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The Employee Clientele of Corporate Leverage: Evidence from Family Labor Income Diversification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2025

Jie (Jack) He*
Affiliation:
University of Georgia Terry College of Business
Xiao (Shaun) Ren
Affiliation:
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen (CUHK Shenzhen) School of Management and Economics renxiao@cuhk.edu.cn
Tao Shu
Affiliation:
The Chinese University of Hong Kong CUHK Business School and ABFER taoshu@cuhk.edu.hk
Huan Yang
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, passed away in December 2019
*
jiehe@uga.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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Consistent with theories on the equilibrium matching between capital structure and employee job risk aversion, we find a robust, positive association between a firm’s leverage and its employees’ family labor income diversification. Higher-Leverage firms also recruit new employees with greater income diversification. For identification, we exploit two policy shocks that exogenously change employee income diversification and firm leverage, respectively. Individual employee-level tests further reveal that workers with differential risk attitudes adjust their job choices and household labor income portfolios in response to significant shifts in their employers’ leverage. Finally, human bankruptcy costs contribute to the general level of corporate risk-taking.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington