Hostname: page-component-77c78cf97d-rv6c5 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-23T15:42:14.045Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Market for Capital and the Origins of State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2003

William J. Hausman
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Box 8795, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187. E-mail: wjhaus@wm.edu.
John L. Neufeld
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27412. E-mail: john_neufeld@uncg.edu.

Abstract

We provide evidence that the problem of raising capital in the early days of the U.S. electric-utility industry motivated industry leaders to embrace state rate-of-return regulation in return for a secure territorial monopoly. Utility executives anticipated that this would lead to a reduction in borrowing costs. Using firm-level bond data for 1910–1919, we estimate a model and find that state regulation led to lower borrowing costs but that the magnitude of the reduction was small. We also find evidence that output of electric utilities in states with regulation was higher than output in states without regulation.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable