ECE in twenty-first-century Turkey

Examining the policy frameworks of ECE in Turkey is crucial to situate Quran kindergartens within the broader educational landscape. All early childhood programs in Turkey – except for the Quran kindergartens – are governed by the Ministry of National Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı; MEB), following relevant national laws and regulations, as well as international agreements. The ECE curriculum is based on scientific research oriented towards evidence-based learning and the latest information on childhood development (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 2017; Yılmaz and Tuğrul Reference Yılmaz and Tuğrul2013). Preschool education encompasses twenty-five hours per week, with half-day programs offering morning or afternoon sessions. Children up to the age of sixty-six months are eligible for ECE, and it is optional. Children who turn sixty-six months old are required to begin elementary school. Children younger than sixty-six months can attend public or private early childhood institutions, such as kindergartens, nurseries, care centers, preschool classes, and school preparation classes, or public-oriented ECE centers, including toy libraries; science, art, music, or sports centers; and mother and child education centers (ibid.). Only 68 percent of children in Turkey had access to ECE in 2018–2019 due to a lack of facilities (Eğitim Sen Reference Sen2021). Turkey dedicated just 0.2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to pre-primary education, compared to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 0.6 percent. While the average annual expenditure per student at the pre-primary level across OECD countries was US$ 8,070, Turkey allocated only US$ 3,172 per student, constituting the lowest amount among its counterparts (OECD 2017). In 2022, the share of GDP allocated to this area in Türkiye was 0.25 percent, compared to the OECD average of 0.60 percent (OECD 2025).

The MEB released updated figures for the 2023–2024 academic year, indicating that ECE coverage had reached 64.04 percent across Turkey (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 2025). Additionally, the number of kindergartens was revised in 2023, with public institutions totaling 12,046 and private institutions numbering 6,820 nationwide (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 2024).

Even though there has been some progress in ECE in Turkey, the number and quality of facilities for childcare require improvement (Akkan et al. Reference Akkan, Buğra and Knijn2023; Dedeoğlu and Şahankaya-Adar Reference Dedeoğlu and Şahankaya-Adar2024; Dedeoğlu et al. Reference Dedeoğlu, Şahankaya-Adar and Sıralı2021). Not only the number but also the prices of ECE facilities affect families (Kavak Reference Kavak2011; Yılmaz Reference Yılmaz2007). The prices of private kindergartens were, on average, three times higher than public ones, meaning that 32 percent of the children in Turkey were covered neither by public nor private kindergartens due to the lack of institutions or high prices (Ertem Reference Ertem and Orhan2022). The enrollment rate in ECE was even lower in 2014 when the Islamic kindergartens were launched. Only 47 percent of four- to six-year-old children had access to ECE by the institutions under the regulation of the MEB (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 2016).

To understand the state of ECE in Turkey and to situate Quran kindergartens, it is also important to look at the recruitment of ECE teachers. To pursue a career as a preschool teacher in Turkey, one must complete a four-year degree program at a faculty of education that spans a wide array of subjects, ranging from theoretical frameworks of child development to practical teaching experience (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Talim Terbiye Kurulu 2013). Candidates are required to engage in a comprehensive curriculum including courses in psychology, sociology of education, and educational psychology, alongside specialized subjects focusing on child development theories and ECE models. Practical skill development is facilitated through preservice teacher training courses. These programs also include specialized courses in areas such as music and movement, art in early childhood, and experiences in science and mathematics. While the Institution of Higher Education prescribes a set of mandatory courses, universities have the flexibility to offer elective courses aligned with the expertise of their faculty members (Gol-Guven Reference Gol-Guven, Rentzou and Slutsky2019). However, none of these qualifications is expected from Quran kindergarten teachers (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2014). This contrast in teacher education requirements highlights a dual-track system in ECE, where religious and secular programs operate under different standards of professionalization.

Islamic education in early childhood: the start and development of the Quran kindergarten project

Before Quran kindergartens, Islamic education at the level of ECE had been given by private institutions. Many Islamic sects already had kindergartens, and they had been de facto tolerated by the state (Çakmak Reference Çakmak2013; Güven Reference Güven2019; Kuran-Burçoğlu Reference Kuran-Burçoğlu2011; Taştan Reference Taştan2021). Several religious sects, such as Menzil, İsmailağa, and Süleymancılar, are still active in the area of education by establishing foundations (vakif) and private schools (Demir Reference Demir2018; Ustamahmut Reference Ustamahmut2022). Various foundations established by Islamic sects, such as the Semerkant, Ensar, Hayrat, and Hizmet foundations, and İlim Yayma Cemiyeti, play active roles in the area of education. Tügva is yet another significant Islamic foundation engaged in educational activities; however, it distinguished itself by not being affiliated with a particular sect. Notably, President Erdoğan’s son, Bilal Erdoğan, was among its founders and has served on its board of directors. These foundations formed collaborative agreements with the MEB and have entered public schools and kindergartens to offer courses and extracurricular activities. They have been operating dormitories, schools, and kindergartens across the country. While the Turkish Council of State (Danıştay) issued decrees to halt the involvement of these sects in public schools, the MEB largely disregarded these decrees and continued to cooperate with Islamic sects by formalizing protocols with them (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 2014).

Adding to this existing situation, the first move by the AKP towards these kindergartens was abolishing the age limit for religious instruction among children with a decree in 2011. Until then, children had to be at least twelve years old (or at least a primary school fifth-grader) before they could attend religion lessons at schools and Quran courses at mosques (Aksoy and Eren Deniz Reference Aksoy and Eren Deniz2018).

Another major turn in ECE in Turkey was the MEB’s decision to terminate the preschool project titled “The Enforcement of Preschool Education” (Okul Öncesi Eğitimin Güçlendirilmesi), which had been supported by the European Union and UNICEF and aimed to establish compulsory preschool and kindergarten education in 2013 (Anne Çocuk Eğitim Vakfı ve Eğitim Reformu Girişimi 2013). This shift transferred the initiative for expanding ECE from the MEB to the DİB, facilitated by the annulment of the age limit and the removal of compulsory preschool education; thus the DİB began to establish kindergartens under the name of “Quran courses for children.” In doing so, authority over public ECE was reconfigured from a secular, pedagogical framework toward a religious–institutional one.

After these legislative changes in ECE, Quran kindergartens – introduced as a pilot project in 2013 – began to appear predominantly in mosques or apartment buildings within residential neighborhoods. Administered by the DİB, they are financed through its official budget, yet their partial reliance on mosque donations underscores the integration of community-based religious funding into the institutionalization of ECE. The number of Quran kindergartens in Turkey was around 5,988 in 2023, and the total number of children who have enrolled since 2013 is 1,531,920 (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2024). The director of the DİB, Ali Erbaş, says opening Quran kindergartens is “a revolution,” with the number who enrolled in 2023 being more than 200,000 and the number of graduates reaching more than a million (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2023b). The DİB also prepared an educational program including rules, curricula, and activities for education in Quran kindergartens. The educational activities, while focusing on regular cognitive, social, emotional, and physical development, motor skills, and self-care competencies, also focus on national, religious, and moral values, the Quran alphabet, and its recitation (ibid.).

In 2018, Quran kindergartens were offering significantly lower tuition fees than the average public and private kindergartens in İstanbul, charging only 100 to 150 TL (US$ 19–28) per month. In contrast, private kindergartens had an average monthly fee of 1,200 TL (US$ 226), and public kindergartens run by the MEB or municipalities were charging 750 TL (US$ 141) on average.Footnote ² Their affordability renders Islamic kindergartens more appealing to low-income families. Also, in many neighborhoods, no public kindergartens are available, making Islamic public kindergartens the only accessible option.

As mentioned above, kindergarten teachers in secular ECE facilities have university degrees (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Talim Terbiye Kurulu 2013), yet Quran kindergartens’ teachers do not have to have university degrees. By contrast, they only need a high-school diploma from an Imam-Hatip school (IHS) and to complete a 296-hour certification program administered jointly by the DİB and MEB, in collaboration with the Directorate of Lifelong Learning in Public Education Centers (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2014).

In mosque-based Quran kindergartens, it is common for imams’ wives to work as teachers. During fieldwork observation, one imam explained that this recruitment practice was widespread, partly because the formal requirements for becoming a Quran kindergarten teacher were relatively low and because imams’ wives were already familiar with the mosque environment. He further emphasized that, when selecting educators, he prioritized women who were mothers, reasoning that they would be better suited to care for young children than women without children of their own.

Cultural hegemony and education

This article argues that the transformation of ECE under the AKP, exemplified by the institutionalization of Quran kindergartens, should be understood not only as an educational reform but as part of a broader project of cultural hegemony construction by the state. As a concept introduced by Antonio Gramsci, hegemony refers to the dominance of a particular social group over others, not only through coercion but also through ideological means, leading the ruling classes’ values and beliefs to be accepted as a social norm (Gramsci Reference Gramsci2011). He argued that the ruling class maintains control through political and economic means and cultural institutions, of which schools are a part. In this context, education is a tool for socializing individuals into the dominant ideology, making them accept the status quo as natural and inevitable. This process, which Gramsci referred to as cultural hegemony, is critical in the reproduction of existing social structures (Gramsci Reference Gramsci2011). This perspective indicates that the ruling class uses cultural institutions – including schools – to disseminate its worldview, making it the “common sense” of society. This hegemony is maintained not just by force but through the active consent of the governed, who are socialized into accepting the status quo. Education, therefore, plays a crucial role in this process by shaping individuals’ beliefs, values, and behaviors in ways that support the existing power structure.

Antonio Gramsci’s (Reference Gramsci2011) concept of cultural hegemony paved the way for Louis Althusser’s (Reference Althusser, Szeman and Kaposy2010) theory of ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) by emphasizing the role of education in securing consent to the dominant class’s rule. Building on Gramsci, Althusser posited education as a state apparatus, emphasizing the role of schools in perpetuating dominant ideologies and legitimizing the state’s authority. Althusser also underlined the difference between his concept of ideological state apparatuses and Gramsci’s idea of hegemonic apparatuses. He pointed out that Gramsci identified these apparatuses based on their outcomes, while Althusser argued for defining them based on their underlying causes. Althusser distinguished between repressive state apparatuses, such as the military and police, which operate through coercion, and ISAs, like schools, churches, and media, which function through ideology. According to him, education is a primary ISA because it is instrumental in reproducing the conditions of production by instilling the dominant ideology in students. Through this process, individuals come to accept and internalize the existing social and economic structures as natural and inevitable (Althusser Reference Althusser, Szeman and Kaposy2010; Reference Althusser2014).

Hegemony construction, therefore, refers to the process by which a dominant social group establishes and maintains its leadership and authority over other groups within a society, not merely through coercion but primarily through the consensual acceptance of its worldview (Gramsci Reference Gramsci2011; Jackson Lears Reference Jackson Lears1985). Hegemony is constructed through the dissemination of ideology across various institutions, such as education, media, and religion, constituting “civil society” (Laclau and Mouffe Reference Laclau and Mouffe2014; Mayo Reference Mayo1999). These institutions play a crucial role in shaping public consciousness and ensuring that the interests of the dominant group are perceived as the interests of the governed masses. The construction of hegemony, therefore, is an ongoing and dynamic process, requiring the continuous adaptation and re-articulation of the dominant ideology to address the changing demands and conditions within society (Laclau and Mouffe Reference Laclau and Mouffe2014). Hence, hegemony construction is the strategic process by which dominant groups secure and maintain their leadership in society by creating and perpetuating a consensual ideological framework that aligns the interests of various social groups with their own, also articulating disparate social demands into a coherent political project (ibid.).

As one of the state’s institutions, education serves as a key mechanism for transmitting practices, beliefs, and value systems that sustain the advantages of dominant groups through cultural and ideological hegemony, thereby ensuring the continuation of social control (Mayo Reference Mayo1999). In this context, schools operate as instruments of the state, producing and legitimizing economic and ideological orientations under the influence of political power (Aronowitz and Giroux Reference Aronowitz and Giroux2003).

Similarly, Michel Foucault (Reference Foucault1995) argued that schools, like other institutions, are sites of surveillance and regulation, where individuals are disciplined into becoming compliant subjects. Foucault’s concept of “micro-technologies of discipline” highlights how seemingly mundane practices – such as sitting, walking, or dressing – serve as techniques of power that regulate behavior through repetition and normalization, particularly in institutional settings like schools. The education system enforces norms and standards of behavior, knowledge, and performance, shaping individuals in ways that align with the needs of the state and capitalist economy. This process of normalization contributes to the maintenance of social order by producing subjects who are docile, productive, and aligned with state objectives (Foucault Reference Foucault1995).

Hegemony construction and public Quran kindergartens

With the understanding and purpose of cultural hegemony in mind, President Erdoğan emphasized his goal of cultivating a hegemonic “pious generation” and has used educational and youth policies to promote new norms, ultimately aiming to shape a more conservative society (Bozan Reference Bozan2007; Kandiyoti and Emanet Reference Kandiyoti and Emanet2017; Kaya Reference Kaya2015; Lüküslü Reference Lüküslü, Öktem and Akkoyunlu2018). Education has become one of the venues for hegemonic struggles and social engineering in accordance with the AKP’s “new Turkey” project. One phase of this effort has been the IHSs, which provide theological education at the high-school and secondary-school levels and are heavily utilized by the AKP to further its agenda (Akşit and Coşkun Reference Akşit, Coşkun and Aktay2004; Buyruk Reference Buyruk2021). The number of IHSs has grown significantly, with many secular high schools and secondary schools being converted into IHSs by the MEB, often disregarding the preferences of local residents (Aşlamacı and Kaymakcan Reference Aşlamacı and Kaymakcan2017; Buyruk Reference Buyruk2021). The number of IHSs stood at 573 in 2012, and by 2018, this number had increased to 1,623 (Celik Reference Celik2023). In the 2022–2023 academic year, a total of 3,404 IHSs at the middle-school level were operational for graduates of elementary education, enrolling nearly 1.2 million students – 695,499 at the secondary level and 480,484 at the high-school level (Celik Reference Celik2023).

Similar to the IHS project, which has always been a pivotal educational unit for political Islamists of Turkey (Buyruk Reference Buyruk2021; Öcal Reference Öcal2007), Quran kindergartens have been a new model of school that is rapidly increasing all around Turkey, and they have become one of the most important projects of the AKP. As mentioned above, the number of children who graduated from Quran kindergartens since 2013 is over one million, and the number of schools in the whole of Turkey was 5,651 in 2022 (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2023a). Being regulated by the DİB, these schools are out of the administration of the MEB. Hence, with this move, the AKP de facto ruled out the Law of Unification in Education for ECE and established alternative Islamic facilities for ECE instead. By organizing it in such a way, the AKP side-stepped secular ECE in Turkey.

Quran kindergartens contribute to “raising a pious generation” discourse and are used in government speeches addressing the masses. Just before the start of the Quran kindergartens, President Erdoğan defined their ideal youth as “youngsters holding the Quran in one hand and a computer in the other” and argued that generations without faith in religion could turn out to be “addicts/thinner sniffers” (BirGün 2012).

The AKP government, particularly through President Erdoğan and DİB officials, has expressed strong support for Quran courses for children aged four to six years. Erdoğan has described these courses as “extremely valuable,” emphasizing their importance for early religious education and stressing that teaching children the Quran at a young age helps strengthen family values and the moral fabric of society (BirGün 2022). DİB director Ali Erbaş described the start of Quran kindergartens as a “major revolution” for Turkey, as mentioned above, and portrayed a myth of non-religious “traitor youth.” This myth constructs a binary opposition between loyal, religious youth and a so-called secular, morally corrupt youth seen as disloyal to the nation. Erbaş added that they are raising a religious generation that loves their state, nation, and country and hates traitors (Gazete Duvar Reference Duvar2024).

Yet, while celebrated by AKP leaders as a moral and national project, the opening of public Quran kindergartens has also been one of the most controversial initiatives of the party’s two decades in power. These new institutions have been subject to criticism from both the press (Akpınar and Doğan Reference Akpınar and Doğan2017) and opposition parties in the TBMM, and a research commission was demanded on the issue (TBMM 2022).

Constructing the “Muslim child” identity

If cultural hegemony is reproduced not only through political discourse but also within the micro-dimensions of daily practice, then Quran kindergartens constitute critical sites where ideology is translated into the practices of ECE. Within these institutions, the state’s aspiration to cultivate a “pious generation” is materialized in pedagogical routines, embodied rituals, and moral instruction that collectively shape how children come to understand themselves and their social world. The concept of the “Muslim child” – repeatedly invoked by teachers and parents during this study – thus emerges not as a rhetorical abstraction but as a lived identity actively constituted through educational practice.

For this research, two Quran kindergartens were visited, and focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews were carried out with teachers from both Quran kindergartens. Positioned on the ground level of a mosque within the expansive middle-class locale of Bayrampasa in İstanbul, the first Quran kindergarten was subject to a week-long visitation. This Quran kindergarten comprised four classrooms, a teacher’s lounge, and an indoor playground that doubles as a gathering space between classes. Within this shared area, a stage and sound system facilitated the children’s year-end shows. The classrooms were not segregated by gender, but the children’s restrooms were equipped with specialized sinks for ablution rituals before the weekly prayers. The mosque employed sixteen staff members in total, including the imam, thirteen of whom were dedicated to the kindergarten. This team comprised three full-time teachers, four contracted teachers, four assistants, and two custodial staff members.

The second kindergarten selected for the study was located in a two-story apartment building in Zeytinburnu, a district marked by lower socio-economic status and well known for its leather and textile workshops and factories. Unlike the first case, this Quran kindergarten operated on a modest scale, consisting of two small classrooms, a compact teachers’ lounge, and a combined vestibule and cloakroom with a restroom on the ground floor. The basement contained a kitchen connected to an indoor play area. The facility lacked amenities such as a stage, children’s restrooms, or an ablution area, requiring the rental of external venues for year-end performances. Staffing was limited to three teachers: one full-time and two on annual contracts paid by the hour, without summer breaks or pension benefits.

Beyond these site-specific details, certain common features could be observed across both kindergartens. Both schools displayed bulletin boards adorned with posters, children’s artwork, Turkish and Ottoman flags, Quranic verses, and quotes from Prophet Mohammad. During prayer times, boys and girls were segregated, and girls were wearing headscarves. Despite the absence of outdoor gardens, indoor playgrounds were available. Classrooms were furnished like secular kindergartens, with sets of toys and puppets. Educational resources, including books, were predominantly supplied by the DİB.

The term “Muslim child” was uttered frequently during the interviews, and teachers defined the general aim of kindergarten education as “Islamic values being introduced as a lifestyle,” “teaching morals to children in an Islamic way,” and “delivering the manners and rituals of being a Muslim,” which extends to every segment of life. Teachers displayed how the Muslim child should drink water, eat, go to the toilet, walk, and get dressed. A teacher explained that a four-year-old Muslim child should sit down while sipping a glass of water and then say “Bismillahmannirrahim,” put his hand to his head – optional but advised – and, after finishing the water, say “Alhamdülillah.”

The classroom observations revealed that gender segregation among children, both in practice and theory, is evident, especially during the performance of prayers. Children have been introduced to the concept of the “Muslim child,” and one of the most visible aspects of this identity formation was the introduction of the hijabFootnote ³ as a religious practice for young girls. Within the recent framework of the new “Muslim child” identity, kindergarten girls wear headscarves, especially during namaz (prayer) practices, and they cover their heads as if they were adult females; and girls and boys pray in separate groups. Teachers explain this ritual with the aim of getting used to the hijab from an early age.

An illustrative example of how the hijab is introduced to children as an obligatory Islamic practice can be found in a song performed during a year-end show – an event organized in Quran kindergartens in parallel with the practice of secular kindergartens. Unlike their secular counterparts, however, these performances are exclusively shaped by religious themes. In the event observed, the central motif was “the virtues of hijab,” conveying the message that moral integrity and faithfulness are achieved through covering the body in accordance with Islamic rules. Although teachers emphasized that hijab is not formally required before puberty (around the age of twelve years), they nonetheless sought to instill this “essential rule” in children as young as four to six years by adopting the dress code for performance purposes. Accordingly, girls were fully veiled in headscarves and long dresses while participating in the show. The lyrics of the song, presented below, are particularly significant in that they not only emphasize the value of hijab but also introduce a set of abstract religious and moral concepts to very young children. The song is called “I Am Valuable with My Hijab”:

The year-end performance offers a salient example of how the hijab is represented to children not merely as a form of dress but as a moral and spiritual safeguard, linking piety to broader notions of protection, obedience, and eternal salvation. Through its lyrics, the performance introduces children between the ages of four and six years to complex and abstract concepts, including the afterlife (peace in two worlds), metaphysical forces (the evil eye), and submission to authority (being an obedient subject). Classroom observations and interviews confirmed that such themes were not confined to performances but also appeared in daily pedagogical practices. Teachers reported that concepts such as death, heaven and hell, Judgment Day, God, the Devil, and angels were regularly introduced in what they described as a “mild” manner. For instance, one teacher explained that she presented God as an omnipresent and loving being who embraces the deceased, thereby attempting to make the notion of divinity and death comprehensible to young children.

These practices underscore how Quran kindergartens operate as sites of cultural hegemony. By embedding abstract theological concepts into everyday rituals – ranging from drinking water and eating to dressing and performing songs – children are socialized into a religious and nationalist worldview that is presented as natural and self-evident. The year-end show thus functions not only as a cultural performance but also as an ideological mechanism that normalizes Sunni Islamic values within ECE and aligns them with the AKP’s broader project of cultivating a pious generation. At the same time, these practices raise critical concerns regarding age-appropriateness, pedagogical adequacy, and the psychological implications of exposing very young children to complex notions of divine judgment, death, and obedience to authority.

The incorporation of abstract concepts emerges as a central component in shaping the identity of the “Muslim child.” Introducing such themes at an early age requires particular care, a concern that has been highlighted both in press coverage and in previous scholarly research (Dwyer Reference Dwyer2001; Mata-McMahon et al. Reference Mata-McMahon, Haslip and Schein2019; Sak Reference Sak2020; Stern Reference Stern2017). As highlighted in Turkish media, inattentive and inadequately informed practices within kindergarten settings have resulted in negative consequences. For instance, a newspaper article published sheds light on concerns raised by parents regarding Quran kindergartens (Akpınar and Doğan Reference Akpınar and Doğan2017). Some parents expressed grievances that their children, aged four to six years, exhibited confusion regarding abstract concepts after attending religious kindergartens. Parents were taken aback when their children began asking about their time of death, having learned at school that “dying means reaching God” and that “accessing God is a beautiful thing,” thus expressing eagerness to die. This newfound understanding of abstract concepts caused considerable concern among many parents, with some reporting that their children were notably frightened by these notions. Additionally, there were instances where children required psychological support following their experiences in kindergarten education (Akpınar and Doğan Reference Akpınar and Doğan2017). Based on classroom observations and interviews conducted at these schools, it became apparent that teachers lacked pedagogical and scientific expertise when addressing sensitive topics and emerging issues. The instructional materials and course books provided by the DİB also failed to offer specific teaching methods for handling these abstract concepts or any guidance on mitigating potential negative consequences for children.

Beyond abstract concepts, teachers also embedded religious explanations into the observation of natural phenomena, reinforcing a worldview in which divine creation frames children’s understanding of the material world. During the fieldwork, it was also observed that while teaching natural phenomena, everything is explained as a creation of God. Teachers cited how they described flowers growing in a garden:

While Quran kindergartens may not consistently present scientific facts in an age-appropriate manner, they prioritize instilling social values such as respect, love, compassion, and mercy within their curricula. These values are often taught through examples from the lives of prophets, mainly through anecdotes and teachings of Prophet Mohammed. Additionally, particularly for girls, there is a notable emphasis on motherhood as a sacred duty, and the reproduction of patriarchal gender roles is evident.

This process of identity formation extends beyond religious doctrine to encompass national and political narratives as well. In addition to Sunni Islamic practices, national and patriotic symbols appear as important parts of Muslim children’s identity formation in Quran kindergartens. During interviews with teachers, political concepts such as nationhood, citizenship, and patriotism – particularly during national holidays – were frequently mentioned. The failed coup of July 15, 2016 was often revisited with various visual aids and incorporated into the curriculum. The anniversary of this event was commemorated as a national holiday, named the “festival of democracy” by the AKP government, and was included as course material in Quran kindergartens. Some Quran kindergartens even depicted the events of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in short plays during their year-end shows, with children portraying soldiers and martyrs. However, teachers expressed concerns during interviews, noting that the intricacies of a coup could be challenging for young children to comprehend. Instead, they emphasized themes such as “the Turkish nation,” “defending the homeland,” “enemies,” and “the holy national flag.”

This convergence of religious, moral, and nationalist instruction demonstrates how Quran kindergartens contribute to the construction of cultural hegemony, naturalizing a worldview in which piety, gender hierarchy, and loyalty to the nation-state are intertwined. The representation of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt through symbolic acts shows how complex political events are reframed as moral lessons, embedding patriotic and regime-oriented narratives into ECE and reinforcing the AKP’s broader ideological project.

The transformation of mosques into educational facilities

Beyond their pedagogical content, Quran kindergartens also reshape the institutional role of mosques and the DİB, expanding their function from religious spaces into multifaceted community centers. In this ethnographic research, Quran kindergartens were observed to be a part of the expanding and changing social role of the DİB and mosques in the social realm of Turkey. Previous research has already documented this transformation, showing that mosques increasingly serve multiple functions, including marriage counseling, leisure activities for women, teenagers, and children, and educational facilities such as Quran kindergartens (Çakır Reference Çakır1990; Karakaş Reference Karakaş2021; Öztürk and Gözaydın Reference Öztürk, Gözaydın, Martínez-Ariño and Zwilling2020). With the emergence of Quran kindergartens at mosques, parents and children come to the mosque every day, and children spend twenty to thirty hours at the mosque per week. Mosques have become the primary venues of children’s lives from as early as the age of three or four years. This expansion underscores how religious spaces are being reconfigured into multifunctional institutions, thereby dissolving the distinction between religious practice, everyday social activities, and public education.

In the case of kindergartens housed within mosques, the pivotal role of the imams is also noteworthy. Serving as teachers also for older age groups and being the highest authority in the mosque, imams naturally assume administrative duties for all educational work within the mosque premises. As such, they hold responsibility for decision-making regarding operational expenses and effectively act as school principals. Throughout the interviews, the imam (referred to as Imam E within this article) characterized himself as the administrator of the mosque, emphasizing its role as a communal hub crafted to serve the local neighborhood. Imam E proudly described the transformation of the mosque into a social center with a rooftop football pitch, dedicated sections hosting numerous Quran courses for children aged seven to sixteen years, a café offering refreshments at affordable rates, and a kindergarten for four- to six-year-olds on the ground floor, and it also welcomes mothers eager to learn Quran recitation. Imam E articulates that his role transcends mere preaching or teaching the Quran; he perceives himself as both a “guide” and “leader” within the community; thus, he not only offers advice on religious matters but also addresses the everyday problems of the neighborhood.

Imam E mentioned that there were 110 students enrolled for the summer of 2019. In addition to the rooms of the mosque, he noted that donations have also been used for Quran kindergartens, to supplement the limited budget provided by the DİB. Since only one teacher was appointed by the local religious administration (Müftülük) on a full-time basis, most teachers were employed on temporary contracts, selected by Imam E because imams have the autonomy to appoint personnel working on hourly contracts. Imam E explained that this kindergarten project was very much needed in Turkey and has been very popular since it started:

As the interview excerpt above demonstrates, fieldwork revealed the transformation of mosques into educational facilities and the redefinition of imams’ roles as de facto school principals. Beyond their function as religious officials, imams assumed responsibility for staffing, budgeting, and daily administration, thereby managing both pedagogical and organizational aspects of kindergarten life. Comparable to principals in secular schools, they acted as key intermediaries in the delivery of public ECE, consolidating the mosque’s role as a central institution in the reproduction of cultural hegemony.