3.1. A handful of countries direct technology and own intellectual property rights

Here, we look at the distribution of patents across countries. Figure 1 gives the global breakdown of patent applications based on applicant residence in 2020, the most recent year available. China alone accounted for more than half of patent applications in 2020, with the US, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Europe comprising all but the remaining 3.6%.

Figure 1.

Global patent applications by country. These data were downloaded from the World Bank DataBank’s World Development Indicators Database. The most recent data are from 2019, so we ranked the states based on the number of patent applications filed by residents in 2019. Noting that several European states were high in the rankings, we decided to aggregate the data for the European region using a list of states from the United Nations Population Division. Source: World Bank Database (2022).

This massive inequality is alarming, but patents are only one indicator of domestic innovation capacity. Not all research is patented; for example, knowledge produced in the public sector may remain in the public domain. Patents would then be a poor measure of output since they represent the level of commercialized knowledge production. We thus explored other indicators of domestic innovation capacity, namely, research and development expenditure and the number of researchers involved in innovation. Expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) is typically regarded as a measure of a country’s input, that is, the level of public resources it commits to research. Researchers (as a proportion of the population) can be regarded as both an input and an output: having more researchers is likely to lead to more knowledge production, but increased expenditure also likely results in more researchers being able to pursue projects.

Figure 2 shows the latest available patent application data for each country, plotted against R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Figure 2a) and the number of researchers per million residents (Figure 2b). These points are color-coded by human development index (HDI). Note that the axes are scaled logarithmically; residents in the very high-HDI group tended to file between 10 and 1,000 times the number of patents per million residents as the low-HDI group. Though the R&D data only cover public expenditure, that divide alone has substantial implications for domestic innovation capacity. Many of today’s developed countries have a reputation for private research and development, but their technological advancement relied heavily on public funding to create technologies that were later privatized (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2019). To a degree, their innovation systems still rely on public funding, especially in risky sectors (Cheng and Parra-Lancourt, Reference Cheng, Parra-Lancourt, Heath, Moerland and Sanders2020). These results additionally point to the economic and innovation risks associated with “brain drain,” or the out-migration of a country’s intellectual base. With fewer researchers at their disposal, such countries risk falling further behind the technological frontier.

Figure 2.

R&D expenditure and researchers versus patent applications, coded by HDI. Countries were sorted into human development index (HDI) groups based on Human Development Report Office (HDRO) designations. Patent application data were retrieved from the World Bank DataBank using the “Patent Applications, Residents” dataset. The most recent available data point was used for each country. Panel (a) was constructed using the “Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP)” dataset from the World Bank DataBank. The most recent available data point on R&D expenditure was used for each country. Panel (b) was constructed using the “Researchers in R&D (per million)” dataset from the World Bank DataBank. The most recent available data point on researchers was used for each country. Note that both axes are in logscale for these panels. Source: World Bank database and HDRO.

It is therefore clear that the technological divide reaches across multiple indicators and that, broadly speaking, patent applications correlate with these other indicators. Though patent holdings are only one part of the divide, they reflect its magnitude and, we will argue, perpetuate and exacerbate the problem.

The distribution of triadic patents across countries sheds light on how the aforementioned inequalities are reflected in some frontier technologies. These categories include some 4IR technologies such as green energy, digital communications, and artificial intelligence. Five entities seem to be the dominant issuers of patents across these modern technologies. These are the US, Japan, Germany, the Republic of Korea, and China.

The data show that over the last decade and a half, China has caught up in every category. Otherwise, the breakdown has remained largely static. The top 10 countries have consistently accounted for 60–80% of triadic patents in important technologies (Figure 3). Due to imbalances in technological capacity and the terms of global agreements, as discussed below, these technologies tend to remain largely in the developed world, with little benefit for other countries. A recent report from WIPO does show that some countries are outperforming expectations based on their level of development; for example, the four countries in this category for the lowest income group are Rwanda, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Burundi (World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2022). Future research could seek to understand how these countries have outpaced their cohort and perhaps use that information to inform future policy. For example, Rwanda is a famed example of a developmental state, in which the government takes an active role in development (Mann and Berry, Reference Mann and Berry2016). Perhaps this has helped to spur innovation.

Figure 3.

Triadic patents in 4IR technologies, 2013–2016, 2009–2012, and 2005–2008. The top bar in each category is 2013–2016, the middle is 2009–2012, and the bottom is 2005–2008. We retrieved these data from the OECD Data Warehouse. After downloading the triadic patent counts for each country, we examined the share of patents held by applicants from all countries for each technology, using categories predetermined by the database. We generated lists of the top 10 countries for each technology in the timeframe 2013–2016 and then identified the 10 countries that placed in the top 10 most frequently. The shares of patents held by applicants residing in these countries is shown as a function of time for each technology in the figure. Source: OECD (2021).

3.2. Pharmaceutical patents—The case of COVID-19

Consider the COVID-19 vaccine. COVID-19 vaccine patents are similarly concentrated in just a few countries. Even among the top 10 jurisdictions,Footnote ² there is an enormous disparity. The US, the jurisdiction with the most vaccine patents (2,335), has more than 100 times the number of patents of the tenth jurisdiction (Japan, with 20). The high concentration of patent applications in a few jurisdictions indicates that the use of the knowledge contained in them is not widespread, despite the urgency of the situation (Figure 4).

Figure 4.

COVID-19 vaccine-related patents by jurisdiction. We used the WIPO PATENTSCOPE database to do a field combination search for the keywords “COVID-19” or “sars-cov-2” and the keyword “vaccin*.” We then identified the 10 countries with the most patents using the CTR keyword, which most closely corresponds with the jurisdiction in which the patent was filed. Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2022).

The picture is even more dramatic when examining the residence of vaccine patent applicants. While filing jurisdiction tends to reflect the markets in which patented knowledge will be commercialized, applicant residence data shows where the innovations originate (Foster-McGregor et al., Reference Foster-McGregor, Nomaler and Verspagen2019). Clearly, the US is overwhelmingly dominant in the field of COVID-19 vaccine patents, with almost 13 times the number of patents of the second-place country (Figure 5). This factor has undoubtedly contributed to its ability to procure enough doses to vaccinate its population. From an analysis standpoint, the discrepancy between the jurisdiction and applicant residence data justifies our prior use of applicant residence when attributing triadic patents to different countries.

Figure 5.

COVID-19 vaccine-related patents by applicant residence. We used the WIPO PATENTSCOPE database to do a field combination search for the keywords “COVID-19” or “sars-cov-2” and the keyword “vaccin*.” Because it is not possible to download applicant residence data as a spreadsheet and therefore easily rank them based on the number of patents by residents, we performed a search using these keywords and the ARE (applicant residence) field. We searched for all countries in the previous figure, as well as the top 10 countries identified in the triadic patent analysis, with a few additional countries that were dominant in certain sectors for triadic patents but did not make the top 10. Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2022).

While COVID-19 vaccines have been developed at record speed in an impressive feat of modern technology, it is mostly rich countries that have been able to access them and widely inoculate their populations (see Figure 6; Gebrekidan and Apuzzo, Reference Gebrekidan and Apuzzo2021).

Figure 6.

Access to COVID-19 vaccines is inequitable. Countries were sorted into HDI groups using the same method as in Figure 2. Data were obtained from the UNDP COVID-19 Vaccine Equity Dashboard. Source: UNDP COVID-19 Vaccine Equity Dashboard 2023; generated using most recent data available as of February 27, 2023. “Vaccinated” refers to those who have received at least one dose of a two-dose regimen, or one dose of a one-dose regimen, while “fully vaccinated” refers to those who have at least received the last dose of the primary regimen.

The World Health Organization, UNICEF, the Global Vaccine Alliance, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Initiatives spearheaded the COVAX initiative early in the pandemic, with the aim of supplying vaccine doses to countries that could not afford to procure them otherwise. The sibling initiative ACT-A (Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator) sought to facilitate the spread of COVID-related IPR. However, these efforts largely served to illustrate that voluntary contributions of intellectual property access, funds, and vaccine doses are insufficient. COVAX was underfunded, and wealthy countries took their allotted doses from it even when they had purchased more than enough from suppliers (Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET) Commission on Global Economic Transformation, 2021). Likewise, representatives of developing countries reported that ACT-A failed to live up to their expectations of it and felt that their input went unheeded when the initiative was developed (Mandaviya, Reference Mandaviya2023). Thus, efforts to bolster equitable access to vaccines have flagged the role of IP (intellectual property) restrictions. While globally there is enough capacity to produce enough vaccine supply, this is hamstrung by tight control of IPR by a few pharmaceutical giants in wealthy countries. The efforts to get vaccines to all developing countries have been closely tied with arguments to relax the rules of the IPR regime and a global move for suspension of intellectual property rights (Spence et al., Reference Sanders, Anselm, Haider, Jambeck, LaPointe, Vickers and Ziebarth2021). This is required not just for vaccines but for a whole host of treatments, tests, and products related to the pandemic.

At the World Trade Organization (WTO), developed country governments have until recently repeatedly blocked attempts by India, South Africa, and other developing countries for suspension of patents for the COVID-19 vaccines and related treatment (Prabhala et al., Reference Prabhala, Jayadev and Baker2020). TRIPS specifically allows for compulsory licensing, and the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health explicitly mentions public health emergencies as adequate cause to issue compulsory licenses that would allow other countries to produce essential drugs (Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET) Commission on Global Economic Transformation, 2021). Despite this, it has taken more than 2 years since the pandemic was declared for any agreement to be reached, during which time many people have died preventable deaths.

Recently, “the Quad” (composed of the US, EU, India, and South Africa) has put forward an agreement, signed in June 2022, to suspend certain TRIPS provisions for the purpose of expanding access to COVID-19 vaccine intellectual property (Monicken, Reference Monicken2022). However, this agreement falls short of what developing countries had hoped for (Green, Reference Green2022). It is unclear whether developing countries will have the latitude to access multiple patents with a single authorization or whether the process will be hindered by bureaucracy, and WTO will only decide whether to extend the waiver to desperately needed therapeutics and diagnostics 6 months after it goes into effect (Monicken, Reference Monicken2022). Furthermore, the technical know-how and trade secrets that are necessary for effectively harnessing patented knowledge are excluded from the deal (Krishnan, Reference Krishnan2022).

4.1. Patents and innovation

Empirically, there is scant evidence that the strengthening of patent laws leads to more R&D spending at the country level (see Challu, Reference Challu1995; Scherer and Weisburst, 1995; Lanjouw and Cockburn, Reference Lanjouw and Cockburn2001; Sakakibara and Branstetter, Reference Sakakibara and Branstetter2001; Bessen and Hunt, Reference Bessen and Hunt2007). In many industries, in recent decades, the patent system has resulted in weak or even negative support for innovation.Footnote ³ This is especially true in developing countries (Allred and Park, Reference Allred and Park2007), though evidence for the effect of patenting on innovation in developed countries is mixed (Allred and Park, Reference Allred and Park2007; Sweet and Maggio, 2015).

For one, the current patent system limits efficient diffusion of technology (Baker et al., Reference Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz2017). Inefficient diffusion of technology can in turn inhibit further innovation. Feedback from first adopters and “user-driven” innovation is important in the lifecycle of more mature technologies (Jaffe and Stavins, Reference Jaffe and Stavins1995).

The effects of IP on innovation also vary from industry to industry. Empirical studies have shown that patents have a net positive impact on innovation in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries (Bessen and Meurer, Reference Bessen and Meurer2009). The differentiating factor, for this sector, is the well-defined boundaries around patents on chemical compounds and pharmaceuticals. It is easier to demonstrate the novelty of a specific molecule, have clear assessment standards, and detect whether there is infringement (Levin et al., Reference Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter1987). Their novelty, non-obviousness, and usefulness can be more clearly assessed as well (Cheng and Parra-Lancourt, Reference Cheng, Parra-Lancourt, Heath, Moerland and Sanders2020). Policymakers and regulators may want to reconsider uniform treatment of innovations from all industries (Roin, Reference Roin2005). For example, boundaries around software patents are typically vague. Each product tends to include multiple technological ideas (Menell, Reference Menell1994; Cockburn and MacGarvie, Reference Cockburn and MacGarvie2011; Bessen and Meurer, Reference Bessen and Meurer2012; Chien, Reference Chien2012).

In the previous section, it was shown that patent activity is distributed very unequally across country groups. When it comes to registering patents, developed regions are ahead, by many multiples. This divide is aggravated when it comes to 4IR technologies due to the rapid pace of innovation and the way these technologies have ingrained themselves into daily life. Given the extent of this inequality, it is instructive to ask if the current IPR regime does anything to help developing countries converge with the developed world. Or, on the contrary, does it lead to even greater divergence?

4.2. Patents and the 4IR

We find that the patent regime is particularly unsuited to efficient development trajectories for the latest frontier technologies. This is due to some characteristic features of the latest technologies. The patent regime is also further concentrating market power for global Big Tech firms that largely originate in wealthy countries and exacerbating the detrimental effects of that asymmetry, including on innovation. Taken together, this does not bode well for the optimal deployment of modern technologies for achieving widespread and inclusive sustainable development.

Though patent protections are intended to spur innovation by allowing for sufficient return on investment, in practice, they may also stifle follow-on innovation that builds on previous technological advances. This effect has become more pronounced in recent decades, with modern technologies, for a number of reasons.

For one, the pace of technological innovation has increased. Typical patent protections last for 20 years and this length may be increased using a variety of means (Henry and Stiglitz, Reference Henry and Stiglitz2010). For reference, Apple’s first iPhone came out just 16 years ago (HISTORY, Reference Sweet and Maggio2007). Cutting-edge 4IR technology changes on a much shorter timescale than the duration of patent protections, so the protected information is often outdated by the time the patent expires and the information is broadly available for commercial use (Roin, Reference Roin2013).

This is exacerbated by the ripple effect of holding the rights to important patents. Firms will often barter for access to each other’s intellectual property, leading to a vicious cycle in which those who are at the technological frontier tend to be the ones pushing it ahead. Such a system disadvantages developing countries, latecomer firms, and smaller firms and individuals who do not have large patent portfolios. Likewise, public sector researchers may be at a disadvantage since their research is sometimes freely accessible, rather than sequestered behind patent protection (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2001). Even when publicly funded research is patent-protected, its role in the development of important technologies is not always properly acknowledged. For example, the American National Institutes of Health is still grappling with the pharmaceutical giant Moderna to obtain payments for a key technique that it licensed to the company. The technique was integral to the production of Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccine, which earned the company massive profits (Mueller, Reference Mueller2023). Recent reports have pointed to the importance of public sector research as a basis for patent activity in the US (Flaherty, Reference Foster-McGregor, Nomaler and Verspagen2019) and have found that such research disproportionately leads to high-value patents (Hourihan, 2020). Given the amount of value generated by follow-on innovation from publicly available research, it clearly plays an important role in domestic technology development.

Second, the nature of the product that is patented has changed, with implications for the effectiveness of patents. The evidence from recent decades shows that the patent system has not played a supportive role to innovation when it comes to most industries, except for the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. It is difficult to isolate specific inventive steps within the complicated codes that underlie many 4IR technologies, so patent boundaries are unclear (Gratton, Reference Gratton2002; Goldman, Reference Goldman2013). That a cancer treatment and the slide to unlock feature in smartphones receive the same 20-year patent protection, is hard to justify (Cheng and Parra-Lancourt, Reference Cheng, Parra-Lancourt, Heath, Moerland and Sanders2020). This is an additional reason for a rethink of the patents system, specifically the optimal stringency for a particular industry and if these should be differentiated by industry.Footnote ⁴

Third, there is a trend toward a more complex technological landscape than before. There is more convergence of technologies from areas that were distinct before. This increased interdependence exacerbates any negative impacts on follow-on innovation (Cheng and Parra-Lancourt, Reference Cheng, Parra-Lancourt, Heath, Moerland and Sanders2020). New products and technologies tend to be built upon patented knowledge from disparate fields, making it even more important for firms to already hold patents rights that they can use to barter with firms from other sectors (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2001).

4.3. Impacts on competition

The Fourth Industrial Revolution has been marked by a high degree of market concentration (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2019). The domination of Big Tech is being flagged and increasingly in the sights of regulators. The IP system tends to also limit competition. This is another channel that goes on to inhibit further innovation.

Firms have been adopting strategies that harm competition. The growing use of a number of strategic patenting tactics has resulted in patent thickets. Patent thickets arise when individual products draw on hundreds or even thousands of patents, often with fuzzy boundaries (Hall et al., Reference Hall, Helmers and von Graevenitz2015). To commercialize a new technology, an innovator must navigate through a dense web of overlapping IPR. The increased transaction costs associated with thickets reduce incentives to innovate. In areas featuring complex technologies, increases in patent thicket density have led to greater increases in patent applications by owners of large patent portfolios, relative to smaller ones (von Graevenitz et al., Reference von Graevenitz, Wagner and Harhoff2013).

As technologies in the Fourth Industrial Revolution become more complex, patent thickets will lead to further market concentration and pose more barriers to entry to potential competitors (Cheng and Parra-Lancourt, Reference Cheng, Parra-Lancourt, Heath, Moerland and Sanders2020). Additionally, firms sometimes file patents solely to block competitors, with no intention to commercially use the patented knowledge. Such “strategic non-use” patents lock away knowledge with no benefit to society (Torrisi et al., Reference Torrisi, Gambardella, Giuri, Harhoff, Hoisl and Mariani2016). The intention behind these often is to threaten or retaliate against competitors via litigation, a process which diverts resources from innovation and can intimidate innovators into avoiding the development of products that could be perceived as similar (Chang, Reference Chang2002).

Companies may introduce small updates to their technologies when filing new patents to add to a thicket; these patents keep knowledge out of the hands of other potential inventors just as much as a truly novel patent, but without the benefit that a novel patent would bring. One recent example is the drug Humira, which treats conditions like arthritis. AbbVie, the company that holds the patent, has used patent thicketing and lawsuits to delay the entry of competitors into the market. By suing competitors and then settling with them to delay their entry in the market by years or decades, the firm is able to maintain its outsize profits. The patents that AbbVie has added to create the thicket have occasionally included minor improvements, but mainly have just expanded on the existing patent (Robbins, Reference Robbins2023). Thus, the drug has existed for more than two decades with only minor improvements, but because of loopholes in the patent system, its price has continued to rise. Follow-on innovation from the initial patent has been stifled by this technically legal and commonplace practice, a clear indicator that the current IPR system is not achieving its goals of promoting and incentivizing innovation. Though this example reveals weaknesses in the American system of regulating IPR, it is much the same globally.

5.1. TRIPS hinders developing countries’ ability to catch up

The experience with the COVID-19 vaccine and its unequal distribution is an illustration of the broader issue of affordable access to lifesaving medicine under current international arrangements (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2001). TRIPS, in particular, is a major barrier to technological diffusion and access. During their earlier development, today’s economic powers had the freedom to protect infant industries and limit IP protections in order to disseminate knowledge that could stimulate innovation (David, Reference David, Reichman and Maskus2010; Moser, Reference Moser2013; Peng, Reference Peng2017). Foreign inventions were often poorly protected, if at all, allowing domestic innovators to freely access and build upon those technologies (Kotabe, Reference Kumar1992; Nicholas, Reference Nicholas2011; Peng, Reference Peng2017). Except in limited and vaguely defined cases, developing countries today cannot engage in these same practices without running afoul of TRIPS.

The two main flexibilities included in TRIPS are compulsory licensing and parallel imports. The compulsory licensing provision allows governments to license out patented information without the patent holder’s consent. This practice is allowed in certain urgent situations and has especially been used for pharmaceuticals. However, the bureaucratic hurdles involved limit the use of this practice in developing countries (Zaman, Reference Zaman2013; Baker et al., Reference Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz2017). This issue has been revitalized in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some states have invoked the compulsory licensing option to produce vaccines and treatments, but the fear of retaliation that would jeopardize bilateral trade agreements has made others reluctant to take this step (Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET) Commission on Global Economic Transformation, 2021). Additionally, many developing countries lack the necessary capacity to produce vaccines and treatments even if they invoke compulsory licensing, again leaving them dependent on imports from developed countries, which have been limited due to vaccine nationalism (Gruszczynski and Wu, Reference Gruszczynski and Wu2021; McMahon, Reference McMahon2021). Non-patented intellectual property including trade secrets, clinical trial data, and technical know-how also remain out of reach, since compulsory licensing only covers patents (Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET) Commission on Global Economic Transformation, 2021).

Parallel imports, in which a product is imported from another country where it is less expensive, are also allowed through TRIPS. As with compulsory licensing, this process is not always straightforward. For example, the publishing industry has successfully lobbied to limit parallel imports of educational materials (Baker et al., Reference Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz2017).

Besides the option for compulsory licensing and parallel imports under certain conditions, the only corrective measure included in TRIPS is the technology transfer clause for least developed countries in Article 66.2. This is a discretionary mechanism and evidence shows that it is rarely used and poorly monitored (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2001; Moon, Reference Moon2008; Moon, Reference Moon2011; Zaman, Reference Zaman2013). Given the unevenness with which TRIPS treats the needs and interests of developed and developing countries, it is little wonder that this system has cemented global inequalities. This effect is clearly visible in our analysis; across a variety of technological fields, the dominance of the top 10 countries in triadic patents has mostly held steady or even increased since 2005, 10 years after TRIPS came into effect. Evidently, the TRIPS conditions do not stimulate innovation and investment in all countries.

TRIPS has existed for the entirety of the 4IR, meaning that the most recent technological revolution has been characterized by inequality. Most countries do not even have the building blocks of these technologies, which hinders their ability to catch up. However, global inequities in pandemic recovery illustrate the most striking and immediately concerning effects of TRIPS. Even the “flexibilities” of TRIPS are insufficient; the terms of the compulsory licensing and parallel import provisions are vague and developing countries fear the repercussions if they inadvertently violate the rules. Power imbalances on the global stage prevent these flexibilities from being truly useful to developing countries.

5.2. Global level reforms

Given the challenges of TRIPS, it is clear that global level reforms are necessary to give developing countries more flexibility in handling IPR protections. For example, Zaman (Reference Zaman2013) argues that countries should be given more latitude to use compulsory licensing and parallel imports for green technologies because combating climate change is an urgent necessity for all countries (Zaman, Reference Zaman2013). This is not merely a problem of uneven patent ownership distribution. Rather, deeply ingrained power imbalances serve to reinforce and even widen the gap in innovation capacity between rich and poor countries, which contributes to global inequalities. These challenges reflect the persistent structural problem with the global IPR regime.

TRIPS embodies this spirit through its insistence on uniformity in IPR protections. Enforcing the same level of patent protection for developed and developing countries leads to higher proportional costs for developing countries to innovate using existing intellectual property since they own less of it (Chang, Reference Chang2011). The incentives offered by IPR are also less effective in developing countries since there are fewer actors capable of taking advantage of them. Thus, innovation is not necessarily hindered by lack of IPR but by lack of access to capital, education, infrastructure, technical know-how, trade secrets, clinical trial data, and other necessary tangible and intangible goods (Sweet and Maggio, 2015; Sanders et al., Reference Kotabe2018; Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET) Commission on Global Economic Transformation, 2021). In addition, TRIPS conditions impose an institutional cost. A functioning IPR system requires substantial institutional and educational resources, including trained officers, lawyers, courts, and inspectors (Chang, Reference Chang2011). This presents a challenge for already-strained developing country budgets. The necessity of accessing protected intellectual property leads to monetary flows from developing to developed countries in the form of royalties and licensing fees, which exacerbates existing between-country inequalities (Kumar, Reference Kumar2003).

Given the crucial role played by technology in development, it is especially important to ensure access to those technologies that are most useful for development goals, many of which are 4IR technologies. It would be reasonable to designate such technologies as global public goods, backed by public funding and openly accessible. One way to improve access would be to allow developing country governments and other actors to freely adopt and adapt such technologies to suit their needs, delaying royalty and licensing payments until these actors profit commercially from the technology (UNDESA, 2011). This may involve a multistakeholder discussion to determine which technologies should be considered global public goods, such as vaccines and climate change mitigation/reversal technologies (Sanders et al., Reference Kotabe2018). Following such a discussion, TRIPS and related agreements would need to be updated to reflect the exemption of technologies labeled as global public goods from the usual IPR protections.

Pharmaceutical advances tend to be more well defined than advances in other industries, say algorithms in information technology, and consequently patents in pharmaceuticals are seen as more efficient than most other industries. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, gives pause. The extraordinary rapid spread of the virus across the globe, the staggering extent of deaths and illness around the world, and the eventual development of vaccines and therapies, shows that addressing COVID-19 needs global solidarity and action. We cannot go by standard efficiency arguments for protecting the intellectual property for the companies that developed the vaccines and the treatments. There is a strong moral argument to make these available broadly to all countries. More than that, addressing COVID-19 is a global public good. The populations that did not receive vaccination become hosts for the development of new variants of the virus that in turn lead to new waves, more illness and death, rendering even vaccinated and rich countries helpless. This is yet another externality that is not accounted for. The argument for sharing of IP information in the case of COVID-19 and similar global challenges is irrefutable. Clearly, the existing IPR needs reform.

The United Nations has multiple technology transfer initiatives in place already, focused especially on sustainable development. Both the Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Technology Mechanism aim to help countries combat climate change and achieve the SDGs by improving access to cutting-edge technologies. Though the inclusion of technology transfer in high-level discussions about the SDGs is an encouraging step, so far it seems to have been insufficient. The aforementioned failure of ACT-A to galvanize widespread sharing of COVID-19 mitigation technologies is a clear example of this (Haugen, Reference Haugen2021). However, part of the TFM is the online 2030 Connect system, which aims to create a pool of openly accessible information as well as to connect growing businesses with support systems (Brougham, Reference Broughamn.d.). This is a long-term initiative, so it is too early to judge its effectiveness. Over time, such efforts may help to change the global culture around IPR.

Technology transfer is important, especially for urgent matters such as climate change. However, long-term, developing country actors must be involved directly in research and development. Merely opening access to intellectual property is insufficient without building up domestic capacity to adopt and adapt technologies (Chang, Reference Chang2011; Archibugi and Filippetti, Reference Archibugi, Filippetti, Archibugi and Filippetti2015). Encouraging and funding domestic innovation systems to put in place the necessary physical and institutional infrastructure would give developing countries the chance to act more independently and reduce their reliance on foreign technology in the long run (Sanders et al., Reference Kotabe2018).

This is especially important given that research funded by developed countries often does not prioritize developing country needs. For example, internationally funded health research generally neglects tropical diseases that primarily affect developing countries (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2001; Baker et al., Reference Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz2017). Likewise, little research is devoted to vaccines for malaria and tuberculosis, despite their prevalence. Firms do not see much profit potential in their development due to the relative poverty of the countries most affected by these diseases (Archibugi and Filippetti, Reference Archibugi, Filippetti, Archibugi and Filippetti2015). This all suggests the need for a fundamental cultural shift at the global level. Rather than granting supremacy to IPR as the sole motivator of innovation, we must instead reframe knowledge production and dissemination as an important development tool and prioritize its usage for the promotion of human wellbeing.