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WHAT DOES “EPISTEMIC” MEAN?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

Allan Hazlett
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Abstract

In this paper I consider the meaning of the term “epistemic.” I discuss the idea that “epistemic” means “of or relating to knowledge,” and consider some uses of “epistemic” that do not jibe with this characterization of its meaning. I argue that “epistemic” is ambiguous: it is sometimes used to mean “of or relating to knowledge” and sometimes to mean “of or relating to belief.” I raise some worries about this ambiguity, and sympathetically consider the prospects for eliminating “epistemic” from our philosophical lexicon.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 13 , Special Issue 4: 2015 Episteme Conference , December 2016 , pp. 539 - 547
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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