It has been over 40 years since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) was concluded and opened for signature, and 30 years since its entry into force. This has sparked renewed attention to the question of how the LOSC can continue to regulate new uses of, and threats to, our oceans. Some have sought to answer this question by framing the LOSC as a ‘constitution’ for the oceans, as a reassertion of its continued influence. This article shows that this provides a false sense of security. While the LOSC is one of the most impressive and significant treaties, it should not be regarded as a constitution. This article examines how the LOSC can remain an effective and enduring framework for the law of the sea, arguing that regarding it as a constitution does not necessarily contribute to that goal. Instead, it proposes a new approach to the treatment of the LOSC which attempts to explain how best it can serve as a ‘living treaty’ and as a framework that is truly capable of guiding legal responses to new opportunities and challenges at sea.

Which international obligations are characterised as obligations owed erga omnes or erga omnes partes is today a crucial question for the enforcement of international law, particularly through adjudication before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ, however, has not given sufficiently clear indication as to how it understands and identifies obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes. This lack of clarity and consistency permits varied approaches to the articulation of such obligations, ultimately leaving uncertain the enforceability, through adjudication and otherwise, of a wide variety of obligations.

In the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, international lawyers and policy advisors are considering the tools that are available to third States that wish to respond to the serious breach of international law and support Ukraine. Within this context, the question of third-party countermeasures is once again highly relevant. Though the topic was contentious during the drafting of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), doctrine on third-party countermeasures often argues that they are permissible under customary international law, even while acknowledging that opinio juris is lacking. Whereas it has been argued that this subjective requirement can be inferred, this article maintains that, given the ambiguity surrounding unilateral sanctions practice, it is necessary to demonstrate that States believe that they are legally permitted to adopt wrongful sanctions in response to a prior breach of an obligation erga omnes (partes). It is argued that the International Law Commission was right to not include third-party countermeasures in the final ARSIWA and that, while sanctions practice has seemingly flourished over the years, there has been little progress in conclusively establishing that third-party countermeasures are accepted as custom, as illustrated by the discussion on the confiscation of Russian State assets.

The duty to render assistance to persons in distress is well established in the international law of the sea, but none of the instruments which codify the duty contains human rights obligations. However, serious human rights violations may occur during search and rescue (SAR) operations or because of the lack thereof. This article examines the duty of States to render assistance to persons in distress through the lens of international human rights law and advocates for a human rights-oriented approach to SAR. It discusses the due diligence nature of the duty, the scope of jurisdiction in maritime SAR and how States should act to adhere to their human rights obligations from the moment they receive a distress call through to the moment they disembark rescued persons on land.

The widespread use of artificial intelligence technologies in border management throughout the European Union has significant human rights implications that extend beyond the commonly examined issues of privacy, non-discrimination and data protection. This article explores these overlooked impacts through three critical frameworks: the erosion of freedom of thought, the disempowerment of individuals and the politicization of human dignity. In uncovering these dynamics, the article argues for a broader conception of human rights to prevent their gradual erosion and safeguard the core principle of protecting human dignity.

This article argues that, in provisional measures cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) now examines jurisdiction by assessing not only an applicant’s arguments for jurisdiction, but also a respondent’s arguments against it. This more granular examination is different from the ICJ’s traditional prima facie test. The change in approach was demonstrated in the 2008 provisional measures order in Georgia v Russian Federation. This article suggests two likely explanations for the development of a more detailed test. The first is the ICJ’s reluctance to limit State sovereignty by imposing provisional measures since it held, in the 2001 LaGrand judgment, that they are binding. The second is the political sensitivity of the particular dispute. However, the more detailed approach to the question of jurisdiction in provisional measures has generated inconsistency in the ICJ’s jurisprudence: first, the malleability of this approach risks like cases being treated differently; second, this approach overlaps with the plausibility test, which concerns a separate requirement for provisional measures; and, third, this approach overlaps with the Oil Platforms test, which the Court uses to determine definitively whether it has jurisdiction ratione materiae. The new approach also promotes a dispute-settlement conception of the Court’s judicial function, rather than acknowledging its role in developing international law or maintaining public order.

This article analyses whether Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) permit nuclear sharing. It argues—contrary to previous research—that the ordinary meaning of Articles I and II, the NPT’s travaux préparatoires and subsequent agreements and practice point to a deep ambiguity as to whether nuclear sharing is permitted under these Articles. It then suggests that, while Articles I and II NPT offer little help in determining the legality of nuclear sharing, the nuclear disarmament obligation embedded in Article VI NPT can be used to challenge the legality of the practice.

The recent rise of ‘qualified neutrality’ has proven highly controversial. Some have suggested that the separation between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello under international law may prevent the reform of ‘traditional neutrality’ into qualified neutrality. This article will seek to resolve academic debate on this topic, arguing that the principle of separation is of limited relevance to perpetuation and reform within the law of neutrality. Although the principle of separation is prima facie incompatible with qualified neutrality, it does not have the required characteristics as a legal rule to inhibit reform of the law of neutrality and the recognition of qualified neutrality as a positive rule under international law.

This article examines how the war in Ukraine has had an impact upon the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and transnational cooperation in Europe. It explains how, in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the EU has relaunched its enlargement process (notably, by opening accession negotiations with Ukraine), promoted the establishment of a new European Political Community and deepened its ties with other regional organisations, like the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Kingdom. It is argued that the return of large-scale warfare to the European continent for the first time since the end of World War II has contributed to reaffirming the role of the EU as a beacon of liberty, peace, security and prosperity, and highlighted the dynamism of the European integration project. Nevertheless, a number of challenges lie ahead, especially regarding enlargement, including both the candidates’ preparation and the EU's own readiness. The article therefore proceeds to map the debate about EU reform, the ongoing stalemate and the open questions concerning the future of Europe in order to illustrate fully the impact of the war in Ukraine on the enlargement project.

China frequently accuses Western governments of interfering in its domestic affairs. International lawyers might be inclined to dismiss these accusations as cynical misrepresentations of the doctrine of non-intervention. This article questions that view, drawing on Chinese State practice and recent Chinese literature. It argues that China propagates a new and distinctive approach to the doctrine of non-intervention, by which the doctrine changes depending on who is interfering with whom, in what context and for what purpose. This approach could also be increasingly useful to Western governments who seek to challenge pernicious forms of foreign influence over liberal democratic processes. Hence, Chinese and non-Chinese approaches to non-intervention might converge. This approach arguably reflects the concerns that originally animated the doctrine and is in line with ideas that have been advocated for by non-aligned States for at least 70 years. Whether this is a desirable development is another question. The article concludes with a critique of the new doctrine of non-intervention.

What are the philosophical and normative orientations of British international law scholarship during the Victorian era? This article explores and answers this question in three complementary steps. It begins with an analysis of the ‘public’ international law textbooks after 1830 to show that, instead of a single legal tradition, there coexisted three competing traditions during this period: a ‘naturalist’, an ‘historicist’ and a ‘voluntarist’ tradition. These three Victorian traditions will, in a second step, be studied in the context of ‘private’ international law—a discipline that developed and received its name during this period. A third section finally offers a detailed examination of the transformative work of Lassa Oppenheim, which straddled the Victorian nineteenth century and the ‘modern’ twentieth century. In revisiting the normative project(s) of Victorian international law, the article hopes to critique three prominent views in the contemporary academic literature. The first view holds that voluntarist State positivism exercised a dominant influence on British international law scholarship after 1830; a second view has claimed, relatedly, that during this period an idiosyncratic ‘English’ approach to international law emerged; and a third view has famously suggested that there was a ‘radical’ break in the discipline of international law around 1870.

Article 58 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) contains a provision which allows for the involuntary withdrawal, or expulsion, of a State from the ECHR if it has been expelled from, or ceased to be a member of, the Council of Europe (CoE). By comparing Russia's exit from the ECHR in 2022 with that of Greece in 1969, this article demonstrates that involuntary withdrawal poses a number of legal problems—partly as a result of it not having been considered during the drafting of the ECHR or the Statute of the CoE, and partly because of the highly unclear basis on which involuntary withdrawal operates. The article then conducts a comparative analysis of other regional human rights systems and public international law principles on treaty withdrawal in order to suggest a more comprehensive legal foundation for expulsion.

The discourse on State immunity has traditionally focused on its application in judicial proceedings. However, in recent years scholars have begun to address whether the law on State immunity also protects foreign States against measures taken against their property by the territorial State's executive and/or legislative organs. This question has been raised following unilateral sanctions regimes freezing property of foreign States. It has gained renewed attention in the context of the ‘immobilization’ of around €300 billion of the Central Bank of Russia's assets as a reaction to the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. In addition, there are recent suggestions to subject these sovereign assets to further steps, including confiscation, the generation of investment returns or taxing windfall profits accruing to the entities holding the assets. This article revisits the various conceptions of the law on State immunity to address the question of whether a principle of State immunity against non-judicial measures of constraint exists. Based on a review of existing State practice and opinio juris, it argues that customary international law does provide for State immunity in this context. However, the article further contends that the content of the norm should be construed differently than in relation to judicial proceedings, recognizing the weight of public policy concerns of the territorial State.

This article argues that the rule of contra proferentem is not applicable to international sales contracts governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). It further argues that the common recognition of the rule of contra proferentem under the CISG is an instance of a broader phenomenon which it calls ‘internationality overreach’. ‘Internationality overreach’ is the tendency to project onto the provisions of a uniform private law instrument doctrines and concepts which are inaccurately presumed to constitute universally recognised principles of private law or the ‘common core’ of various legal systems. This article demonstrates that internationality overreach disrupts the goals underpinning the harmonisation of commercial law in two ways: first, it undermines uniformity in the application of international conventions; and, second, it leads to outcomes that fall short of the agreement reached by the Contracting States during the drafting process. While this article focuses on the CISG, the argument developed in this article is of equal relevance to other uniform private law conventions which follow the principle of autonomous interpretation.

While States can often refer to a single language text of a multilingual treaty, there are times when an examination of other language texts is required. This article proposes a novel three-step method for applying Article 33(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to remove, or otherwise reconcile, differences in meaning between multilingual treaty texts. In doing so, this article seeks to address the current vacuum of practical guidance on when an examination of different authentic treaty texts is necessary in the process of interpretation, and how any differences in meaning between the texts should be removed or reconciled.

This article argues that critical and emerging technologies, evolving geopolitical dynamics and the urgent need to pursue the green agenda are changing the traditional approach of the European Union (EU) and its Member States towards their trade and security strategies, and this is particularly evident in the domain of export controls. In search of a balance between green energy, security and technological progress, this article explores the potential for a more cohesive and comprehensive regulatory framework for export controls at the EU level. It takes the debate beyond a technical level of export control lists to discuss geopolitical and strategic assumptions surrounding inter-State cooperation on the regulation of critical and emerging technologies and their components. The article underscores, in particular, the potential unintended repercussions of controls for the EU's technological future and the prospects of the green transition in Europe and beyond. Finally, it advocates for what is often overlooked in discussions: the necessity for the EU to set clear, long-term objectives for its export controls and to align them with the purposes and objectives of other EU economic instruments.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) has famously sought to eliminate intra-European Union (EU) investment arbitration under bilateral investment treaties and the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty. In doing so, the Court has navigated settled case law concerning commercial arbitration. In this regard, Achmea and subsequent rulings are premised upon a distinction drawn by the Court between investment and contract-based arbitration, based on the origin of arbitral proceedings and the intensity of the review of the relevant award. This article demonstrates that this distinction disregards important commonalities and the diversity of enforcement regimes. It is further argued that, even in the light of Achmea, EU law rightly permits intra-EU arbitration under investment contracts, that is, contracts between States and foreign investors. The article thus examines investment contract-based arbitration as the only surviving form of intra-EU investment arbitration and cautions against expansive applications of the Achmea reasoning to contractual agreements, signs of which are already emerging.

This article provides a critical examination of the Moscow Mechanism, a rapid-response tool within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Originally established in 1991 and rarely invoked during its first three decades of existence, the Mechanism has experienced a reinvigoration since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, having been triggered six times, four of which were in response to alleged violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law during the conflict. Drawing on the authors’ experience as experts in these four missions, the article offers a historical overview, explains the Mechanism’s procedural dynamics and assesses its unique features. Through a comprehensive analysis of its repeated use in respect of Ukraine, the article highlights both the strengths and limitations of the Moscow Mechanism, ultimately arguing that recent developments have revealed its full potential as an instrument for advancing international justice and accountability.