This comment argues for the recognition of ecocide as an international crime, focusing on its contemporary legal relevance and the growing momentum for its codification. Originally coined in 1970 to describe wartime environmental destruction, the term ecocide was framed in parallel to genocide and grounded in the post–World War II development of international criminal law. Although initial legal efforts to formalize ecocide, including proposed conventions and debates during the drafting of the Rome Statute, failed to secure sufficient political support, these early shortcomings have been re-energized by rising environmental consciousness and sustained legal advocacy, particularly by the Stop Ecocide Foundation. Recent developments, including the 2021 legal definition proposed by the Independent Expert Panel and the 2024 amendment proposal to the Rome Statute advanced by Pacific Island nations, reflect a renewed and increasingly actionable international consensus. By examining the conceptual genealogy of ecocide and its doctrinal links to international humanitarian and criminal law, this comment contends that recognizing ecocide as a core international crime is not only a normative necessity but also a legally coherent and pragmatic step. It directly responds to the scale and urgency of present environmental crises and addresses a longstanding gap in the enforcement architecture of international criminal law.

This note critically examines the tendency of some international human rights treaty bodies to uncritically conflate sex tourism with human trafficking. Through analysis of concluding observations from the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the note reveals a troubling pattern of equating these phenomena without adequate conceptual differentiation. While acknowledging that sex tourism can involve trafficking when the constitutive elements of the Palermo Protocol’s definition are satisfied – namely the act, means, and purpose requirements – this note argues that the wholesale characterization of sex tourism as trafficking is both conceptually inaccurate and potentially harmful. This conflation risks eliding the agency of individuals who make difficult but deliberate choices to participate in sex tourism, particularly women from the Global South.

International law has been predominantly shaped by the West. Despite decolonization, insufficient attention has been paid to non-Western civilizations’ practices, including Asian civilizations. This article examines this insufficiency in relation to treaty interpretation and customary international law identification. To do so, it uses the notion of conscientious objection to military service as a case study. Despite particularly adverse state practice, chiefly in Asia, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) treaty body and UN organs began affirming in the 1990s that the Covenant includes a right to conscientious objection to military service. The first part analyzes whether such a right can be implied from the ICCPR, inter alia, by assessing the practice of Asian states. The second part endeavours to explain the gap between the international human rights machinery’s pronouncements and non-Western practice by discussing the Western-centrism and individual-centrism of interpretations adopted by human rights bodies and organs.

The interaction between international law and constitutional law has been increasingly recognized as salient to understanding the functioning of both and hence as worthy of academic attention. This Introduction to a special issue on how a selection of five Asian courts engage with international law when adjudicating constitutional cases explains the significance of studying such judicial behaviours, outlines the conceptual framework to be used in this regard, and identifies and reflects on some of the key findings from the case studies, including by highlighting domestic constitutional factors that help account for observed divergencies in judicial approach. This contribution also points to the value of examining courts’ attitudes towards international law for a variety of scholarly debates.

This article explores the role of international law in Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal (CFA). The CFA makes extensive use of international and comparative materials, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, it avoids issuing judgments that would clash with Beijing’s core interests and accepts its broad definition of “national security”. This arguably facilitates authoritarian interpretations of the ICCPR and undermines the authority of the Human Rights Committee. Yet, in March of 2025, the CFA granted an appeal and upheld the right to fair trial, emphasizing that the ICCPR continues to enjoy constitutional status in Hong Kong. Moreover, the CFA continues to advance the rights of vulnerable groups, including the LGBT community. The CFA’s contributions to comparative jurisprudence on international human rights law are decidedly mixed. But this is arguably inevitable, given its unusual status as an “apex court” operating in the shadow of Beijing.

Mauro Cappelletti’s waves of domestic and transnational constitutionalism have reached Asia where courts exercise constitutional review and engage with international law in the process. Institutional and sociological legal scholars celebrate this as the inexorable global constitutionalization of international law through the liberal structures of judicial review and dialogue. A previous article cast doubt on the inevitability of global constitutionalization in view of material inconsistencies in interactions with international law by Asian courts, even those with rule of law and liberal democratic traditions. The present article on the Philippine Supreme Court sheds light on an underlying cause: arbitrary and contradictory selection and application of secondary rules for identifying international law by its source. The consequent degradation of international law and delegitimization of judicial engagement with it are the makings of the third wave of judicial review that Doreen Lustig and Joseph Weiler warned will reverse the gains of transnational constitutionalism.

This article examines the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s use of international law in its decisions between 2003 and 2023, when it referred to international legal instruments in approximately 10% of its constitutional review cases. However, it has not clearly explained why or how it uses international law. The article develops a typology of the Court’s use of international law, categorising it into four areas: bolstering domestic law, interpreting domestic law, rejecting international law, and misconstruing international law. The Court primarily uses international law to support or confirm domestic constitutional and statutory provisions, especially when they are similar (or universal, as the Court sometimes observes). However, the Court sometimes uses international law to interpret domestic law, and occasionally, it even appears to misconstrue international law to reach a desired outcome. We conclude that, if anything, the Court practices pragmatic dualism, rather than pragmatic monism, as Palguna and Wardana argued in this Journal in 2024.

Despite Taiwan’s exclusion from many treaty regimes, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court (TCC) has at times cited international law, particularly international human rights norms. To analyse the authority and influence of these citations, this article proposes a typology along two dimensions: legal effect (whether the Court treats international norms as legally binding or merely advisory) and impact level (whether international norms are used to reaffirm or alter existing constitutional jurisprudence, or to guide future developments). Applying this framework reveals that the TCC’s traditional tendency to treat international norms as non-binding and reaffirming is evolving. In recent years, the TCC has increasingly invoked international law to articulate new rights protections and has begun to recognise its legal authority, suggesting a deeper engagement. Beyond the case study of Taiwan, this typology offers an analytical tool for distinguishing varying degrees of judicial engagement with international law and for underscoring the evolving nature of such engagement.

In line with Singapore’s vision of the separation of powers, the courts’ duty is primarily to give effect to domestic law; the political branches take the lead in engaging with international law. A study of Singapore’s interface with international law would therefore be incomplete were it to consider only the courts’ role and not the political branches’ model of international law as primarily a guarantor of Singapore’s sovereignty and standing as a participant on the international stage. The political branches have been circumspect in engaging with international law in other areas, such as human rights, preferring a specifically Singaporean vision of rights. A symmetry emerges: the courts and political branches engage strongly with sovereignty-related norms; take other areas of international law as inspiration for developing domestic law; and take human rights law seriously even as their fidelity is ultimately to a specifically Singaporean legal framework for rights protection.

Transitional justice’s nature has continued to evolve and, consequently, its scope has significantly widened, raising various unsettled issues. As this review essay observes, transitional justice itself has become conceptually “transitional”, undergoing profound transitions and doing so within an also increasingly and profoundly changing context. Also, as this essay contends, the orientation of those transitions lies at the core of competing visions for transitional justice as a whole. In this vein, as this essay further argues, two major trends seem to be emerging and giving shape to transitional justice’s ongoing transitions: firstly, a trend towards focusing on the (infra)structural dimension of transitional justice processes and thus aiming to reorient transitional justice towards addressing “(infra)structural” factors of (societal) change; and, secondly, a trend towards increasingly relying on public law, in both international and internal legal orders, as a framework to conceptually articulate and implement (infra)structural processes of change.