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Have Bayesians Solved the Paradox of the Ravens?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 March 2026
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Abstract
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The standard Bayesian solution to the paradox of the ravens maintains that the degree of confirmation provided by seeing a non-black non-raven is positive but negligible compared to that provided by seeing a black raven. I show that, unless we impose severe and unmotivated restrictions on the subject’s priors, this has the consequence that the cumulative confirmation provided by all the non-black non-ravens the subject expects to see is non-negligible compared to the cumulative confirmation provided by all the black ravens the subject expects to see. If this is so, however, then the paradox retains its full force.
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- © The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Philosophy of Science Association
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