Does it matter to reach a verdict about which description of the state of nature is more credible? According to contractarian reasoning, the state of nature determines political legitimacy. Thus, considering that one hypothesis of the state of nature is more credible than the other provides reasons to favor—at least prima facie—one view of political legitimacy over another. This paper is built on the dialectic between Hobbes’s and Locke’s states of nature, acknowledging that it is typically thought that Hobbes has a more convincing view of the state of nature. Accordingly, some may believe an authoritarian regime that guarantees peace lies at the foundation of every legitimate political government (Mittiga Reference Mittiga2022). Yet, this is only the case if one disregards the inescapable human feature. Once the assumption that human beings do not enter the world as equals ready to fight is part of the picture, the results change, and the case for Hobbesian authoritarianism weakens.
Locke’s observations about the hypothetical state of nature better accommodate the inescapable human feature, which, ultimately, leads to a more compelling view of political legitimacy than Hobbes’s. We enter the world as defenseless creatures whose parents (or guardians) must nourish, help us survive, and teach us to coexist in a society of equals. Through a process of moral education that shapes behavior, humans enter a society of equals equipped with a moral compass to avoid collective punishment for violating the law of nature. Families lay the foundation for peaceful cooperation in the state of nature, but also introduce its main perils. Since individuals are educated in the law of nature within different families, their interpretations of that law may occasionally diverge, which might lead to conflicts. Such conflicts threaten the peace in the state of nature when punishments are biased. As families foster strong allegiances and serve as the primary source of trust, individuals in the state of nature tend to be biased towards their families and punish harshly those who harm their family members (ST 2:13). Divergent interpretations and family biases may generate conflicts that endanger the fragile peace of the state of nature. Hence, the core threat in the state of nature is not, as Hobbes believes, a state of generalized distrust that leads to war (ST 3:19), but, as Locke surmises, it lies in the indeterminacy of the law of nature and biased enforcement (ST 7:87).
A legitimate political regime is one that offers a solution to those problems. According to Locke, this is achieved through a commonwealth that separates the power of legislation from the power of execution (ST 8:89). The problem of the indeterminacy of the law of nature is solved by choosing representatives who reach common agreements about the content and interpretation of the law (Barrett Reference Barrett2020). And the executive power functions only as an impartial umpire, tasked with enforcing the commonly agreed-upon law to prevent the ongoing conflicts that arise from biased enforcement (ST 7:88). Put simply, the separation of powers characteristic of liberal regimes is the solution to the ills of the state of nature. Acknowledging the significance of upbringing and the role of the family in the state of nature thus provides strong reasons to favor Locke’s liberalism over Hobbes’s absolutism.
One might, of course, reject the entire contractarian framework, dismissing the states of nature as a hypothetical construct that offers little insight into real political regimes. Alternatively, one could argue that other thinkers, such as Rousseau (Reference Rousseau1971 [1755]), present a more plausible conception of the state of nature (Juarez-Garcia and Schaefer Reference Juarez-Garcia and Schaefer2022). Similarly, some, following Kant, may understand the state of nature as a transcendental exercise, an “as if” story that need not reflect empirical realities. For these critics, the distinction between Hobbes’s and Locke’s states of nature may seem irrelevant. However, if we accept the premises of contractarian theorizing and limit our consideration to Hobbes’s and Locke’s hypotheses, we should recognize that Locke’s separation of powers offers the legitimate form of government, insofar as the hypothetical foundation of his claims is more plausible than Hobbes’s.
5.2 Speculative implication: informal child care institutions
One of the most significant implications of stressing the role of the family in Locke’s reasoning is that it highlights that a liberal regime of separated powers is grounded in the prevalence of decentralized, nonpolitical (informal) institutions that enforce moral rules. Yet, the importance of such institutions in the state of nature has often been overlooked. Social contract theorists frequently leap from interactions between isolated individuals to the state, bypassing the role of intermediate informal institutions. An indirect goal of this analysis is to emphasize the importance of such institutions within contractarian thought, more specifically, the importance of child care institutions.
Current social contract theorists may have forgotten that child care institutions were at the core of political philosophy, but classical philosophers, from Plato (1998) to Smith (Reference Smith1981) and Engels (Reference Engels1884), knew that it was impossible to change political institutions without radically transforming child care. To illustrate the crucial role that the family plays in Locke’s liberalism, we can speculate about what would happen if we treat the family as a variable that we can tweak in the state of nature. Would the separation of powers be legitimate with a different kind of informal child care institution? In the following, I briefly speculate about how informal child care institutions may modify the form of the political regime. Do the different forms that child care institutions have historically acquired pose a problem for Locke’s liberalism?
Historically, there have been a variety of child care institutions. Anthropological investigations show that conjugal societies are not as spontaneous as Locke might have thought. Different informal associations play the role of child care. In early societies, for example, it was the whole group that collaborated to provide child care, which, according to anthropologist Sarah Hrdy (Reference Hrdy2009), shaped pro-social impulses. In some matrilineal kinship systems (e.g., the Mosuo in Southwest China, the Trobriand people in Papua New Guinea), the role of the father is diminished while the mother’s brothers take a more important role in the household and child care (Mattison Reference Mattison2011). Polygyny, a system in which one male reproduces with multiple wives, has existed as a system of child care for centuries (White and Burton Reference White and Burton1988). Contrary to Locke’s claims, conjugal societies are thus only one form of child care institution in history, and probably not the oldest one. Locke was certainly wrong about the spontaneity of monogamous heterosexual conjugal societies in the state of nature. Is this a problem for his theory?
This does not seem like a fatal flaw to Locke’s liberalism. A particular composition of conjugal societies does not seem essential to Locke’s claims as long as there is a spontaneous child care institution responsible for moral education and serving as a reputation tracker for enforcement. However, it is fundamental for Locke’s picture that child care institutions are pre-political. Since the inescapable human feature creates evolutionary pressures to form pre-political child care institutions, it seems reasonable to believe that any state of nature should have informal child care institutions, even if they are organized differently. As long as adults care for helping children survive and there is some sort of moral education, the problems in the state of nature will remain the ambiguity of the law of nature and the lack of impartial enforcement, as Locke believed.
The inevitability of child care institutions points to an element that is often overlooked by social contract theorists: informal institutions shape the personality and behavior of individuals while they are growing up. Social contract theorists often think about informal institutions as different and independent spheres of legitimacy; however, as Locke shows, they must be considered as grounds that determine the shape of the state.Footnote 13 Once we realize the importance of the family for liberal institutions from a Lockean perspective, we understand that we need to study further these informal institutions and their influence on political institutions. Put simply, social contract theorists may strengthen their analysis if they follow Locke in understanding that informal institutions determine formal institutions.
6 Conclusion
For Locke, in the state of nature individuals are free within the limits of the law of nature. His description is not grounded in a rosy and overly optimistic view of human behavior, but rather in the observation that decentralized collective punishment is possible at various stages and through pre-political institutions. First, parents punish their children to shape their behavior as they grow up. Second, adults collectively punish those who violate the laws of nature. Only those who respect—even if imperfectly—the laws of nature are allowed to live as free and equal individuals in the state of nature; those who fail to abide by it are treated as enemies of humanity. From this perspective, The Second Treatise can be read as a hypothetical exploration of the different decentralized spontaneous enforcement mechanisms, their virtues, their problems, and the importance of complementing them with a centralized enforcing apparatus.
Locke takes into account an inescapable human feature, which grounds his claims about the pre-political institutions that shape behavior. The family plays a fundamental role in his political theory: it is because of informal child care institutions that the state of nature is not a state of war. Although it has fundamental problems that can lead to conflict, these can be resolved through a regime of separated powers. Therefore, Locke’s liberalism is grounded in the family as a source of education and cooperation.
In closing, I briefly mention two unsettling implications of rediscovering the importance of the family in Locke’s liberalism. First, the Lockean regime of separated powers appears to rely heavily on the existence of some form of spontaneous child care institution. Without it, individuals in the state of nature would not internalize the law of nature and lack ways to signal trustworthiness. This is to say that, in a state of nature without spontaneous child care institutions, Hobbes’s description becomes more accurate and his solution more appropriate than Locke’s. Does that mean that the family as a spontaneous child care institution is a necessary condition of a liberal regime characterized by the separation of powers? Locke seems to believe so.
The second disturbing implication is the recognition that in-group biases may be a source of instability of the regime of separated powers. Signaling belonging to those we can identify as members of our own group solves the problem of cooperation in the state of nature. But the very same mechanism may become problematic for the commonwealth. As population increases and individuals are compelled to cooperate with strangers (ST 5:38), they may remain skeptical of those groups they do not identify as moderates and trustworthy due to different types of family education. The in-group biases that make peace possible in the state of nature might hinder the recognition of strangers as cooperators in political societies. Considering strangers part of an out-group might lead to distrust and polarization. If this dynamic is true, it raises a further question: are families (as the main source of moral education) unintentionally exacerbating conflicts in political societies?
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the editor, Helen McCabe, and the anonymous reviewers for their encouraging and constructive feedback. AI tools were used in the preparation of this article exclusively for language editing and for locating bibliographic references. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Meeting and the New Orleans Political Economy Workshop (Murphy Institute, Tulane University). I am grateful to the audiences for their helpful comments. I owe special thanks to Jacob Barrett, Bruce Brower, Ben Ferguson, Luca Ferrero, Michael Moehler, Matt Myers, Alexander Schaefer, John Thrasher, Chad Van Schoelandt, Peter Vanderschraaf, David Ween, and Matt Zwolinski. I am deeply grateful to Dan Engster and Matthew Jeffers for reading the manuscript and offering valuable feedback. Finally, I am especially indebted to Dan Layman and Alexandra Oprea, whose encouragement led me to write this paper in the first place.
Open access
