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Information Disclosure and Peer Innovation: Evidence from Mandatory Reporting of Clinical Trials

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2025

Po-Hsuan Hsu
Affiliation:
National Tsing Hua University College of Technology Management pohsuanhsu@mx.nthu.edu.tw
Kyungran Lee
Affiliation:
NEOMA Business School kyungran.lee@neoma-bs.fr
S. Katie Moon
Affiliation:
University of Colorado Leeds School of Business katie.moon@colorado.edu
Seungjoon Oh*
Affiliation:
Peking University HSBC Business School
*
sjoonoh@phbs.pku.edu.cn (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We document significant increases in the suspension of ongoing drug projects following the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), which mandates that pharmaceutical companies publicly disclose detailed clinical study results. Our results suggest a causal interpretation through difference-in-differences analyses that exploit variations in pre-FDAAA information environments. We also show evidence that fewer new projects are initiated after the FDAAA. Drug developers’ learning from peer failures is the primary mechanism, further amplified by financial constraints. We also examine the consequences of enhanced information disclosure, including changes in firm investment efficiency, drug quality, and disease morbidity.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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