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Consciousness and the “causal paradox”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Max Velmans
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, United Kingdom, m.velmans@gold.ac.uk

Abstract

Viewed from a first-person perspective, consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity. Viewed from a third-person perspective, however, consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains – producing a“causal paradox.” To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first-and third-person access are fundamental. First- and third-person accounts are complementary and mutually irreducible.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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