Introduction
When Swedish EU diplomat Johan Floderus was detained by Iranian authorities in April 2022, the case quickly evolved into more than an instance of unlawful imprisonment. It became a tool of geopolitical leverage, sparking outrage in Sweden and empathy across Europe. Floderus’s arrest was used by the Iranian regime to reinforce narratives of nationalist defiance among its supporters. What is puzzling about this case – and others like it – is how emotional responses are not mere by-products of political captivity but appear to be deliberately cultivated and instrumentalised by states. Why and how do actors weaponise emotions like fear, outrage, or pride in such contexts? Existing scholarship on hostage-taking and political captivity in international relations has addressed the psychological and societal effects of such crises but has largely overlooked the strategic role emotions play in shaping both state behaviour and public reactions.
This paper addresses that gap by developing the concept of the weaponisation of emotion: the deliberate manipulation of collective emotions to achieve political, ideological, or diplomatic goals. Drawing on intergroup emotions theory (IET), I argue that captors evoke emotions to exert pressure on foreign governments, mobilise domestic support, shape international narratives, and legitimise their own political agendas. Such emotions are tied to specific behavioural tendencies: anger motivates confrontation, fear leads to avoidance, and pride fosters altruism within the group. IET defines emotion as an evaluative, affective response that arises when individuals perceive events or situations in terms of their group membership, leading them to feel on behalf of the group rather than solely as individuals.Footnote 1 International political captivity – the forced deprivation of individuals’ freedom by state or non-state actors for political advantage – exemplifies the weaponisation of emotions, as states or non-state actors strategically manipulate emotional responses to achieve political objectives. The act of detaining foreign nationals typically generates intense emotional reactions, such as fear, outrage, and sympathy, which are leveraged to pressure governments or influence public opinion. For instance, the fear and anxiety experienced by hostages’ families and home communities can mobilise public demands for government action, while outrage over perceived injustices can rally domestic or international support against the detaining state. Simultaneously, captors often exploit the emotional vulnerability of hostages to extract confessions or project narratives of power and control. By weaponising emotions in such ways, political captivity transcends its material and transactional dimensions, becoming a powerful tool for psychological and diplomatic coercion in international politics.
To address the strategic dimension of emotion in political captivity, this study conceptualises the weaponisation of emotion as a form of emotional statecraft: one that involves a deliberate means–ends logic. Much like military strategy employs specific weapons to achieve defined outcomes, political actors may selectively elicit particular emotions – such as fear, anger, or pride – to influence the perceptions and behaviours of targeted audiences. For instance, fear might be instrumentalised to generate compliance or justify extraordinary security measures, while anger can be mobilised to galvanise public support against an adversary. The strategic use of emotion thus hinges on not merely stirring affective responses but also doing so with a particular purpose and with some foresight regarding probable effects. In the case of Johan Floderus’s captivity, the Iranian government arguably aimed to provoke diplomatic pressure or leverage negotiations by cultivating outrage and empathy in the Swedish public, while simultaneously fostering pride and resistance at home. This dual targeting illustrates that emotional strategies can pursue differentiated emotional outcomes across audiences. However, such strategies remain inherently unstable: emotional responses can exceed the initiator’s control, producing unintended consequences. Emotions function as powerful yet volatile weapons, more akin to fire than to precision-guided missiles. When strategically deployed and successfully harnessed, they can rapidly spread, mobilise publics, and reshape political landscapes; but like fire, they are difficult to contain and may just as easily engulf the initiator, triggering backlash, escalation, or emotional exhaustion.
The argument on the weaponisation of emotions during political captivity highlights how the strategic manipulation of political captives’ situations intersects with the broader theme of this special issue, demonstrating how the exploitation of individuals for political ends extends beyond mere imprisonment to encompass calculated tactics aimed at achieving specific objectives. This manipulation reveals how captivity transcends its material confines to become a potent tool for identity politics and coercive diplomacy. By eliciting collective emotions such as fear, outrage, and solidarity, political captivity amplifies societal tensions, mobilises identity politics, and facilitates the construction of moral superiority for captors and captives alike. This process, as I argue, reflects a calculated effort to exploit individual and national trauma, reinforcing the broader themes of this special issue: the emotional upheaval and socio-political mobilisation inherent in captivity. Understanding captivity as both a material and affective phenomenon, this perspective bridges theoretical insights from social psychology with implications for global power dynamics rooted in security studies. It illustrates how emotional narratives can escalate crises, influence state behaviour, and shape international responses.
Linking emotion research to the phenomenon of political captivity offers significant contributions to IR and security studies by illuminating the often-overlooked affective dimensions of state strategies and power dynamics. Emotions such as fear, anger, humiliation, and sympathy play a crucial role in shaping how political captivity is perceived, both domestically and internationally. By integrating emotion research, scholars can better understand the socio-psychological mechanisms underpinning the effectiveness of political captivity, as well as its impact on international legitimacy, crisis escalation, and conflict resolution. This perspective challenges rationalist paradigms in IR and security studies, emphasising the interplay between strategic interests and emotional narratives in shaping global politics.
The article is structured as follows. In the first section, the concept of international political captivity as a distinct phenomenon will be further developed against the backdrop of the literature on hostage-taking. While hostage-taking often serves as a tool of coercion and negotiation, international political captivity extends beyond individual incidents to encompass the broader political, symbolic, and strategic dimensions of detaining individuals for state-level goals. The second section will examine how international captivity becomes politicised through the weaponisation of emotions, especially when viewed through the framework of IET. According to IET, emotional responses are influenced by not only personal experiences but also the identities individuals hold as members of specific groups and the dynamics of intergroup relations. In these contexts, emotions serve as strategic instruments to shape perceptions, drive behaviours, and manipulate power dynamics between groups. In the third section, this framework will be applied to the case of the detention of Johan Floderus by Iranian authorities, showcasing how collective emotions are weaponised to shape political dynamics and intergroup relations. The final section revisits the main argument and suggests avenues for further research.
International political captivity
Political captivity refers to the state or condition of being imprisoned or detained for political reasons rather than criminal ones. It often occurs when individuals are incarcerated or restricted in their freedom due to their political beliefs, actions, or affiliations. This can happen in various contexts. Political captivity as a phenomenon occurring within states often serves as an expression of state sovereignty, where governments detain individuals perceived as threats to the regime’s stability, authority, or ideology.Footnote 2 In this context, political captives may include activists, journalists, opposition leaders, or anyone challenging the ruling powers. The detention of political dissidents or perceived enemies of the state is justified by governments as necessary for allegedly maintaining ‘internal order’ or ‘national security’. This form of domestic political captivity is often characterised by restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and association, reflecting a state’s exercise of control over its citizens. Domestic political captivity occurs when states detain political opponents, dissidents, or activists to suppress dissent or maintain authoritarian control. These captivities often gain international attention and can influence global political dynamics. For example, Nelson Mandela’s twenty-seven-year imprisonment under South Africa’s apartheid regime galvanised international sanctions and anti-apartheid movements. Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment in Russia drew widespread condemnation from Western governments and led to sanctions and strained diplomatic ties. Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest in Myanmar became a focal point for international advocacy for democracy in the region. Such cases underscore how domestic political captivities can shape international relations by rallying states and organisations against perceived injustices.
In contrast, international political captivity used to target other states involves the abduction, detention, or restriction of individuals by one state or state-sponsored actor against the citizens or officials of another state. This form of international political captivity is often employed as a tool of coercion, retaliation, or diplomatic leverage in interstate conflicts or disputes. Examples include state-sponsored abduction by intelligence agencies, hostage-taking during armed conflicts, or the detention of foreign nationals on espionage charges. Unlike domestic political captivity, which is grounded in notions of sovereignty and internal governance, international political captivity targeting other states reflects power struggles, geopolitical rivalries, and attempts to influence the behaviour or policies of other states. International political captivity involves seizing individuals or groups with the intention of using them as leverage to achieve specific demands. This conceptual distinction is useful for analytical clarity, even though some cases may overlap or share certain characteristics. While this paper distinguishes between domestic and international political captivity, it is important to acknowledge that many cases fall within a grey area between the two, forming a continuum rather than a binary. Dual nationals, such as Saeed Azizi and Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, exemplify this overlap: their arrests may be framed domestically (as actions against internal dissent) while simultaneously being leveraged internationally to exert pressure or extract concessions from their second country of citizenship. Such cases reveal how states can fluidly navigate and instrumentalise both domestic and international dimensions of political captivity, blurring the boundaries between internal repression and foreign policy strategy.
While both forms of political captivity involve the detention of individuals for political reasons, they differ in their underlying motivations, dynamics, and implications. Domestic political captivity reflects the exercise of state sovereignty and control over domestic affairs, while international political captivity targeting other states reflects interstate power dynamics, conflict resolution strategies, and attempts to assert influence or extract concessions. In this contribution, I am concerned with the latter one. Precisely, I conceptualise international political captivity as a practice of emotional weaponisation. The weaponisation of emotions refers to the deliberate use of captivity situations as a strategic tool to achieve political, military, or ideological objectives by evoking a collective emotional response. Rather than being a mere act of coercion or criminality, this practice involves the instrumentalisation of captives as bargaining chips or leverage in conflicts, negotiations, or diplomatic manoeuvres. As I explain further below, the weaponisation of emotions during political captivity encompasses the transformation of emotions into instruments employed by state or non-state actors seeking to exert pressure on adversaries, extract concessions, or manipulate public opinion. It exploits the vulnerability and emotional suffering of captives for strategic gain, posing significant challenges for conflict resolution, counterterrorism efforts, and the protection of human rights.
International political captivity has historical roots and persists in modern international politics. Prominent examples include the Iran Hostage Crisis, where militants detained fifty-two Americans to protest US intervention in Iranian affairs, North Korea’s repeated detainment of foreign citizens under accusations of espionage to gain political bargaining power, or Hamas’s seizure of Israeli civilians, some of which are also covered in this special issue (Ackert and Samuels; McGlynn and Romaniuk).Footnote 3 Cases like that of Kim Dong-chul, a South Korean–born American citizen detained on espionage charges, highlight how North Korea employs hostage-taking as a means of exerting control, extracting concessions, and generating international tension for diplomatic negotiations. Similar tactics have been employed in cases like the Cold War–era ‘spy swaps’ between the United States and USSR, the Lebanese Civil War kidnappings by Iran-backed factions such as Hezbollah, and China’s ‘hostage diplomacy’, as seen in the detention of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in response to the arrest of Huawei’s CFO.Footnote 4 More recently, Iran has strategically employed hostage-taking of Swedish citizens as a weapon to advance its diplomatic and political agendas. By detaining Swedish nationals on various charges, Iran aims to exert pressure on Sweden and potentially leverage its actions to gain diplomatic concessions. Similarly, during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian-backed separatist forces targeted Ukrainian military personnel, politicians, journalists, and even children, detaining them as political hostages to destabilise Ukraine and assert Russian control over the region (see McGlynn and Romaniuk in this special issue). Despite there being nuances and contextual differences, these cases underscore the deliberate and strategic use of state-sponsored political captivity as a tool of coercion, manipulation, and violence in the realm of international relations. I argue that by exploiting the emotional vulnerability of hostages and manipulating public perceptions, these actors seek to exert pressure on international adversaries, assert dominance, and advance their strategic interests in the international arena. These instances underscore how captivity is politicised by actors to achieve strategic goals in international relations.
International political captivity is characterised by several distinct features that underscore its strategic use in international relations. Victims may be carefully chosen based on their nationalities, targeting individuals from countries involved in disputes with the detaining state. These detentions are typically justified through legal pretexts, with captives accused of violating national laws, such as espionage or subversion. The timing of these acts is often symbolic, coinciding with political or diplomatic crises to maximise pressure on the targeted government. The primary objective of international political captivity is to leverage hostages to extract concessions, such as diplomatic recognition, economic relief, prisoner exchanges, or public policy changes. In sum, international political captivity exploits legal pretexts, symbolic timing, and targeted nationalities to justify and maximise leverage for political concessions. While the case in this article emphasises the strategic selection of captives based on nationality, evidence suggests that many cases of international political captivity are initially opportunistic rather than premeditated. Individuals may first be arrested for minor alleged offences or under genuine suspicion, with their foreign or dual-national status subsequently leveraged for political purposes.
While the phenomenon of international political captivity is well documented through historical and contemporary cases, little is understood about the underlying affective mechanisms and processes that make it an effective and enduring strategy of state policy. In the discipline of IR, research on political captivity has evolved to recognise its multifaceted nature, considering psychological, political, and strategic dimensions. Scholars analyse how hostage situations impact state behaviour, interstate relations, and conflict dynamics, emphasising the role of power dynamics, and negotiation strategies.Footnote 5 Additionally, studies explore the intersection of political captivity with broader themes such as terrorism, diplomacy, and human rights, highlighting the complex interplay between state sovereignty, security concerns, and ethical considerations.Footnote 6 Finally, some works delve into the sociological and cultural dimension of political captivity, studying it as a social phenomenon.Footnote 7 ‘Hostage diplomacy’, as delineated in the literature, encompasses the strategic utilisation of captives or detained individuals as bargaining chips in diplomatic negotiations or as a means to attain political goals.Footnote 8 This tactic entails the intentional seizure or confinement of individuals by one nation by another, frequently leading to prolonged negotiation processes and escalating diplomatic strains.
International political captivity differs from hostage-taking and hostage diplomacy in its broader scope, purpose, and context. While hostage-taking typically involves the isolated seizure of individuals to exert immediate pressure for ransom, concessions, or symbolic power, political captivity often represents a more sustained and institutionalised practice, where individuals are detained as part of a larger political strategy. Hostage diplomacy, in turn, refers specifically to the use of hostages as bargaining chips in state-to-state negotiations, emphasising a diplomatic framework. Political captivity, by contrast, extends beyond such negotiations to encompass long-term uses of detainees to project state power, manipulate domestic or international narratives, or achieve ideological and political goals without necessarily engaging in formal diplomatic bargaining. Hostage diplomacy thus represents a narrower subset of cases within the broader category of cross-border abductions. It specifically involves state actors detaining foreign citizens as leverage in diplomatic negotiations, often under the pretext of legal or political justifications. In contrast, the broader context of international political captivity encompasses a range of practices like state-sponsored kidnappings, where non-state actors abduct individuals to demand ransoms, promote ideological agendas, or incite fear. It also includes extraordinary renditions, where states covertly seize individuals abroad for interrogation or detention, bypassing formal legal processes. Additionally, economic predation can involve forms of coercion that blur the lines between captivity and exploitation, as seen in cases where individuals or entities are held or targeted to extract financial or strategic benefits. These broader practices reflect diverse motives and mechanisms, expanding the understanding of abduction and captivity beyond the diplomatic confines of hostage diplomacy.
Research on political captivity in international relations acknowledges the importance of emotions in shaping the behaviour of both hostages and hostage-takers. However, this research often examines the psychological impact of captivity on hostages, exploring how emotions such as fear, stress, and hopelessness influence their responses and coping mechanisms. One notable phenomenon is the Stockholm Syndrome, where hostages develop empathy, loyalty, or even affection for their captors, often as a survival mechanism in extreme situations of dependency and fear.Footnote 9 At the individual level, hostages and their families often experience a range of other intense emotions, including fear, anxiety, helplessness, and despair. Fear and anxiety are prevalent emotions among hostages, impacting their resilience, coping strategies, and willingness to negotiate or resist captivity. Conversely, captors may experience emotions such as power or pride, driving their behaviour and decision-making during hostage-taking incidents. The experience of captivity can be deeply traumatic, with hostages grappling with feelings of isolation, uncertainty about their fate, and the loss of control over their lives. Coping mechanisms such as bonding with fellow captives, maintaining hope, and seeking support from loved ones are common responses to mitigate the psychological toll of captivity.Footnote 10 For families of hostages, the emotional impact can be equally profound, characterised by feelings of anguish, fear, and powerlessness. Uncertainty about the safety and well-being of their loved ones can lead to a state of constant anxiety and distress. Families often experience a rollercoaster of emotions as they navigate the complexities of hostage negotiations, media scrutiny, and diplomatic efforts to secure the release of their relatives.Footnote 11
At the collective level, some research explores the role of emotions in shaping public perceptions, media coverage, and international responses to hostage crises.Footnote 12 By considering the emotional dimensions of hostage-taking within broader socio-political contexts, these scholars contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of these complex phenomena in international relations. Instances of hostage-taking evoke strong emotional reactions among broader societal or national groups. Emotions play a crucial role in shaping public opinion, political discourse, and policy responses to international political captivity. The plight of hostages often evokes strong emotional reactions among the public, ranging from outrage and sympathy to fear and solidarity. These emotions can mobilise public support for diplomatic efforts, humanitarian interventions, or military actions aimed at securing the release of captives or punishing their captors. Media coverage and political discourse surrounding hostage crises can amplify these emotional responses, framing the situation in terms of national pride, moral outrage, or existential threat.Footnote 13 Additionally, emotions intersect with broader geopolitical dynamics, influencing interstate relations and the dynamics of conflict resolution. The emotional responses of state leaders to instances of international political captivity can shape diplomatic negotiations, crisis management strategies, and the escalation or de-escalation of conflicts.Footnote 14 Emotions such as anger or humiliation can fuel cycles of retaliation and revenge, exacerbating tensions and hindering efforts to achieve peaceful resolutions.Footnote 15
Furthermore, emotions such as anger, resentment, or vengeance may also emerge among the affected nation-state, fuelling calls for retribution against the perpetrators of hostage-taking incidents. Political leaders may capitalise on these emotions to justify military actions, impose economic sanctions, or demand concessions from the hostage-takers, often with the aim of appeasing public sentiment and restoring national honour. Emotions contribute to the construction of national identities and narratives surrounding international political captivity. Hostage narratives often evoke themes of heroism, victimhood, and resilience, which resonate deeply with collective memories and cultural identities.Footnote 16 Emotions of national pride, solidarity, or shame may shape how societies interpret and respond to instances of political captivity, influencing public attitudes towards foreign policy, military interventions, and human rights advocacy.
International captivity becomes politicised in international relations when the motives, methods, and outcomes of captivity generate disputes that extend beyond the immediate actors involved. Politicisation often occurs when captors exploit captives as tools to achieve strategic, economic, or ideological objectives, such as compelling foreign policy concessions, extracting ransoms, or garnering international attention. The emotional dimensions of captivity – such as fear, anger, solidarity, or humiliation – can escalate tensions between states, rally domestic or international constituencies, and frame political narratives that amplify its significance. For example, captors may leverage the visibility of hostages through media or social platforms to pressure governments, while target states may respond with military operations or public diplomacy to reinforce their credibility and resolve. Moreover, competing interests within states (among government officials, opposition parties, and victims’ families) can further politicise captivity by influencing how it is framed domestically and internationally. Whether used by weaker actors as a tool of asymmetric coercion or by powerful states to maintain influence, captivity in international relations reveals deep-seated tensions around sovereignty, security, and legitimacy, transforming what may initially appear as a localised event into a global political crisis.
To sum up, research on political captivity in international relations has recognised the emotional dynamics involved, particularly the psychological toll on hostages – such as fear, anxiety, and hopelessness – and phenomena like Stockholm Syndrome. Families of hostages also endure intense emotional distress, grappling with uncertainty, helplessness, and media scrutiny. While some scholarship has begun to examine the broader societal and political effects – how emotions shape public opinion, policy responses, and international negotiations – their work treats emotions as background effects rather than as strategic instruments. This study fills that gap by conceptualising political captivity as a deliberate attempt to weaponise emotion, transforming emotions into a tool of political influence. Drawing on insights from terrorism studies, which have shown how acts of terror target emotions like fear and outrage to manipulate political behaviour,Footnote 17 it is argued that hostage-taking operates similarly. It seeks to mobilise emotional responses among hostages, families, publics, and state leaders to achieve specific strategic goals. This approach offers a novel perspective that moves beyond trauma-centred or media-focused analyses and instead reframes political captivity as part of an emotional economy in global politics.
In the next section, I will introduce intergroup emotions theory as a framework to capture and explain the collective emotional dynamics surrounding international political captivity and how the weaponisation of emotions underpins political captivity in international relations.
Weaponising emotions: Intergroup dynamics and international political captivity
The importance of emotions in the context of international political captivity lies in their multifaceted influence on individual and collective behaviour. Individual and collective emotional responses to political captivity in international relations are influenced by factors such as cultural norms, political context, media portrayal, and personal experiences. These emotional responses play a crucial role in shaping public opinion, political discourse, and policy outcomes, both domestically and internationally. However, it is essential to recognise that emotions surrounding international political captivity are not monolithic and can vary widely depending on cultural, political, and personal factors. While some may respond with empathy and compassion towards the hostages, others may harbour feelings of indifference, suspicion, or even hostility, particularly if the hostages are perceived as complicit in actions deemed contrary to national interests. The assumption that international political captivity can stimulate collective emotional dynamics relies on cases being publicly known. While many detentions never attract media attention due to governmental reticence, in the case of Johan Floderus there was indeed immense pressure from his family to make the case public, illustrating how the visibility of certain cases often depends on actors outside the state rather than on the detaining state itself (see Nguyen and Hall in this special issue).
The emotional reactions elicited during instances of international political captivity are complex and rarely remain fully under the captors’ control, as emotions often transcend the immediate intentions of those orchestrating the act. Captors aim to manipulate emotions such as fear, sympathy, or outrage to achieve strategic goals, but these emotional responses are filtered through a network of socio-political factors, including media framing, public discourse, and the cultural and political context of the target country. For instance, captors might release proof of life or craft narratives to evoke sympathy for their cause, as seen in cases like the kidnapping of aid workers by groups seeking to highlight perceived injustices. Alternatively, captors may use public executions, as with ISIS’s broadcasted videos, to amplify fear and demoralise adversaries. However, such tactics often have unpredictable ripple effects. To avoid intensifying emotional reactions to counterproductive levels, captors may carefully calibrate their actions. This could involve setting demands that appear rational or attainable, avoiding unnecessary cruelty, or even signalling a willingness to negotiate. For example, during the Iran Hostage Crisis, the Iranian government leveraged the emotional humiliation of the US embassy’s occupation to assert anti-imperialist narratives domestically and internationally while managing the crisis to avoid outright war.
The weaponisation of emotion refers to the deliberate manipulation of emotional responses (such as fear, empathy, guilt, pride, or outrage) to achieve strategic objectives in contexts of political captivity. Drawing on coercion theoryFootnote 18 and Petersen’sFootnote 19 analysis of emotions as strategic tools, captors seek to elicit specific emotions in distinct audiences: fear and helplessness in the captive; empathy and moral outrage in the captive’s home public; pride and defiance among their own supporters; and guilt or anxiety among policymakers pressured to act. For instance, the release of ‘proof of life’ videos demonstrates that the hostage retains value, sustaining bargaining leverage, while executions or harsh sentencing enhance the credibility of future threats. Cases such as the kidnapping of aid workers in Syria by ISIS or the imprisonment of dual nationals in Iran illustrate how emotional displays (statements of remorse, orchestrated confessions, or visible suffering) are designed to amplify psychological pressure and extract concessions. While the weaponisation of emotion is typically intentional, it can also emerge accidentally when an emotional effect, such as domestic outrage, fear, or sympathy, unexpectedly produces strategic advantages. In such cases, regimes or captors may subsequently recognise and exploit these effects deliberately, transforming an initially incidental emotional reaction into a purposeful coercive instrument. Weaponising emotion thus encompasses both calculated emotional strategies and the adaptive instrumentalisation of emotions whose potency becomes apparent only in retrospect.
When emotional weaponisation occurs, whether intentional or accidental, it can significantly alter the dynamics of captivity. Intentional weaponisation, such as provoking public outrage to rally domestic support or push an adversary into rapid concessions, can sometimes backfire. The kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006, for example, elicited massive public solidarity in Israel, driving the government to negotiate his release while simultaneously intensifying calls for military retaliation against Hamas. Unintentional weaponisation, on the other hand, often stems from misjudgements that can lead to international condemnation, hardened public resolve, or military interventions. For instance, the Boko Haram abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014 sparked global outrage, resulting in diplomatic pressure and military campaigns against the group. Ultimately, the interplay of emotions in captivity is deeply entangled with broader narratives of national identity, morality, and geopolitics. Whether captors succeed in leveraging these emotions depends on their ability to predict and shape the cascading effects of their actions. However, emotions can take on a life of their own, escaping the initial calculations of the captors and reshaping the broader political and emotional landscape of the crisis.
The weaponisation of emotions can be linked to international political captivity, particularly through the lens of intergroup emotions theory (IET). This theoretical framework, rooted in social psychology, provides insights into how emotions shape intergroup relations and influence political behaviour by emphasising how individuals’ emotions are shaped by their identification with specific social or national groups. IET suggests that, when a particular group identity is activated, individuals will experience emotions on behalf of their group even though they may not be personally affected.Footnote 20 In the context of international political captivity, this framework helps explain how group-based emotions – such as anger, humiliation, or solidarity – are activated and how they influence collective behaviour, public opinion, and policy decisions. For example, national outrage over the detention of citizens abroad can unify domestic publics and galvanise demands for assertive action, while narratives of victimhood or moral superiority may be leveraged by captors or targeted states to frame their responses. These collective emotional dynamics contribute to the weaponisation of political captivity in international relations, as states and non-state actors alike manipulate emotional responses to strengthen their bargaining positions, justify retaliatory measures, or project ideological dominance.
Collective emotional dynamics in political captivity
Intergroup emotions theory highlights how emotions, while individual experiences, can operate strategically within broader group dynamics, particularly in the context of international captivity. Although states as entities do not possess emotions, the individuals within them do, and these emotions reverberate through society, shaping public opinion, political discourse, and policy decisions. Scholars like Brent SasleyFootnote 21 and Jonathan MercerFootnote 22 demonstrate how individual emotions are linked to the nation-state. Sasley argues that emotions such as pride, anger, and fear arise collectively when individuals perceive threats or opportunities to their nation, fostering national cohesion and guiding foreign policy decisions by shaping what actions are seen as appropriate or necessary responses. Mercer builds on this, asserting that states can appear to ‘feel’ because collective emotions aggregate as citizens identify with their state, influencing how states respond to crises.
IET builds on social identity theory and self-categorisation theory, emphasising how individuals identifying with a group experience emotions based on group dynamics. Through depersonalisation, individuals view themselves less as unique personalities and more as representatives of the group. This shift causes group-centric emotions like anger, pride, or empathy to arise in response to events impacting the group. For example, during the Iran Hostage Crisis, the American public perceived the fifty-two diplomats as symbols of their nation (‘America is held hostage’), leading to widespread anger, resentment towards Iran, and increased national unity.Footnote 23 In such cases, captives are seen not as individuals but rather as representatives of the nation, heightening collective emotions that drive political actions like protests, diplomacy, or military responses.
Depersonalisation also amplifies intergroup conflict, as harm to group members is perceived as an attack on the group’s collective identity. For example, during international captivity, captors may be viewed not as individuals but rather as part of a hostile group threatening the nation’s pride and well-being. This perception fosters emotions such as outrage or retribution, which can shape public demands for action. Such emotions are tied to specific behavioural tendencies: anger motivates confrontation, fear leads to avoidance, and pride fosters altruism within the group. For instance, intergroup anger at perceived injustices often fuels support for military interventions, while guilt over past wrongdoings can promote reparative actions like apologies and compensation.Footnote 24 Halperin applies IET to intergroup conflicts, demonstrating how emotions like fear, hatred, and hope influence conflict escalation or resolution.Footnote 25 By showing the malleability of emotions, Halperin emphasises that interventions targeting emotional dynamics – such as fostering empathy or reducing anger – can promote reconciliation. This perspective is particularly relevant for the politicisation of international captivity, where emotional responses among captors, captives, and their respective nations influence policy decisions and public support. In cases of politicised captivity, governments’ responses can either align with or contradict public emotions, which has significant implications. For example, if a government pursues conciliatory actions while the public feels anger towards captors, this inconsistency can weaken national solidarity and trigger backlash against leadership. Political entrepreneurs can exploit such emotional dissonance by amplifying public resentment to challenge leadership and reshape group appraisals.
Ultimately, IET provides a nuanced framework for understanding the emotional dynamics of international political captivity. It explains how emotions are collectively experienced, driving both group perceptions and political actions. By influencing public opinion and shaping policy responses, intergroup emotions become a strategic tool for both captors and political actors within the target state.
Politicised captivity and weaponisation of emotions
Intergroup behaviour is closely linked to intergroup emotions, such as anger, fear, or pride. When behaviours align with these emotions, they reinforce group solidarity and strengthen collective identity. For example, if a nation views the captivity of its citizens as an affront to national dignity, actions like diplomatic pressure or public demonstrations validate the emotional response and solidify group cohesion. In cases involving dual nationals, these dynamics can become more complex, as overlapping ethnic, religious, or cultural affiliations with the detaining state may introduce a degree of identity ambiguity and emotional ambivalence, potentially weakening or fragmenting public identification and solidarity within the target state. However, behaviour that contradicts intergroup emotions can undermine this solidarity, creating cognitive dissonance and weakening emotional bonds. A case in point is the widespread public support and media coverage in Canada following the detention of the ‘two Michaels’ by China, which reinforced national unity.Footnote 26 Mackie, Maitner, and SmithFootnote 27 describe a feedback loop where intergroup behaviours express and reshape the appraisals that generate emotions. For instance, if a government responds passively to a hostage situation, it can clash with public outrage, resulting in disillusionment and division. Alternatively, successful negotiations may shift appraisals, turning anger into empathy and producing new action tendencies like concessions or reconciliation.
Collective emotions often translate into demands for decisive action. Fear and anger can prompt calls for retaliation or punitive measures, while solidarity can inspire support for diplomatic or military efforts. Political captivity, particularly when captives symbolise ideological or national struggles, carries significant implications for foreign policy. During the Cold War, for example, the detention of individuals often escalated tensions, as opposing sides leveraged the emotional capital generated by such incidents to advance geopolitical objectives.
The weaponisation of emotions in political captivity highlights how states and non-state actors exploit collective emotions to achieve strategic goals. Hostage-taking can provoke emotions like fear, humiliation, or anger, rallying domestic support or pressuring adversaries. Captors may manipulate these emotions to secure concessions, provoke backlash, or influence foreign policy. For instance, the 2007 abduction of BBC journalist Alan Johnston in Gaza triggered widespread outrage, which both domestic and international actors leveraged for political purposes.Footnote 28 This illustrates how captivity serves as a tool for manipulating both captives’ communities and broader political dynamics.
Status plays a central role in the emotional dynamics of political captivity, shaping not only the motivations behind such acts but also the emotional repertoires they make available. In asymmetrical conflicts, where a lower-status actor confronts a higher-status opponent (as in the case below of Iran versus the EU), the weaponisation of emotion is often aimed at reversing or contesting status hierarchies. For the lower-status actor, emotional strategies such as eliciting pride and defiance at home can serve as tools of symbolic resistance, transforming perceived weakness into moral or ideological strength. In this context, Iran’s captivity strategy may not only seek leverage over the EU but also aim to reaffirm national dignity in the face of appraised Western dominance, making pride a particularly potent and accessible emotion to mobilise.
IET helps explain that political captivity is about not merely individuals but also the emotional impact on larger groups. Captivity creates ripple effects, shaping intergroup perceptions and behaviours and influencing negotiations, conflicts, and strategic responses. Emotions like fear, anger, and solidarity can unify domestic publics and generate demands for retaliation, military intervention, or diplomatic pressure. States and non-state actors often weaponise these collective emotions, using them to strengthen bargaining positions, escalate conflicts, or achieve broader goals in international relations.
Moreover, IET highlights that emotions function as powerful drivers of political behaviour and policy outcomes. The emotional bonds between captives and their national or societal groups amplify the stakes involved. Political leaders may harness these emotions to mobilise public support for policies, such as military interventions or negotiations. However, emotions can also lead to irrational or counterproductive actions, intensifying tensions and hindering peaceful conflict resolution. While IET helps explain how political captivity can trigger group-based emotions, these responses are not uniform. For example, during the Vietnam War, the treatment and return of American POWs divided the domestic public: some expressed patriotic solidarity with the servicemembers, while anti-war groups criticised the war and its political costs (see the contribution by Ackert and Samuels in this special issue). This illustrates that group-based emotions can both unify and polarise, depending on the broader political context.
To sum up, IET offers a framework for understanding the weaponisation of political captivity by illustrating how group-based emotions shape collective responses and political actions. When captives belong to specific identity groups, their captivity triggers emotions that extend beyond individuals, influencing group cohesion and demands for action. These emotions can be manipulated by states or captors to achieve strategic objectives, making political captivity a powerful tool in international negotiations and conflicts. The next section applies this framework to the case of Johan Floderus’s detention by Iranian authorities, demonstrating how emotions are weaponised to influence intergroup relations and political dynamics.
International political captivity: The case of Johan Floderus
The case of Johan Floderus, a Swedish national and European Union diplomat detained by Iranian authorities in April 2022, offers a compelling lens through which to examine the emotional dynamics of international political captivity. Floderus’s detention highlights the complex ways in which international captivity can intersect with geopolitical power struggles. This case is significant for understanding how the weaponisation of emotions in captivity can shape political dynamics, influence intergroup relations, and further complicate international negotiations.
Johan Floderus was detained by Iranian authorities in April 2022 while spending a vacation with friends in Tehran. The charges against him included espionage, although these allegations were widely viewed as politically motivated. Floderus had been living and working in Iran for several years in a diplomatic capacity. His arrest came at a time of escalating tensions between Iran and Sweden, particularly related to the Hamid Nouri trial. The Hamid Nouri trial in Sweden set a significant precedent as the first time any Iranian official faced justice for the 1980s prison massacres and the first application of universal jurisdiction to a case involving the Iranian government. This high-profile conviction generated intense attention both within Iran and among the Iranian diaspora, creating a situation the Iranian government was keen to influence. The timing of Johan Floderus’s detention in 2022 (coinciding with the conclusion of Nouri’s trial) suggests that Iran arrested him specifically to exert pressure on the Swedish government, signalling the stakes of universal jurisdiction and potentially facilitating a prisoner swap, which ultimately occurred. The trial thus both established a legal and diplomatic precedent and directly motivated Iran’s actions towards Floderus.
The Iranian government’s accusations against Floderus were vague, and no concrete evidence was presented to substantiate the espionage claims. His arrest was widely regarded by the EU and human rights organisations as a form of international political captivity. This tactic, as outlined above, involves detaining foreign nationals to extract concessions or to influence international negotiations. It arguably has become a recurring strategy for Iran in its dealings with Western states.
Over the years, Iran has detained numerous foreign nationals, particularly those from Western countries, in an effort to pressure their governments into compliance with Iran’s political and economic demands. Floderus’s case was seen as part of this broader pattern. During a moment in the trial, Floderus mentioned feeling faint, prompting the Iranian judge to notice his condition and reassure him not to worry: ‘I was just going to be their guest for two or three days, but I would remain there for the next two years and two months’, Floderus said. The diplomat endured two months of ‘confusion, anxiety, and despair’ in solitary confinement before being transferred to a group cell, where he and the other prisoners were able to converse openly. ‘When I told them about what had happened to me, who I was, they told me, “But Johan, you’re a hostage”.’Footnote 29
In response, the EU and Sweden demanded Floderus’s immediate release, framing his detention as a violation of diplomatic norms and international law. The EU condemned the charges as unfounded and politically motivated, calling for greater transparency and fairness in the legal proceedings. The Swedish government, in coordination with EU officials, also pushed for consular access to Floderus and ensured that his case remained in the public eye as a symbol of Iran’s disregard for international diplomatic conventions. In a public statement, Sweden’s Foreign Affairs Minister Tobias Billström demanded that ‘the person in question has been arbitrarily deprived of his freedom and should therefore be released immediately. This message has been conveyed, including by me personally.’ Peter Stano, EU Commission spokesman for foreign affairs and security policy, said that, ‘this case has also to be seen in the context of the growing number of arbitrary detentions involving EU citizens. We have used and will continue to use every opportunity to raise the issue with the Iranian authorities to achieve – in close cooperation with the member states involved – the release of all arbitrarily detained EU citizens.’Footnote 30
Floderus’s case also highlights a broader dynamic of emotions in international political captivity. His detention generated widespread emotional reactions, including anger, fear, and outrage, within the EU and Sweden, which viewed the arrest as a hostile act aimed at undermining their political and diplomatic standing. For example, Swedish Member of the European Parliament Abir Al-Sahlani wrote ‘This is OUTRAGEOUS!!!!!’ on X.Footnote 31 The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell publicly condemned Iran’s ‘illegal detention’ of the European diplomat Johan Floderus.Footnote 32 ‘The imprisonment of a Swedish citizen and employee of the European Union is a scandalous event that urgently needs to be clarified’, said the chairwoman of the EU Parliament’s Iran delegation, Cornelia Ernst.Footnote 33 These emotions were strategically used to rally support for Floderus’s release and to put pressure on Iran.
In Iran, the detention was framed as a demonstration of national strength and defiance against Western influence, with the government leveraging the emotions of pride and resistance to reinforce its stance in the ongoing negotiations. Johan Floderus’s detention was thus not merely the result of an isolated legal case, but rather a part of Iran’s broader geopolitical strategy. It arguably reflected Iran’s use of foreign nationals as bargaining chips in its diplomatic relations, particularly when faced with international pressure over sensitive issues like nuclear proliferation and sanctions. The case underscores the intersection of politics and emotion in international diplomacy, demonstrating how emotional responses to such detentions can shape the course of international relations and influence the strategies of involved parties.
The detention of Johan Floderus by Iranian authorities can be analysed as a case of international political captivity involving the weaponisation of emotions, particularly when interpreted through the lens of IET. To reiterate, this theory posits that emotional responses are shaped by not just individual experiences but also group identities and the dynamics of intergroup relationships. In such contexts, emotions can function as strategic tools to influence perceptions, behaviours, and power dynamics between groups.
The Floderus case highlights the pivotal role of emotions in shaping the political dynamics between Iran, Sweden, and the European Union, illustrating how intergroup conflicts elicit powerful emotional responses that influence state behaviour and strategies. According to IET, these emotions are rooted in group identities and adversarial relationships, with Floderus embodying the ‘out-group’ to Iranian authorities and representing an attack on the ‘in-group’ for Europeans: ‘If it wasn’t me, it would have been another Swedish citizen put in my place’, Floderus acknowledged.Footnote 34 The interplay of fear, empathy, defiance, and pride arguably created a complex web of motivations and consequences on both sides, driving the escalation of this diplomatic standoff. From the European perspective, the detention of Floderus triggered a profound sense of collective fear within the EU, encompassing both personal concern for his safety and collective apprehension about the risks to Western nationals in adversarial states like Iran. Floderus’s detention set off a particularly intense collective fear within the EU, in part because of his profile as a young EU diplomat and the high public visibility of his case. Unlike other EU citizens previously detained in Iran, his arrest occurred in a context shaped by the precedent-setting Nouri trial, and the family’s shock at prosecutors reportedly seeking the death penalty heightened the emotional stakes: ‘it was like the Earth was trembling. All along, I’ve expected a life penalty, but then you hear this (…) It is very frightening.’Footnote 35 ‘This arrest in 2022 was a real escalation’, remarked Richard Ratcliffe, husband of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, a British-Iranian charity worker who had endured six years of detention in Iran on unfounded espionage charges.Footnote 36 Floderus’s family wrote in a statement: ‘We, Johan’s family, are deeply worried and in despair. Johan was suddenly and without reason deprived of his liberty on a vacation trip and has been in an Iranian prison for more than 500 days.’ Human Rights Watch worker Nahid Naghshbandi explained that ‘Iranian authorities are using executions as a tool of fear’.Footnote 37 The EU Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Josep Borrell underlined that, ‘This terrible practice needs to stop’. While Floderus was never sentenced to death, the threat – compounded by Iran’s laws criminalising homosexuality, which he kept secret – underscored the extreme risks he faced. European officials, including Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson, expressed personal concern and emotional distress over his situation, amplifying public awareness and fear at the EU level: ‘I’m very sad. I’m very worried. And this has been with me for such a long time now.’Footnote 38
This collective fear underscored the vulnerabilities of EU citizens and diplomats in such environments, compelling the EU to adopt cautious strategies to avoid further escalation. Fear also amplified calls for strengthened protective measures, such as enhancing diplomatic immunity and security protocols. However, this emotion constrained the EU’s actions, as aggressive responses might jeopardise Floderus’s chances of release, fostering a delicate balancing act between demonstrating resolve and ensuring his safety. Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson asserted that Iran had made Mr Floderus and Mr Azizi ‘both pawns in a cynical negotiation game, with the aim of getting Iranian citizen Hamid Nouri released from prison in Sweden’.Footnote 39 Hamid Nouri had served as a judicial official at Gohardasht Prison near Tehran during the 1988 purge that saw 5,000 executions. He had compiled the names for the so-called death committee comprising three officials, including future president Ebrahim Raisi. Nouri had then escorted blindfolded prisoners from their cells to the committee for sentencing and subsequently to the gallows. In 2019, he was enticed to Sweden by his former son-in-law, working in coordination with international legal experts and victims’ families. Upon his arrival in Stockholm, he was arrested under the principle of universal jurisdiction and later convicted of war crimes. In 2022, Floderus had been detained shortly before a Swedish court sentenced Nouri to life imprisonment.
Moreover, in-group empathy for Floderus, as a fellow EU citizen and diplomat, arguably strengthened internal solidarity among EU member states. His detention was perceived as an attack on the collective ‘in-group’, reinforcing shared identity and unity. As Josep Borrell, head of the EU Diplomatic Service, declared: ‘In the case of Johan Floderus, the EU has a special duty of care, which we take very seriously.’Footnote 40 This emotional response motivated coordinated efforts to secure his release, including diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and appeals to international support. Speaking at a public event in Brussels, Floderus’s sister Ingrid lamented that ‘this is about some big political game where my brother is being used as a pawn, and that is really, for me, something I cannot accept. I don’t think we (Sweden) as a nation or the European Union either should accept that.’Footnote 41
Following his release, Ylva Johansson, the Swedish EU commissioner in whose team Floderus had worked, said:
Johan is finally free, after more than two years wrongfully imprisoned in an Iranian jail. I am so, so, so happy. I am happy for Johan, for his family and his friends. Every day, in these last two years, Johan has been in our minds and our hearts. We spoke about him every day and now we are just all so relieved and happy to finally be able to say: ‘Johan, welcome home’.Footnote 42
Beyond elite decision-makers, empathy mobilised public opinion, placing additional pressure on governments to act decisively. Initially, Swedish and European Union authorities had kept the arrest secret for over a year. After more than 500 days in detention, the New York Times revealed Floderus’s imprisonment in September 2023. This sparked a public campaign led by Floderus’s partner, Jonathan von Fürstenmühl, featuring posters across Brussels and widespread international media coverage.Footnote 43 This solidarity-driven response underscored the importance of group cohesion in navigating intergroup conflicts.Footnote 44
For Iran, detaining Floderus arguably represented an act of defiance against Western powers, asserting its sovereignty and resistance to external pressures. This defiance reflected a broader narrative of standing firm against Western-imposed norms, sanctions, and political dominance. By targeting a representative of the EU and Sweden (a member of the ‘out-group’), the Iranian regime signalled its willingness to escalate tensions if its interests were challenged. For example, Iran’s hardline newspaper Kayhan warned that Johan Floderus, a Swedish national currently detained in Iran, was likely to face ‘a severe and unfortunate sentence’.Footnote 45 This stance was both a domestic and international statement, demonstrating Iran’s resolve to assert autonomy and reject what it apparently perceived as foreign interference. Defiance also hardened Iran’s diplomatic posture, making concessions unlikely without significant gains, thereby prolonging the standoff. Iran now demanded the release of its citizen Hamid Nouri from Swedish custody. An Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson described Nouri as a ‘hostage’ in a statement to local media, claiming that his detention was due to an ‘illegal Swedish court decision that lacked legitimacy’.Footnote 46 The Nouri case had marked the first conviction of an Iranian official abroad for crimes committed in Iran and was celebrated as a landmark in transborder justice. It demonstrated the potential of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals globally, setting a precedent for charges against officials from countries like Syria, Sudan, and Russia accused of similar crimes. Mirroring Floderus, Nouri embodied the ‘in-group’ to Iranian authorities, symbolising Iranian defiance against Western powers. The spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the release of Hamid Nouri, allegedly achieved despite the ‘plots of the Zionist regime’ and the ‘terrorist activities of the MKO’, demonstrated the Islamic Republic’s effective diplomacy in safeguarding national interests and defending the rights of its citizens abroad. He emphasised that, after 1,680 days of what was described as unjust imprisonment and violations of basic human rights, Nouri had finally returned home to reunite with his patient family and loved ones.Footnote 47 When Nouri arrived in Tehran after the Swedish swap, Iranian state television captured his reception on the tarmac by several officials, a cleric, and the presentation of a floral wreath. Following brief comments about the case, he abruptly raised his voice to deliver a pointed message directed at terrorists, opposition dissidents, and Israel. ‘I am Hamid Nouri, I am in Iran, I’m with my family’, he shouted. ‘Where are you despicable people? You said even God cannot release Hamid Nouri, and see he did.’Footnote 48
Furthermore, pride was central to Iran’s framing of Floderus’s detention as a symbolic act of strength. This emotion was deeply intertwined with nationalistic narratives, portraying Iran as a resilient and sovereign state that resists ‘Western oppression’. As Siamak Namazi, an Iranian-American businessman and former hostage, explained: ‘The mullahs wanted to humiliate Sweden.’Footnote 49 Domestically, the regime promoted Floderus’s detention as a symbol of resistance, even though it is unclear whether these messages resonated beyond its narrow base of supporters. The act resonated beyond Iran’s borders, appealing to anti-imperialist sentiments among sympathetic states and groups, thereby strengthening Iran’s position in the international arena.Footnote 50
Yet, the detention of Johan Floderus by Iranian authorities also became a focal point of political controversy both domestically and internationally. Internationally, the EU and Sweden faced criticism for their perceived initial silence and the effectiveness of their diplomatic efforts to secure his release. The chairwoman of the EU Parliament’s Iran delegation, Cornelia Ernst, exclaimed that ‘the commission, and in particular Josep Borrell, must now explain how long they knew about the detention and why it was not made public’.Footnote 51 Richard Ratcliffe, whose wife, Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, a British-Iranian charity worker, spent six years in prison in Iran on false political charges, added that, ‘my view is that the European governments’ keeping their new hostage cases quiet last year inevitably led to other escalations by Iran. In our family’s experience, publicity keeps hostages safe because it limits the abuse that gets done to them.’ Abir Al-Sahlani, a Swedish Member of the European Parliament, concurred: ‘While keeping this secret, the Mullahs regime in Iran has been given the opportunity to blackmail European governments and continue killing people!’Footnote 52 The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, defended the initial secrecy by stating that, ‘we understand that there is interest in this matter, but in our assessment it would complicate the handling of the case if the ministry were to publicly discuss its actions’.Footnote 53
Domestically, the Swedish government encountered scrutiny over its handling of the situation, especially given the potential implications for Sweden’s foreign policy and national security. The eventual prisoner exchange, which led to Floderus’s release in June 2024, involved the controversial decision to free Hamid Nouri, a former Iranian official convicted of crimes against humanity. This exchange sparked debate within Sweden, particularly among the Iranian-Swedish community, over the ethical and legal ramifications of such diplomatic negotiations. Specifically, the release of Hamid Nouri in a prisoner swap triggered anger over seemingly rewarding Iran for arresting foreign nationals to extract concessions. Gissou Nia, chairwoman of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, called the move ‘an affront to justice’, emphasising it had undermined efforts to hold Iranian officials accountable and discourages universal jurisdiction cases. Families of victims and detainees expressed outrage, with Ahmadreza Djalali’s wife, Vida Mehrannia, stating, ‘The Swedish government abandoned my husband’, adding that releasing Nouri without securing all detainees’ freedom was unacceptable.Footnote 54 Ahmadreza Djalali, an Iranian-Swedish scientist, has been imprisoned in Iran since 2016 on highly disputed espionage charges, with numerous human rights organisations condemning his detention as unjust and politically motivated. Richard Ratcliffe also highlighted the political complexities of such swaps: ‘I am really delighted for Johan and his family. They didn’t deserve any of this. But I am distraught for Ahmadreza and all the others left behind. Nothing about hostage diplomacy is fair.’Footnote 55 Olivier Vandecasteele, a Belgian humanitarian worker who had been imprisoned in Tehran alongside Floderus before his release in a separate prisoner exchange, described this as a sombre moment he deeply understood from personal experience: ‘When hostages are freed, there is always a mix of joy and pain. When some get freed, it means others don’t. We know that families still awaiting their loved ones are experiencing today a very bittersweet moment.’Footnote 56
The emotional dynamics of fear, empathy, defiance, and pride interacted in ways that intensified the stakes and complicated resolution. For the EU, fear and empathy unified member states and drove collective action while also constraining aggressive responses to avoid endangering Floderus. These emotions fostered in-group solidarity but introduced caution into the EU’s and Swedish diplomatic and strategic calculus. For the Iranian regime, defiance and pride reinforced its resolve to resist Western pressure, attempting to use the detention to consolidate domestic legitimacy and bolster Iran’s anti-imperialist image. However, ongoing protests such as the Mahsa Amini mass protests suggest that such framing did not translate into widespread domestic legitimacy.
At the international level, these ‘captivity passions’ elevated the symbolic importance of Floderus’s detention, turning it into a microcosm of broader geopolitical tensions between Iran and the West. The fear and empathy of the EU counterbalanced the defiance and pride of Iran, creating entrenched positions on both sides. The emotional weaponisation complicated negotiations, as each side sought to protect and project its group identity, making resolution challenging. However, these dynamics also underscored the strategic use of emotions as tools of statecraft, with Iran leveraging fear and outrage to deter adversarial actions and rally support. The detention and political captivity of Johan Floderus by Iranian authorities became a highly politicised and contested issue both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the case elicited strong public outrage in Sweden, with calls for government accountability and criticism over the perceived lack of swift diplomatic action. Internationally, Floderus’s captivity highlighted the broader geopolitical tensions between Iran and Western states. The case became a focal point for debates on human rights, state sovereignty, and the ethics of using individuals as bargaining chips in international relations.
In summary, this analysis demonstrates that emotional dynamics are not epiphenomenal to international crises but are deeply embedded in the framing strategies, identity constructions, and political calculations of state actors. It also brings clarity to the multiplicity of actors involved: Iran as the primary manipulator of emotions for domestic legitimacy and diplomatic leverage; Sweden and the EU as emotional targets and secondary manipulators mobilising affect for collective action; and Floderus himself as a symbolic figure whose emotional suffering was publicly leveraged by all sides to advance competing political claims. In the case of Johan Floderus, emotional dynamics shaped not only the strategies employed by both Iran and the EU but also the trajectory and outcome of the crisis itself. Emotions such as outrage, empathy, nationalist pride, and moral disgust were not incidental but strategically mobilised to frame the detention in competing terms.
On the European side, the emotional reframing of Floderus’s captivity transformed a consular issue into a symbolic affront to shared democratic values, prompting a shift from legalistic diplomacy to moral condemnation. This affective escalation galvanised public pressure, legitimised diplomatic counter-measures, and positioned the EU as a normative actor defending its institutional integrity. These dynamics suggest a kind of counter-weaponisation: emotional responses were not simply epiphenomenal but became performative acts with concrete political effects. Outrage and fear catalysed media coverage, parliamentary interventions, and high-level diplomatic statements, which helped to maintain international pressure on Iran and to frame the captivity as an affront to the entire European project. Empathy and group-based solidarity shaped the EU’s sustained and coordinated diplomatic strategy, with member states rallying behind Sweden and highlighting the shared threat posed by arbitrary detentions. Emotional dynamics, in short, created a collective sense of obligation and solidarity that translated into concrete political behaviour – including intensified advocacy, appeals to international legal norms, and backchannel negotiations that eventually contributed to Floderus’s release (see also Ackert and Samuels in this special issue).
Iran, by contrast, engaged in emotional manipulation through appeals to nationalist pride, historical grievance, and resistance to Western interference. The Iranian regime framed Floderus as not just a spy but also a symbol of Western arrogance and interference. This mobilisation of collective emotions served to legitimise Iran’s actions domestically and present its stance as a form of righteous resistance to imperial pressure. The regime framed Floderus as a symbol of Western interference to mobilise emotions among its supporters. However, the broader population’s response appears muted or even oppositional, as evidenced by widespread protests against the government shortly after Floderus’s arrest.
These regime-promoted emotions imagined the EU as not merely a diplomatic adversary but also an existential threat to Iranian sovereignty, thus justifying extreme measures such as political captivity. By casting the detention as a principled stand against foreign coercion, Iranian authorities reinforced domestic legitimacy among its supporter base while signalling resolve to international audiences. These strategies served both instrumental reasons (swapping prisoners) and emotional needs (modes of resistance), shaping how each side constructed meaning, justified action, and constrained the possibilities for resolution. Ultimately, it was the affective interplay between the weaponisation of emotions and its contestation that explains why the incident became a protracted diplomatic standoff rather than a quietly resolved consular affair.
Conclusion
This article has explored the weaponisation of emotions in the context of international political captivity, arguing that emotional weaponisation serves as a strategic tool for achieving political, military, or ideological objectives. Rather than being mere by-products of captivity, emotions are deliberately manipulated and politicised. In international relations, the weaponisation of emotions serves not only to exert pressure on the captive’s home country but also to shift public opinion, shape diplomatic negotiations, and influence the broader geopolitical environment. By manipulating collective emotions – such as fear, outrage, and sympathy – captors can escalate tensions, making the political consequences of the captivity more far-reaching. Fear and outrage, for example, can mobilise public demands for government intervention, while sympathy may be leveraged to garner international support and rally political constituencies against the detaining state. These emotions become powerful tools in the captor’s arsenal, amplifying the perceived stakes of the hostage situation and increasing the psychological and diplomatic costs of inaction, while in the captive’s home country, they are often harnessed to galvanise public opinion, foster national unity, or pressure governments into taking decisive action.
The integration of intergroup emotions theory has been crucial in understanding how these emotional responses are shaped by not just individual experiences but also group identities and the dynamics between groups. IET highlights that emotions are not merely personal but also deeply tied to individuals’ group affiliations, and as such, they can be harnessed to drive collective action, shape political discourse, and influence intergroup relations. This theoretical framework provides a nuanced lens through which to analyse the role of emotional weaponisation in international political captivity, particularly in terms of how emotional responses can escalate conflicts and be strategically utilised to achieve specific state or non-state goals. In the case of Johan Floderus, his detention by Iranian authorities demonstrates the practical application of this approach. The emotional responses elicited from Floderus’s home country and the broader international community were not incidental but part of a broader strategy aimed at influencing European Union diplomacy regarding the stalled nuclear talks and Iran’s regional policies. By manipulating collective emotions such as fear for Floderus’s safety, outrage over perceived injustice, and sympathy for the victim, Iran was able to leverage his captivity to shift diplomatic dynamics in its favour.
Further research should explore the long-term psychological effects of international political captivity, on not just the captives themselves but also their home societies and governments. The emotional toll that such experiences take on individuals – ranging from trauma to changes in their post-capture behaviour – may have significant implications for future diplomatic and security policy. Additionally, understanding how the emotional effects of captivity influence the collective psyche of the home country can provide valuable insights into how such experiences shape public opinion and government decision-making in international relations. Another critical avenue for future research is the role of international legal frameworks in addressing the weaponisation of emotions in political captivity. As emotions are increasingly recognised as central to the functioning of international relations, there is a need to explore how international law can respond to and mitigate the strategic exploitation of emotional responses during crises involving political captives. This could include mechanisms for the protection of individuals caught in such situations, or strategies for preventing the emotional manipulation of public opinion during hostage situations.
Moreover, the emotional dimensions of political captivity hold significant potential for influencing conflict resolution processes. Future studies could investigate the role of emotions such as empathy, trauma, and reconciliation in post-capture diplomacy, particularly in cases where hostages are released or exchanged. Understanding how these emotional factors influence the prospects for peace and the terms of negotiations could lead to more effective diplomatic strategies, in not just resolving individual cases of political captivity but also addressing broader geopolitical conflicts. In this regard, the emotional aftermath of captivity may shape the future relations between states, offering both opportunities for healing and potential obstacles to long-term reconciliation. Thus, this paper suggests that incorporating an emotional dimension into the study of political captivity and international relations provides a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms that drive state behaviour and international negotiations.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the special issue editors, Richard J. Samuels and Karl Gustafsson, for their insightful guidance, careful editorial stewardship, and invaluable contributions throughout the development of this special issue. I would also like to thank my fellow contributors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions as well as Rosalie von Papius for her excellent assistance with editing and formatting this article.
Funding statement
Research for this study was generously funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) as part of the CRC 1171 ‘Affective Societies’ (Project number 258523721).
Declaration of conflicting interest
I declare no conflict of interest.
Simon Koschut is Professor of International Security Policy at Zeppelin University in Friedrichshafen, Germany. His research interests are international relations, in particular regional security governance, norms, and emotions in world politics. Previously, he was a DFG Heisenberg professor and visiting professor at Freie Universität Berlin, Fritz Thyssen Fellow at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and Fulbright Scholar at San Francisco State University. He is the co-editor of the Oxford Handbook of Emotions in International Relations (2026) and currently leading a four-year research project on Affective Contestation that looks at how emotions underpin transnational protest against EU migration policies.
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