1. Introduction
Providing victims of corporate human rights abuses with effective access to remedy is a central pillar of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).Footnote 1 Without credible avenues for redress, the other two UNGP pillars—the state duty to protect human rights and the corporate responsibility to respect human rightsFootnote 2—lose their normative force. Yet, the global system of remedy envisioned by the UNGPs (comprising multiple reinforcing mechanisms, including state-based judicial and non-judicial grievance processes as well as non-state-based channels) operates unevenly across jurisdictions. In many extractive contexts, particularly in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, structural governance weaknesses,Footnote 3 limited state capacityFootnote 4 and the uneven diffusion of business and human rights (BHR) normsFootnote 5 have produced what can be described as a ‘remedy gap’Footnote 6: affected rightsholders lack access to effective redress both in the jurisdiction where the harms occur and in the home state of the corporation accused of committing the harm. Essentially, the ‘remedy gap’ describes the space between the formal recognition of a right to remedy and the practical inability of affected rightsholders to obtain meaningful redress. This gap thus shapes how global frameworks such as the UNGPs are translated, or distorted, when they encounter local political economies of extraction. The result is a fragmented global governance environment in which private authority often substitutes for absent, inaccessible or unwilling state institutions. In the African mining context, this gap has at least three dimensions: (i) host-state judicial and administrative mechanisms may be inaccessible because of cost, distance, delay, political pressure, corruption, limited capacity or fear of retaliation; (ii) home-state mechanisms may be formally available but practically remote, especially where claimants must overcome jurisdictional barriers, complex corporate structures, evidentiary burdens and prohibitive litigation costs; and (iii) non-judicial mechanisms may exist but fail to provide remedies that are transparent, predictable, rights-compatible or independent of the company alleged to have caused or contributed to the harm. The remedy gap, therefore, captures the absence of a forum as well as the failure of available forums to provide effective, rights-based redress.
Operational-level grievance mechanisms (OGMs)Footnote 7 sit at the centre of this tension. Envisioned as early-warning and remediation tools meant to complement state-based judicial and non-judicial mechanisms,Footnote 8 OGMs have been implemented by several transnational mining companies (TMCs).Footnote 9 In theory, they offer accessible, site-specific pathways for members of affected communities to raise concerns before adverse human rights impacts occur. To ensure they function effectively, the UNGPs set out eight criteria: legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, equitability, transparency, rights-compatibility, continuous learning and dialogue-based engagement.Footnote 10 These criteria emphasise that grievance mechanisms can only achieve their purpose if those they are intended to serve find them credible and trustworthy.Footnote 11 In remedy gap contexts, however, OGMs have enabled corporations to exert substantial control over the design, operation and outcomes of the only grievance mechanism often available to affected rightsholders, compromising their credibility and trustworthiness. Thus, while the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria nonetheless remain important minimum benchmarks for evaluating grievance mechanisms, they are insufficient to confront the structural problem that arises in remedy gap contexts.
It is not surprising, then, that several OGMs operated by TMCs in remedy gap contexts have fallen short of the aspirations outlined in Pillar Three of the UNGPs. This paper argues that the UNGPs, despite their emphasis on a pluralistic remedy ecosystem, inadvertently empower companies to govern access to remedy where both home-state and host-state mechanisms are absent, ineffective, or inaccessible. Through a comparative examination of four TMCs operating in Africa—Barrick Mining Corporation,Footnote 12 Gemfields Ltd., Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. and Rio Tinto—the paper demonstrates how OGMs have been structured to limit, and often foreclose, victims’ access to meaningful redress. This not only undermines the fundamental principles of access to remedy set out in the UNGPs, but also reveals several limitations embedded in Pillar Three.
The cases examined here reflect a distinct configuration of intersecting BHR problems in African mining: foreign-controlled extractive projects operating in postcolonial resource economies; communities affected by these operations whose livelihoods are tied to land, water and artisanal mining; mining companies continuing to rely on public and private security forces to protect their sites; and weak or inaccessible state-based remedial mechanisms for individuals harmed by these operations. These features are not unique to Africa, but their convergence gives OGMs a particular significance in African mining contexts. Where host-state mechanisms are unavailable or ineffective and home-state remedies remain distant, costly or jurisdictionally uncertain, company-designed grievance mechanisms can become the default centre of the remedy ecosystem. This article, therefore, exposes how global BHR frameworks are translated in the African mining experience where corporate authority, state fragility and extractive dependency intersect.
This article employs a comparative case-study methodology grounded primarily in documentary analysis of publicly available materials. The four cases have been selected for three reasons: each involves serious allegations of human rights abuses linked to security forces, resettlement processes or environmental contamination; each resulted in the creation or operation of an OGM that is publicly documented to some degree; and together, they reflect different geographic and institutional settings within the African mining sector. The analysis draws on NGO reports (from organisations such as Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID), MiningWatch Canada, Amnesty International and the Andrew Lees Trust), company sustainability and human rights reports, and press coverage. Court documents, including statements of claim and settlement information, have been incorporated where publicly available. A small number of interviews with Tanzanian legal experts that I conducted during fieldwork in May 2024 have informed my understanding of the broader legal, political and institutional context surrounding access to remedy in the country. These interviews are not treated as a standalone qualitative dataset, nor are they an evidentiary basis for my findings; the article’s claims rely primarily on publicly verifiable documentary sources. The reliance on these sources reflects two constraints: the limited public transparency of OGMs themselves, many of which provide little reporting beyond high-level summaries; and the confidentiality of certain settlement agreements, which restricts access to detailed information on remedies. While these constraints preclude a full assessment of each OGM’s internal operations, they do not impede comparative analysis of patterns across cases, especially where deficiencies are corroborated by multiple sources.
The dynamics explored in this paper sit within broader debates about mining governance, the diffusion of BHR norms, and the structural conditions that shape extractive industries in the Global South. These debates capture a shared insight: that global BHR norms, most prominently conveyed by the UNGPs, circulate widely but are implemented unevenly. In many African mining jurisdictions, state institutions lack the capacity, reach, or political autonomy required to regulate powerful TMCsFootnote 13 or provide credible remedies for human rights harms.Footnote 14 These weaknesses do not eliminate state authority but instead fragment it,Footnote 15 allowing mining companies to exercise quasi-governance functions in areas such as human rights due diligence, security arrangements, resettlement processes and grievance handling.Footnote 16 This structural environment helps explain why OGMs, although conceived as supplementary tools to complement state-based grievance mechanisms, often become the primary, if not the only, avenue for raising complaints. It also illuminates why OGMs are so readily embraced by companies: they satisfy global expectations associated with BHR norms, offer reputational benefits, and create a procedural appearance of compliance while leaving underlying power relations intact. When OGMs operate in remedy gap contexts marked by weak or inaccessible state institutions, their design and implementation mirror the structural imbalances of the local governance environment. As the case studies in this paper show, OGMs frequently function less as early-warning systems than as privatized, company-controlled processes that limit victims’ access to meaningful redress.
This article proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a background on OGMs within the UNGPs; Section 3 details the four case studies, summarises alleged human rights violations and the OGMs implemented at their respective mining sites in Africa; Section 4 examines how these OGMs entrench corporate control over rights through four intersecting dimensions—consultation and transparency, clarity of process, accessibility and information imbalance, and unpredictability of remedies; Section 5 proposes an alternative pathway to remedy through independent grievance mechanisms that could be more effective in remedy gap contexts and considers how access to remedy might be strengthened in African mining contexts through this alternative mechanism, sector-specific UNGPs guidance and complementary remedial structures that reduce company control over remedy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. OGMs in the UNGPs and their limitations
The BHR field emerged from growing recognition that corporate activities can have significant adverse impacts on human rights, and that voluntary initiatives alone were insufficient to prevent or remedy those harms. Early instruments, such as the 1976 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, encouraged responsible business conduct,Footnote 17 and a proliferation of private and multi-stakeholder initiatives soon followed, including company-specific corporate social responsibility programmes, the UN Global Compact and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Yet the voluntary and self-regulatory nature of these initiatives revealed clear limits. Civil society organisations, academics and several international human rights bodies including the United Nations called for a more concrete and coherent framework to clarify corporate human rights obligations.
The UNGPs, adopted unanimously by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, marked a turning point.Footnote 18 They operationalized John Ruggie’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’Footnote 19 framework and quickly became the central global reference point for responsible business conduct.Footnote 20 The UNGPs rest on three interdependent pillars: the state duty to protect human rights; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and access to remedy. Under the second pillar, businesses are expected to embed a policy commitment to respect human rights, conduct human rights due diligence and establish mechanisms to remediate harms they have caused or contributed to.Footnote 21 A central component of this responsibility is the creation of OGMs, envisioned as accessible channels through which affected rightsholders can seek early recourse for harms arising from corporate operations.Footnote 22
Pillar Three of the UNGPs outlines the foundational principles for ensuring victims have access to remedy for any ‘grievance’, defined as ‘a perceived injustice evoking an individual’s or a group’s sense of entitlement, which may be based on law, contract, explicit or implicit promises, customary practice, or general notions of fairness of aggrieved communities’.Footnote 23 Ensuring effective access to remedy is integral to both the state’s duty to protect against business-related human rights abuses and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. To achieve this objective, ‘state-based judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms should form the foundation of a wider system of remedy … [within which OGMs] can provide early-stage recourse and resolution’.Footnote 24 OGMs are described as a ‘process or a set of processes for receiving, evaluating, and addressing grievances from affected communities, in a timely and consistent manner at the site or operational level’.Footnote 25 As non-state-based mechanisms, OGMs have become a crucial means ‘through which companies receive complaints and may directly provide remedies at the project level to those harmed by the company’s operations’.Footnote 26 Principle 29 of the UNGPs highlights two core functions of OGMs. First, OGMs provide a forum for those directly affected by a company’s operations to raise concerns, enabling the company to identify and analyse harmful impacts and systemic trends. This allows the company to adjust its conduct to avoid future harm. Second, OGMs establish a process for remedying adverse impacts ‘early and directly … thereby preventing harms from compounding and grievances from escalating’.Footnote 27 OGMs are therefore intended as early-warning systems to prevent future harm,Footnote 28 not substitutes for judicial or administrative bodies. They are envisioned as complementary to broader remedial mechanisms that operate alongside, rather than replace, state-based judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms.Footnote 29 To ensure OGMs ‘serve their purpose’, the UNGPs establish eight effectiveness criteria that serve as benchmarks to guard against ‘poorly designed or implemented grievance mechanisms’.Footnote 30
The intersecting norms captured in the three pillars of UNGPs have created a pluralistic remedy ecosystem anchored in state institutionsFootnote 31 that simultaneously encourage corporations to establish OGMs to uphold their responsibility to respect human rights. This dual emphasis creates tension in practice, especially in remedy gap contexts where this complementary structure may collapse when neither host-state nor home-state grievance mechanisms are meaningfully accessible. In such situations, companies may unilaterally develop, implement and adjudicate OGMs, often making them the sole or primary avenue through which victims can seek redress. Although these mechanisms are presented as compliant with the UNGPs, their design and operation often reflect corporate priorities rather than the needs and rights of affected communities. In practice, OGMs may function less as channels for early, direct resolution and more as tools that structure and contain claims, shaping the scope of redress available to victims. This places companies in industries like mining that produce significant adverse human rights impacts in control of victims’ access to remedy under the guise of complying with the UNGPs framework that mandates respect for human rights.
Corporate control over OGMs tends to manifest through several recurrent features. Limited consultation, weak dialogue, and a lack of transparency undermine legitimacy and prevent complainants from understanding or influencing the process.Footnote 32 Unclear or poorly communicated procedures create uncertainty about how grievances can be raised, how they will be assessed, and what remedies may be available.Footnote 33 Significant imbalances of information and expertise disadvantage complainants, particularly when companies restrict access to legal support or control the evidence on which decisions are made.Footnote 34 Finally, the unpredictable nature of available remedies, both in quantum and in form, creates further barriers to meaningful access to remedy and erodes trust in the mechanism.Footnote 35 As the following case studies illustrate, these limitations not only compromise the fairness and effectiveness of OGMs but also enable corporate control over victims’ access to remedy in ways that are at odds with the spirit of the UNGPs. The analysis that follows assesses the case studies against the logic of the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria while also considering whether those criteria are sufficient to prevent corporate control over access to remedy in remedy gap contexts.
3. Human rights allegations and OGMs at select African mines
Since the UNGPs were endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011, several mining companies operating in Africa have implemented OGMs as part of their corporate social responsibility, human rights, or sustainability strategies. These OGMs were often established in the context of settlements between companies and victims alleging serious human rights violations, including killings, forced evictions, sexual violence and environmental harm. This section examines the creation and performance of four specific OGMs: Barrick Mining Corporation’s North Mara Gold Mine (NMGM) in Tanzania, Gemfields’ Montepuez Ruby Mine (MRM) in Mozambique, Ivanhoe Mines’ Kamoa-Kakula Copper Mine (KKCM) in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rio Tinto’s Qit Madagascar Minerals (QMM). The four case studies are not presented as representative of all African mining conflicts. Rather, they are selected because they illustrate recurring BHR tensions within African mining, notably the absence of trusted remedial institutions capable of addressing corporate harm in a sector dominated by foreign investment and characterised by serious allegations of human rights and environmental abuses. Read together, the cases show how the remedy architecture imagined by the UNGPs is implemented in an African mining context that is shaped by these tensions.
A. Barrick Mining Corporation’s North Mara Gold Mine
The NMGM is located in the Tarime district of the Mara region in Northwest Tanzania. The mine is situated on the land of the Kuria Indigenous peoples, near a population of about 70,000 people. RAID, a UK-based human rights organisation, reports that less than 10 per cent of the rural population in this remote northern region has completed secondary education and over 30 per cent are illiterate.Footnote 36 The NMGM consists of two ore deposits: the open-pit Nyabirama deposit and the underground Gokona deposit, each operating under a special mining license. The processing plant at the mine has a capacity of 8,000 tonnes of ore per day, with commercial operations beginning in 2002.Footnote 37
In 1999, the Tanzanian government signed a Mineral Development Agreement with East Africa Gold Mine Ltd., which later became Placer Dome Tanzania, a subsidiary of Placer Dome Inc., when Placer Dome acquired the mine. Barrick acquired Placer Dome in 2006. Since this acquisition, Barrick has directly or indirectly owned all or a majority interest in the NMGM through various subsidiaries. In 2010, Barrick incorporated Africa Barrick Gold (AGB), a wholly owned subsidiary based in the United Kingdom, to control its Tanzanian operations. In 2014, AGB changed its name to Acacia Mining Plc (Acacia Mining), partly to distance itself from Barrick. Throughout this period, Barrick retained a 64 per cent interest in AGB and Acacia. In 2019, Barrick purchased the remaining shares in Acacia Mining, thereby reacquiring 100 per cent ownership and control of the NMGM.Footnote 38
Since Barrick acquired the mine in 2006, there have been many reports of human rights abuses committed by the mine’s private security and the resident police force unit against villagers living near the mine, leading to the deaths of at least 77 people.Footnote 39 RAID and MiningWatch Canada have documented these alleged violations through multiple field visits. Both organisations have published several reports describing the abuses, which have been corroborated by international press coverageFootnote 40 and a 2011 commission and 2016 parliamentary inquiry initiated by the Tanzanian government.Footnote 41 Between 2008 and 2013, RAID reported at least 16 deaths and 11 injuries caused by police either in or near the mine.Footnote 42 Subsequent reporting revealed that the nearest general hospital to the NMGM in Tarime was treating five to eight patients with gunshot wounds each week, many of whom reported having been shot by mine security and police.Footnote 43 From 2014 to 2016, RAID and MiningWatch, in cooperation with local civil society groups, documented at least 22 people killed, 69 seriously injured, and 9 victims of sexual assault at or near the mine, suggesting that the level of violence was increasing.Footnote 44 In March 2017, Acacia Mining acknowledged 32 deaths of so-called ‘trespassers’ on the mine site between 2014 and 2016, and reported two additional such deaths in 2017.Footnote 45
Most of the documented human rights abuses at the NMGM involve allegations of excessive force used against villagers accused of trespassing on the mine site. Members of the local community have long entered the mine to scavenge for gold in waste rock to earn a living, particularly after losing their lands and livelihoods to the mine.Footnote 46 Through its partnership with local police forces, the mine adopted a strategy that effectively turned the police into a private security force tasked with forcibly and violently removing villagers, who were criminalised for entering the site to search for small traces of gold in the mine’s waste.Footnote 47
In 2012, Barrick began establishing OGMs at multiple mine sites, although the creation of the NMGM grievance mechanism was not publicly reported until 2014 amid international press coverage of a lawsuit brought by Leigh Day against Acacia Mining in the United Kingdom.Footnote 48 In 2012, several victims of abuses at the NMGM reported that they were approached by Barrick and encouraged to withdraw from the lawsuit and sign legal waivers precluding all future legal action against the company in exchange for a remedy package through a newly created Community Grievance Mechanism. Individuals who accepted this offer later revealed that the remedy provided did not match what had been orally promised when they agreed to drop their claims.Footnote 49
Between 2015 and 2017, Acacia Mining seemingly paused the grievance mechanism. After the Leigh Day suit was settled in 2015 and the grievance mechanism was in place, villagers who attempted to bring grievances through the company process reported that the company was unresponsive.Footnote 50 RAID reported that in late 2016, Acacia Mining ‘cleared’ a backlog of pending cases by rejecting over 90 per cent of complaints as ‘unsubstantiated or inconclusive.’ Acacia Mining’s own public reporting supports this account: in its 2017 Annual Report, the company indicated that it had rejected 109 out of 117 cases related to excessive use of force.Footnote 51 In early 2017, in response to mounting international attention and pressure from activists, Acacia Mining began designing a revised OGM. The company presented a draft of the mechanism to communities around the NMGM but did not disclose the feedback it received from those meetings.Footnote 52 Some of the former Leigh Day lawsuit plaintiffs, as well as complainants who had participated in the previous mechanism and expressed dissatisfaction with that process, were approached by Acacia Mining’s Remediation Officer and invited to participate in a pilot of the new mechanism.Footnote 53
The revised OGM was implemented through four publicly available documents: a ‘Standard Operating Procedure’ (SOP); a ‘Handbook for Grievants’ (which explained the process and contained the intake form); a ‘Security and Human Rights Standards Reference Guide’ (which set out the methodology for assessing the conduct of those accused of committing human rights abuses); and a ‘Remedies Reference Guide’ (which detailed the methodology for assessing remedies). Three entities were tasked with implementing the grievance mechanism: a Community Grievance Team, a Community Impacts and Remedies Investigations Team (Investigations Team), and a Community Grievance Committee. The Grievance Team, made up of a Team Leader and Grievance Officers appointed by the Mine, spearheaded the process. The Investigations Team was responsible for investigating claims and gathering evidence. The Grievance Committee functioned as a quasi-judicial body that presided over hearings; it was composed of three members, all directly or indirectly appointed by the mine.
In April 2018, MiningWatch Canada detailed the SOP for this new OGM. The SOP set out general procedures from the initiation of a grievance to its rejection or resolution:
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• Complainants initiated claims verbally or through an intake form filed with the grievance officer.
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• The Investigations Team then investigated to determine whether there was a legitimate grievance. This included travelling to the complainants’ homes and conducting interviews.
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• The Investigations Team was also responsible for explaining the grievance process to the complainants.
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• To determine whether there was a legitimate grievance, the Investigations Team engaged the grievant in a first stage ‘facilitated dialogue’.
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• If no agreement was reached through the dialogue, the grievance proceeded to a second stage hearing, which was adjudicated by the Grievance Committee. The Grievance Committee was made up of three members, all of whom were appointed by the mine. The Investigations Team represented the mine at these hearings.
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• If it was determined, either during the dialogue or after a hearing, that a human rights impact had in fact occurred, the next step was to determine the appropriate remedy. This step proceeded similarly to the identification of the harm, with a dialogue to start, followed by a hearing if necessary.Footnote 54
Forty-eight grievances were lodged through the new mechanism: 18 related to ‘security and human rights,’ 16 to ‘land and property’, and 13 to ‘environmental issues’. The company reported that remediation plans were established for 19 of the 47 grievances that had been processed.Footnote 55
Throughout its operation, Acacia Mining presented the mechanism as a viable means of addressing community members’ concerns. When Barrick gained full ownership and operational control of the mine in 2019, the grievance mechanism was effectively shut down and was not replaced with an alternative arrangement.Footnote 56
B. Gemfields’ Montepuez Ruby Mine
Ruby mining in Mozambique began in earnest in 2009, soon after a large deposit was discovered in the Cabo Delgado region. Three years later, Gemfields began operations at the MRM through a joint venture with Mwiriti Limitada, a Mozambican company, which led to the establishment of the Montepuez Ruby Mine. Today, the mine covers more than 33,000 hectares and is estimated to supply over half of the world’s rubies. Throughout its operations in Cabo Delgado, Gemfields has portrayed itself as a responsible corporate actor that has delivered on its promises to mine responsibly, support the community and advance conservation projects in the area.Footnote 57 Within a few years of the mine’s opening, community members living near the mine and artisanal miners reported grave human rights abuses allegedly committed by mine security forces, which included MRM employees and public and private security forces contracted by the mine. These allegations included forced evictions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, shootings and killings of artisanal miners, and severe beatings.Footnote 58 These claims formed the basis of a lawsuit brought against Gemfields in the United Kingdom by law firm Leigh Day.
Gemfields publicly refuted the allegations, issuing a statement to disclose the lawsuit and affirm that the company and its subsidiary ‘take allegations of this nature extremely seriously and denounce any form of violence or abuse’.Footnote 59 The company stated that MRM provided human rights training in line with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights to employees and service providers, and that it voluntarily extended this training to Mozambican police and other government forces. In the same press release, Gemfields suggested that the lawsuit was vexatious, describing Leigh Day as ‘well known for bringing claims of this nature’ and noting that the claim had not yet been filed as the firm was exploring ‘alternative resolution…on behalf of its clients’.Footnote 60 While acknowledging that violence had occurred at the mine after it opened, Gemfields argued that most incidents were between rival gangs of artisanal miners and that any force used by its security personnel was to protect the safety and wellbeing of its employees. The company’s chief executive at the time also defended Gemfields’ broader role in Mozambique, claiming that without a ‘legitimate and trusted’ company such as Gemfields mining rubies, the country would not have benefitted from its mineral wealth because ‘the country would have been looted’ by foreign gangs.Footnote 61 In the face of serious human rights allegations, Gemfields moved quickly to defend a carefully cultivated reputation as a responsible miner and net contributor to Mozambican society through taxation (over US$100 million),Footnote 62 royalties, health and education initiatives near the mine, and internal measures to address wrongdoing by its security forces. In 2019, Leigh Day settled the claim against Gemfields on behalf of 273 plaintiffs living around the MRM. Redress for these victims was through transnational litigation rather than an OGM. As part of the settlement, Gemfields agreed to compensate the claimants, fund agricultural projects and training for the local community and establish an independent OGM for victims whom Leigh Day was unable to represent, given that the settlement terms prohibited the firm from bringing any further claims arising before the settlement date.Footnote 63 For these individuals, access to remedy would depend on the newly established OGM.
The OGM opened in February 2021. In its announcement, Gemfields acknowledged ‘that setting up an OGM was the right thing to do to address grievances from the communities’.Footnote 64 The company reported that it had consulted international and local human rights specialists over two years, a process that, in its view, reflected ‘the care and thought that went into [creating] the OGM, to make it as resilient as possible’.Footnote 65 It was designed as an independent entity distinct from the mine, and consistent with the UNGPs and Mozambican law. An OGM secretariat, provided by a local social development consultancy, was established to administer the grievance mechanism independently of the company, while a separate international consultancy, Synergy, was retained to monitor the OGM regularly. Anyone with grievances similar to those covered by the settlement could bring a claim to the OGM. Claims were categorized based on whether they met an evidentiary threshold assessed on a balance of probabilities. Those that were substantiated by an independent Fact-Finding Team and then brought before an Independent Panel (comprised of five members from civil society, academic or research institutions, and the local community) were eligible for financial or non-financial remedies.Footnote 66
Synergy issued mixed assessments of the OGM in the two monitoring reports Gemfields has published. In the first, covering 1 June–30 November 2021, Synergy evaluated the OGM against the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria. It found that claimants whose grievances were resolved generally reported satisfaction with the process, but the OGM nonetheless fell short of several key criteria. Synergy noted that the mechanism faced ‘very high caseload’ and ‘severe delays in acknowledging, resolving and closing out grievances’, which posed ‘a major risk to the OGM’s legitimacy’.Footnote 67 Vulnerable claimants, including families in the resettled village and elderly women, experienced barriers to access due to limited knowledge of the OGM and risks encountered when lodging complaints. Predictable remedy was not consistently available because the mechanism failed to adhere to its own procedures and timelines. Equitability and transparency were also compromised due to the Secretariat’s failure to follow established procedures and a lack of public reporting on the OGM.Footnote 68 In its second report, covering 1 December 2021–1 June 2022, Synergy concluded that ‘the OGM demonstrated limited progress to claimants that it is providing access to remedy’.Footnote 69 The OGM’s legitimacy and predictability continued to be undermined by significant delays, limited progress in providing remedy, and inconsistent application of procedures. Moreover, poor communication with claimants and minimal public reporting continued to characterise the mechanism’s operations.Footnote 70
After these two initial reports, Gemfields launched a revamped OGM, which Synergy reviewed for the period covering 1 March 2024–31 August 2024.Footnote 71 The consultancy group noted that while the mechanism had addressed concerns related to its procedure, similar reforms had not been implemented to improve substantive redress for complainants of serious human rights violations.Footnote 72
C. Ivanhoe Mines’ Kamoa-Kakula Copper Mine
The KKCM in southeastern DRC is a joint venture between Ivanhoe Mines (a Canadian mining company), Zijin Mining Group (a Chinese firm), Crystal River Global Limited (a Chinese investor), and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo.Footnote 73 Ivanhoe Mines acquired mineral exploration rights over 50,000 km2 in the former Katanga province in 1996 and began early exploration in 2001. The high-grade deposit at Kamoa was discovered in 2008, and mine development began in 2015 after Ivanhoe entered into an agreement with Zijin Mining. A year later, the ultra-high-grade deposit at Kakula was discovered. Commercial production began in July 2021, and expansion plans scheduled for completion in 2024 are expected to make the KKCM the third-largest copper mine in the world.Footnote 74 In 2023, the KKCM reported annual revenues of US$2.70 billion.
Shortly after Ivanhoe entered into the joint venture with Zijin Mining, the company identified households living within the vicinity of the future mine site that would be resettled to make way for the project.Footnote 75 The communities agreed to a resettlement package with the KKCM that included specific housing features. Construction of the replacement housing and the resettlement of households took place in 2018.Footnote 76 Around that time, Amnesty International and a local NGO, the Initiative pour la Bonne Gouvernance et les Droits Humains (IBGDH), conducted group interviews with residents of a local community that had been resettled by the KKCM.Footnote 77 The interviewees reported that the KKCM ‘provided them [with] accessible information about the development of the [mine], meaningfully assessed their demands, and facilitated their resettlement’,Footnote 78 but that the company had built substandard housing that did not meet the commitments made in the agreement. Field researchers confirmed that the housing ‘fell short of both Congolese and international human rights standards [concerning] the right to adequate housing’.Footnote 79 Ivanhoe has contested this characterisation. In its 2022 Sustainability Report, the company stated that ‘162 households have been relocated, replacing their straw-hut hamlet structures with stronger, more spacious houses of a much higher quality, constructed from pre-cast concrete, hollow cement blocks, roof sheeting and steel frames’.Footnote 80 However, Amnesty International and IBGDH’s field research refutes the company’s claims, finding that the houses lacked running water and electricity, in contrast to accommodations built for company staff. Only one water source was constructed for approximately 4,000 individuals, and a nearby water source, the Mulunguishi River, was polluted. Its use was associated with skin rashes and infections.Footnote 81
The resettled families reported that while consultation with the KKCM was ‘robust’ prior to resettlement, the company’s engagement was ‘non-existent’ afterwards,Footnote 82 despite its stated commitment to ‘providing access to remedy by maintaining functioning, accessible, and effective grievance mechanisms that enable stakeholders, particularly affected rightsholders, to raise concerns regarding the impacts arising from [its] activities’.Footnote 83 Little information about Ivanhoe’s OGMs was disclosed in its 2019 and 2022 Sustainability Reports beyond the number of grievances received and resolved at the KKCM in the current and preceding years. Other information about the OGM was limited to aspirational statements about the company’s commitment to ‘timeously and amicably resolving grievances’ and devoting ‘appropriate time and resources to share project information, obtain stakeholder feedback, address concerns, defuse misinformation and resolve issues’, while acknowledging ‘that [those at the company] are human and don’t always get it right’.Footnote 84 No further details about the design, operation, or outcomes of the OGM have been made publicly available.
D. Rio Tinto’s Qit Minerals Madagascar
The QMM, a joint venture between Rio Tinto and the Government of Madagascar, is a mineral sands project that was the first large-scale mining operation in the country and its largest foreign investment. It is located near the town of Fort Dauphin, in the southeastern Anosy region, one of the poorest areas in Madagascar.Footnote 85 With a projected mine life of 40 years, the QMM has removed roughly 6,000 hectares of forest to extract ilmenite, monazite, and zircon. Since operations began in 2009, Rio Tinto has been accused of human rights violations, including forced evictions, land dispossession and contamination of local water sources.Footnote 86
Local opposition to the mine, including protests and general strikes, has been a frequent occurrence since 2009. Community members displaced to make way for the mine and for the construction of a rock quarry have stated that compensation provided by QMM was insufficient to replace lost land, livelihoods and sacred sites.Footnote 87 In recent years, contamination of local waterways, which has affected residents’ health and the livelihoods of fisherfolk, has become the focus of advocacy campaigns and a central subject of grievances brought through the mine’s OGM. The Andrew Lees Trust (ALT), a UK-based NGO supporting affected communities, has commissioned several studies since 2018 to examine water contamination levels, including after three tailings dam failures in 2018 and 2022. These studies identified toxic levels of uranium and lead that exceeded World Health Organisation drinking water guidelines,Footnote 88 and potential radiation exposure through several pathways linked directly to the QMM’s activities.Footnote 89 ALT’s most recent analysis, published in March 2024, confirmed that water contamination persisted and remained unaddressed by the QMM. ALT also reported that three protestors were shot dead by state police during demonstrations in October 2023 relating to water contamination and compensation concerns.Footnote 90
Following the tailings dam failures in 2022, Rio Tinto met with local government and community representatives, along with NGO partners ALT and Publish What You Pay Madagascar (PWYP-M), in July to address protests that had arisen.Footnote 91 A few months earlier, in May, the QMM had agreed to operationalise a grievance process following conflict resolution negotiations with the community. By the time of the July meeting, over 8,700 complaints had been submitted to QMM by villagers seeking remedy for loss of land and livelihoods.Footnote 92 Around this time, Rio Tinto approved its applicable ‘Communities and Social Performance Standard’, which set out the company’s ‘complaints and grievance management’ procedures.Footnote 93 The policy requires every Rio Tinto asset to have an OGM in place that specifies, among other things, the ‘processes for obtaining, handling, responding to, and remedying complaints and grievances’, and that is consistent with the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria. OGMs must be ‘designed in consultation with communities and stakeholders’, and must ‘[allow] for an appeals process that includes independent stakeholders for resolution of complex complaints for grievances’.Footnote 94 Rio Tinto’s assets are also expected to track complainants’ views of the process and outcome, as well as anonymized data on all grievances, and to share this information with host communities.Footnote 95 Despite these commitments, no detailed public information about the QMM OGM has been made available. The only publicly reported evaluations of the grievance process come from the community’s NGO partners, ALT and PWYP-M, who have described general dissatisfaction with the grievance mechanism and the compensation provided to date, as reflected in ongoing protests and attempts to disrupt mine operations.Footnote 96
4. OGMs in remedy gap contexts: Entrenching corporate control over access to remedy
The concerns raised about the four OGMs described in the previous section illustrate the power imbalances between mining companies, which design and direct the grievance process, and complainants, who are subjected to these procedures often without being consulted about their design. Corporate control over access to remedy at these four mines reveals several recurrent features that undermine the effectiveness and fairness of grievance mechanisms generally, and OGMs specifically. These include (i) lack of consultation, dialogue and transparency in the grievance process; (ii) an absence of a clear and well-known grievance procedure; (iii) the inaccessibility of the mechanism, coupled with a significant imbalance of information and expertise between the corporation and the complainants; and (iv) the unpredictability of the process, including the quantum and nature of available remedies.Footnote 97 Together, these factors exacerbate the remedy gap as they are manifestations of a collapsed remedial system where company-controlled OGMs become the remedial forum by default, compromising both victims’ rights and the integrity of what is often the only available grievance process. It is clear these OGMs fall short of the standards outlined in the UNGPs when they lack the independence and rights-compatibility necessary to provide effective access to remedy.
A. Lack of consultation, dialogue and transparency
When corporations fail to engage affected communities in a genuine and participatory manner, they undermine the legitimacy of OGMs. Rather than fostering an environment in which grievances can be openly discussed and addressed, the process becomes one-sided, with the corporation maintaining control over the narrative and the outcomes. A lack of transparency exacerbates this imbalance, leaving victims and stakeholders in the dark about key aspects of the process, such as decision-making criteria, timelines and the identity and independence of those responsible for adjudicating claims. This opacity shields corporate conduct from scrutiny and ensures that the mechanism primarily serves corporate interests rather than those of affected communities.
The UNGPs emphasise dialogue and consultation as core elements of credible grievance mechanisms. Practice at the NMGM OGM diverged from these principles. Given the low levels of literacy and education among villagers living near the mine, the mechanism did little to support complainants in navigating the process and did not adjust procedural burdens accordingly. MiningWatch Canada reports that ‘grievants expressed lack of understanding of their rights in the process’.Footnote 98 Complainants indicated, for example, that they did not know they had a right to sponsored legal-aid vouchers or to bring documents or witnesses to hearings in support of their cases. In two cases, complainants stated that they were unaware of the option to proceed to a second-stage hearing before an ‘independent’ committee, and believed the first-stage facilitated dialogue was their only opportunity to reach a resolution. Complainants also described a first-stage process that differed significantly from the SOP. None had independent legal advice during these sessions as described in the SOP, nor were any provided with a written Grievance Resolution Report, despite this being required by the SOP. Most reported that ‘dialogue’ consisted of a single visit to their homes by a mine employee who conducted a one-way, investigative interview focused on their economic situation, rather than a two-way facilitated dialogue session. Complainants who sought remedy through the Gemfields and Rio Tinto OGMs also reported difficulties engaging with the process and understanding how decisions were made.
All four OGMs have fallen short in meeting the transparency criterion set out in the UNGPs, even though each company claims to have modelled its process on those criteria. Very little information about these mechanisms is publicly available beyond brief references in corporate sustainability reports. Gemfields did commission independent monitoring of its OGM, but the resulting reports were not proactively disclosed, and monitoring has not been continued beyond the initial two reviews. The most detailed and critical information about these mechanisms has instead come from NGOs, including those cited in this article.
B. Lack of a clear and known grievance process
When grievance mechanisms are poorly communicated or deliberately obscured, affected individuals and communities are often unaware of the avenues available to them for seeking redress. This lack of clarity creates significant barriers to remedy, as victims may not know where to file complaints, how the process works, or what outcomes they might reasonably expect. In such scenarios, the corporation retains control over the grievance process by default, as the ambiguity surrounding the mechanism disempowers those seeking redress. By failing to provide a clear and accessible pathway, companies drastically reduce the potential for genuine accountability and justice.
A clear and known grievance process is therefore critical to the success of OGMs. At the NMGM, while Acacia was developing its new OGM in early 2017, the company’s Remediation Officer contacted complainants who had participated in the previous mechanism and encouraged them to initiate grievances under the pilot phase of the new one. The Remediation Officer reportedly promised that they would receive more satisfactory remedies this time. Complainants who accepted this offer later reported that the monetary awards they received did not match those promises and expressed dissatisfaction with both the process and the way determinations were made.Footnote 99 Complainants engaging the Gemfields, Ivanhoe Mines and Rio Tinto OGMs similarly expressed dissatisfaction with procedures and outcomes.Footnote 100 While mining companies often publicised anticipated remedies, these frequently fell short of complainants’ expectations, either because they did not meet nationally or internationally recognised standards (as in the case of Ivanhoe Mines) or because they failed to resolve underlying grievances, contributing to ongoing protests and unresolved disputes, as at QMM.
C. Inaccessibility and imbalances of information and expertise governing the proceedings
Inaccessible grievance mechanisms further entrench corporate control over access to remedy, particularly where there is a marked imbalance of information and expertise between the corporation and complainants. When grievance procedures are difficult to navigate, whether due to complex language, bureaucratic hurdles or physical distance, victims are discouraged from pursuing their claims. These barriers are compounded by the structural disparity in access to information and expertise: companies control the evidence, set the rules of engagement and may restrict complainants’ access to legal, technical and financial support. This power and knowledge imbalance skews the process in favour of the company, which retains control over both procedure and outcome.
At the NMGM, Barrick reportedly took sworn statements from complainants without providing them with copies, even after repeated requests. The mine also failed to share other documents associated with the grievance process. When MiningWatch raised this issue with an Investigations Team leader in August 2018, the leader responded that a new procedure had just been put in place to provide complainants with copies of relevant documents going forward, highlighting both the previous gap and the company’s control over basic procedural safeguards.Footnote 101 MiningWatch and RAID have also documented significant concerns about the Grievance Committee and its hearings. Interviews with complainants revealed that none fully understood the process and none had legal representation. The hearings were characterised by a gross imbalance in the evidence presented: almost all evidence was submitted by the mine’s Investigations Team and almost none by complainants, who lacked access to video footage, witnesses, or other corroborating material. Complainants indicated that they were ‘dissuaded by the mine’s OGM personnel from seeking or bringing legal support’Footnote 102 and one reported being told, when asking whether to bring a lawyer, to bring a family member or friend instead.
At the Gemfields and Rio Tinto OGMs, either a lack of knowledge about the mechanism or the sheer volume of complaints hindered effective access to remedy, particularly where delays in processing grievances were significant. Access to legal counsel or comparable expertise was not mentioned as a component of the Ivanhoe Mines, Gemfields or Rio Tinto OGMs. Participation was largely limited to complainants engaging alone with company-controlled processes.
D. Unpredictable process, quantum and nature of available remedies
The unpredictability of the grievance process, including the size and form of available remedies, is another hallmark of corporate control over access to remedy through OGMs. When outcomes are inconsistent, unexplained or unclear, victims are left uncertain about whether any remedy is likely, or what form it might take. This unpredictability discourages engagement, fosters mistrust, and deepens frustration among affected communities. Where companies retain broad discretion over the type and extent of remedies, they can minimise costs and limit precedents that might expose them to further claims.
OGMs are intended to address a range of grievances in a predictable and timely manner and to provide an appropriate menu of remedies.Footnote 103 At the NMGM, none of the complainants interviewed indicated that they were satisfied with either the process or the remedies received. Those who did receive compensation were generally victims of gunshot injuries or the families of individuals killed. The highest monetary award reported was equivalent to approximately US$15,746. Some complainants who had participated in the earlier mechanism (active from 2012 to 2015) received ‘sponsored employment’, meaning they were required to work to receive a remedy. When these same complainants were invited to participate in the new mechanism, any previous salary earned through sponsored employment was deducted from the new remedy awarded.Footnote 104
Similar dissatisfaction with available remedies has been reported in relation to the Ivanhoe and Rio Tinto OGMs, where remedies were perceived as inadequate in light of the harms experienced. Across all four sites, the unpredictability of process and outcome, together with poor communication about procedures and timelines, has undermined the legitimacy of the OGMs and deepened the harm already suffered.
Taken together, these patterns reveal that the shortcomings of OGMs in remedy gap contexts are not isolated design flaws but structural features of company-controlled grievance processes. In this sense, OGMs in these contexts do not fail despite alignment with the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria, but often operate within their parameters in ways that allow corporate control to persist. Across the four case studies, failures in consultation, clarity, accessibility and predictability do not occur independently; they reinforce one another in ways that consolidate corporate authority over both process and outcome. What emerges is not merely an ineffective mechanism, but a structure that reconfigures access to remedy in line with entrenched power differences. The result is a model of access to remedy that is procedurally recognisable yet substantively deficient, raising fundamental questions about whether company-designed grievance mechanisms can deliver the kind of impartial, rights-based redress imagined in Pillar Three of the UNGPs.
5. Broader reflections on rethinking the company grievance mechanism
The limitations identified in Section 4 point to a deeper tension within the UNGPs’ approach to access to remedy. While the framework envisions OGMs as accessible, dialogue-based mechanisms that complement state-based processes, their implementation in remedy gap contexts often produces outcomes that are neither impartial nor rights-protective. This section considers potential alternatives, including whether different institutional designs, particularly independent grievance mechanisms, offer a more effective pathway for addressing corporate human rights harms in the extractive sector. It also evaluates whether the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria require revision to account more directly for power imbalances between corporations and affected communities. Rather than abandoning non-judicial mechanisms altogether, this section asks what structural conditions are necessary for them to function as genuine avenues of redress rather than instruments of corporate control.
A. Independent grievance mechanisms as an alternative to OGMs?
The foregoing examples of mining company OGMs in Africa show how the remedy ecosystem envisioned by the UNGPs can inadvertently lead to corporate control over access to remedy in host countries that have failed or are unwilling to introduce state-based grievance mechanisms. They also confirm that the effectiveness criteria outlined in the UNGPs fall short of adequately addressing the fundamental principles of access to remedy, particularly the need for grievance mechanism to be ‘impartial, protected from corruption and free from political or other attempts to influence the outcome’.Footnote 105 This section explores a potential alternative to OGMs: independent grievance mechanisms (IGMs)Footnote 106 that operate at arm’s length from the company and are composed of adjudicators who are independently appointed.
Preventing corporate control over access to remedy is crucial for securing victims’ rights to redress in the African mining context. Critics of OGMs and other non-judicial grievance mechanisms have proposed various alternatives that are particularly relevant to mining sites in Africa. A more effective approach to providing efficient and timely access to remedy must place rights-holders at the centre of the process,Footnote 107 ensuring that victims are empowered participants throughout the grievance process, rather than merely being subjects of a mechanism designed, implemented and adjudicated by the mining company. One alternative that mitigates corporate control over the remedy procedure and could offer more equitable and effective access to remedy is an IGM.
IGMs provide a viable substitute for OGMs in contexts where power imbalances, lack of transparency, and unpredictability compromise the integrity of the grievance process. IGMs are typically established as external entities, either by third-party organisations or as a result of legal settlements, and are designed to function independently from the companies whose actions are under scrutiny.Footnote 108 IGMs are characterized by their autonomy from corporate control, ensuring that the adjudication of grievances is impartial and free from the influence of the company involved.Footnote 109 This independence is critical in contexts where the company might otherwise act as both judge and jury over complaints related to its own operations. The primary objective of IGMs is to provide a fair, transparent, and accessible process for affected communities to raise their concerns and seek redress. Unlike OGMs, which are often criticized for their lack of impartiality and transparency, IGMs are designed to meet rigorous standards of legitimacy and effectiveness.
IGMs operate by establishing clear, predictable procedures that are widely known and accessible to all stakeholders.Footnote 110 These mechanisms are often designed in consultation with affected communities and include provisions for continuous learning and improvement. A critical feature of IGMs is their emphasis on equitable access to information and resources, ensuring that complainants have the necessary support to engage effectively in the grievance process. Additionally, IGMs typically involve third-party oversight or monitoring to maintain their independence and credibility. For example, the IGM established following legal action against Petra Diamonds Ltd. in Tanzania was designed to address the significant power imbalances between the company and the affected communities.Footnote 111 This mechanism operates separately from the company’s internal processes, providing a more trustworthy avenue for victims to seek justice.Footnote 112
IGMs offer several advantages over company-run OGMs in the context of transnational mining operations in Africa. Their independence from corporate influence helps to prevent the shortcomings that often undermine the effectiveness of OGMs. This independence is crucial for building trust among affected communities, who may otherwise perceive company-run mechanisms as unpredictable, opaque and inequitable. Additionally, IGMs typically incorporate a higher level of transparency and accountability. By involving third-party oversight and ensuring that the grievance process is open and accessible, IGMs can provide a more credible and reliable means of redress.Footnote 113 IGMs are also better suited to handling severe human rights violations, either individual or collective violations, which require a level of expertise and impartiality that companies often lack.Footnote 114 By providing an external, neutral forum for adjudicating these issues that is supported by independent legal and technical assistance and protected from company influence, IGMs help to ensure victims’ access to remedy through a more impartial procedure.
B. Strengthening UNGP implementation through sector-specific guidance and complementary remedial mechanisms
Corporate control over access to remedy by mining companies in Africa persists despite two safeguards embedded in the UNGPs. The first concerns the scale of grievances that OGMs are intended to address. According to the commentary on Principle 29, OGMs are designed to identify and remediate human rights impacts at an early stage, allowing individuals directly affected by a business’s operations to raise concerns about ongoing or potential harms and to ‘prevent harms from compounding or grievances from escalating’.Footnote 115 This language suggests that OGMs are not intended to handle severe human rights violations, but rather to prevent them from arising.Footnote 116 The mining case studies in this article demonstrate, however, that companies frequently use OGMs to address serious human rights impacts, including killings, sexual violence, forced displacement and long-term environmental damage, which are more appropriately handled by courts or other specialised state-based bodies. Mining companies typically lack the capacity and independence required to adjudicate such claims objectively.Footnote 117 Outsourcing the operation of an OGM to a third party controlled or paid by the company does not resolve this problem and can further undermine victims’ rights in the absence of state-based mechanisms.
The second safeguard lies in the effectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms, including OGMs, set out in Principle 31. These criteria are meant to ensure that a mechanism fully serves its purpose, namely that ‘the people it is intended to serve know about it, trust it and are able to use it’.Footnote 118 For OGMs, the UNGPs also recommend that they be ‘based on engagement and dialogue’ with stakeholder groups. Procedurally, these criteria suggest that OGMs should be designed to reach agreed solutions through dialogue, reflecting the idea that a business cannot reasonably be the subject of complaints and unilaterally determine their outcome. In practice, as the mining OGMs discussed above illustrate, these criteria have done little to prevent corporate control over access to remedy. At a minimum, the criteria would need to be strengthened or adapted in sector-specific ways to address the inequities built into company-designed processes. As currently drafted, the UNGPs do not provide sufficiently nuanced guidance on access to remedy to ensure the effective implementation of OGMs across different sectors, including transnational mining. The changes proposed here are targeted at developing further guidance and institutional arrangements that can make the UNGPs’ remedial pillar meaningful in sectors and regions where company-controlled grievance mechanisms operate exclusively in the absence of effective or accessible state-based options. This means strengthening the implementation of Principle 31, clarifying when OGMs are inappropriate for serious harms, and identifying the settings where independent or hybrid mechanisms are more suitable.
Principle 29 recognises that grievance mechanisms should be adapted to the specific context in which they operate, yet the framework lacks detailed, sector-specific recommendations that might prevent OGMs from becoming formalities that legitimise, rather than remedy, corporate abuses. Given that the UNGPs envision access to remedy as a network of mutually reinforcing mechanisms, more tailored guidance is necessary to ensure that OGMs do not simply serve corporate interests at the expense of victims’ rights. To mitigate the implementation of ineffective OGMs in remedy gap contexts, the commentary to the UNGPs could address power imbalances more directly. One possibility would be to ensure victims’ access to legal counsel or other forms of independent representation throughout the grievance process. This would help level the playing field and enable victims to navigate complex and intimidating procedures that companies currently control. Commentary to Principle 29 could also encourage companies not to require complainants to sign legal waivers barring further legal action in exchange for compensation. Preserving the possibility of additional judicial or administrative recourse would safeguard victims’ access to remedy and ensure that their rights are not fully determined by a single, potentially inequitable company-run process.
Moreover, any company that establishes an OGM to address serious human rights impacts should be subject to external oversight or independent investigation. This oversight could take the form of an independent body mandated to monitor the effectiveness of OGMs and to intervene when necessary to preserve fairness and transparency. In some cases, it may be necessary to prohibit the use of OGMs altogether for severe abuses and to redirect such cases to state-based mechanisms better equipped to address them impartially. State-based non-judicial mechanisms in home states, such as OECD National Contact Points, may also be better positioned to address complaints against TMCs operating in host states that lack equivalent mechanisms. The commentary to Principle 29 could also clearly outline such a recommendation.
Reimagining project-level grievance mechanisms in the extractive sector requires confronting the limits of a framework that relies on companies to design and administer the very mechanisms through which they are held to account. As the analysis in this section has shown, IGMs and targeted UNGPs-based implementation enhancements offer pathways to mitigate the risks of corporate control. Improving the guidance provided in the UNGPs does not require abandoning its commitment to a pluralistic remedy ecosystem; however, they do demand a more explicit recognition of the structural inequities that shape how project-level grievance mechanisms operate in practice. Without safeguards that ensure independence, transparency and parity of participation, OGMs will continue to fall short of their intended purpose. Ensuring that access to remedy is meaningful rather than symbolic depends on shifting from process-oriented compliance toward institutional designs that can deliver impartial and rights-based outcomes in contexts where state-based mechanisms remain weak or inaccessible.
6. Conclusion
The case studies examined in this article reveal a persistent structural problem at the heart of the UNGPs’ remedy ecosystem. When OGMs operate in contexts marked by weak governance, limited state capacity, or inaccessible judicial systems, they do not function as supplementary mechanisms in a pluralistic ecosystem of redress. Instead, they become the primary, and often the only, avenue through which victims can raise grievances. In these settings, the UNGPs unintentionally enable mining companies to occupy a quasi-adjudicative role: they investigate harms linked to their own conduct, interpret the standards against which those harms are judged, and determine whether, how, and to what extent victims will be remedied. Across the four mines analysed in this article, these structural conditions translated into predictable patterns. Companies controlled the design of OGMs, dictated the evidence available to complainants, restricted access to legal representation and withheld critical information about procedures, timelines and outcomes. Even when OGMs were framed as ‘independent’ or aligned with the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria, their implementation reproduced the underlying power imbalances of the local political economy of extraction. The cumulative effect was not simply a procedural deficiency but substantive injustice: victims were pushed into mechanisms that could not deliver impartiality, predictability or meaningful remedy. These dynamics underscore a deeper conceptual weakness in the UNGPs. By emphasising process-based criteria without addressing the power relations that shape who designs, controls and oversees OGMs, the UNGPs leave significant room for corporate control. The result is a framework that aspires to pluralism but, in practice, devolves into privatized governance when state institutions fail to meet their obligations. Remedy gaps therefore persist not because companies ignore the UNGPs, but because they comply with them in ways that maintain control over the very mechanisms meant to hold them accountable.
Meaningful access to remedy at the project level in the extractive sector cannot be realised where the authority to define, administer and resolve grievances remains in the hands of the actors responsible for the harm. Independent grievance mechanisms, like those described in Section 4, offer a more credible pathway in contexts where state institutions cannot provide reliable redress. Sector-specific guidance within the commentary to Pillar Three of the UNGPs is also needed to clarify when OGMs are inappropriate, particularly in cases involving severe human rights abuses that should be handled by independent judicial or administrative bodies. Finally, additional guidance must explicitly address practices that restrict victims’ rights, including the use of legal waivers and the absence of safeguards that ensure parity of information and expertise.
The promise of Pillar Three has always rested on the idea that remedy is not voluntary or discretionary but a necessary component of respecting human rights. As the examples in this article demonstrate, that promise is compromised when companies control access to remedy under the mantle of compliance. Closing the remedy gap in the African mining sector will require additional considerations that realign the UNGPs with their underlying purpose: ensuring that people whose rights have been violated can seek redress in processes that are credible, fair and independent of the entities that caused the harm.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Razan Mohamed, Vitus Ngaanuma, and Samantha (Sam) Wex for their exceptional research assistance. Earlier versions of this article benefited from feedback offered by colleagues at the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law during a February 2024 Faculty Workshop, and by participants at the Business and Human Rights in Africa conference held from 24 to 26 April 2024, organized by the Business and Human Rights in Africa Special Issue co-editors and hosted by the University of Cape Town Faculty of Law. I am indebted to all who engaged with the draft, including the two anonymous reviewers and special issue co-editor Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, whose comments strengthened the paper. I also extend my thanks to the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working alongside mining-affected communities, whose commitment to documenting and amplifying local experiences made this article possible. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada as part of a broader project examining the impacts of two Canadian mining conflicts in Southern Africa.
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