1 See, for example, Hurrell, Andrew, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?’, International Affairs, 82 (2006) pp. 1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Alden, Chris and Vieira, Marco Antonio, ‘The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism’, Third World Quarterly, 26 (2005) pp. 1077–1095CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Soares de Lima, Maria Regina and Hirst, Mônica, ‘Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities’, International Affairs, 82 (2006) pp. 21–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

2 See, the special issue, ‘Globalising the Regional, Regionalising the Global’, Review of International Studies, 35, Supplement S1 (2009)Google Scholar . On the notion of ‘overlay’, see Buzan, Barry and Wæver, Ole, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

3 See Nolte, Detlef, Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein Analysekonzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungsmächte, GIGA Working Paper No. 29 (2006), p. 25Google Scholar . See also, Lake, David A., ‘Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order’, Review of International Studies, 35 (2009) pp. 35–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar . On regional order, see Godehardt, Nadine and Lembcke, Oliver W., Regionale Ordnungen in politischen Räumen. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie regionaler Ordnungen, GIGA Working Paper No. 124 (2010)Google Scholar .

4 In using the term ‘strategy’, I refer to the integration of political, economic, and military aims for the preservation and realisation of states’ long-term interests, that is, what is commonly named ‘grand strategy’ in order to distinguish it from the purely military art of using battles to win a war. See Kennedy, Paul, ‘Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition’, in Kennedy, Paul (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn./London: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 1–7Google Scholar . For a ‘classical’ but more restrictive view of grand strategy, see Hart, Basil Henry Liddell, Strategy (New York, NY: Meridian, ² 1991), pp. 321–322Google Scholar .

5 See, for example, Flemes, Daniel and Nolte, Detlef, ‘Introduction’, in Flemes, Daniel (ed.), Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 1–14Google Scholar .

6 See Østerud, Øyvind, ‘Regional Great Powers’, in Neumann, Iver B. (ed.), Regional Great Powers in International Politics (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 12Google Scholar ; Schirm, Stefan A., ‘Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale Politik Brasiliens’, Lateinamerika Analysen, 11 (2005), p. 111Google Scholar ; Nolte, , Macht und Machthierarchien, p. 28Google Scholar , for whom the regional power's influence addresses issues such as the geo-political delimitation and politico-normative construction of the region, regional governance structures, and the determination of the regional security agenda; Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers; Lemke, Douglas, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge/New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Flemes and Nolte, ‘Introduction’.

7 For a more extensive discussion on the contribution by Buzan and Wæver, especially on their differentiation between great powers and regional powers, see the introduction to this special section by Detlef Nolte.

8 A Regional Security Complex is ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’. Regions are therefore conceptualised in terms of security. Buzan, and Wæver, , Regions and Powers, p. 44Google Scholar .

9 Buzan, and Wæver, , Regions and Powers, p. 45Google Scholar .

10 In so-called ‘standard’ RSCs, polarity is wholly defined by regional states; in this context, a unipolar RSC would imply that the region contains only one regional power, but the structure of the RSC would be anarchic anyway. On the contrary, in ‘centred’ RSCs the regional security dynamics are either unipolar and dominated by a state which is a great power or a superpower or the RSC is integrated by institutions rather than by a single power. See Buzan, and Wæver, , Regions and Powers, pp. 55–62Google Scholar .

11 Lemke, , Regions of War and Peace, p. 49Google Scholar .

12 Ibid.

13 Lemke, , Regions of War and Peace, pp. 38–39Google Scholar . Somehow at the opposite end of the spectrum in theorising about regional dynamics there are authors who, in the context of so-called ‘new regionalism’ approaches, transcend the focus on nation-states and de-emphasise the role of power capabilities in the shaping of regional order, displaying a low degree of interest in ‘regional powers’ and in the strategies these states pursue. See, for example, the volume edited by Söderbaum, Fredrik and Shaw, Timothy M., Theories of New Regionalism (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

14 See Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien.

15 See Nolte, , Macht und Machthierarchien, p. 28Google Scholar . The notion of cooperative hegemony was developed by Pedersen in his analysis of strategies employed by regional powers in promoting regional institutionalisation. See Pedersen, Thomas, ‘Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration’, Review of International Studies, 28 (2002) pp. 677–696CrossRefGoogle Scholar . On p. 683 Pedersen defines cooperative hegemony as ‘[…] soft rule within and through cooperative arrangements based on a long-term strategy’.

16 Flemes and Nolte, ‘Introduction’, p. 6.

17 See Schoeman, Maxi, ‘South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994–2003’, in Daniel, John, et al. (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004 (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003), pp. 352–353Google Scholar .

18 Schoeman, ‘South Africa’, pp. 362 and 364.

19 See Schirm, ‘Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen’, pp. 110–12.

20 Gratius, Susanne, Die Außenpolitik der Regierung Lula: Brasiliens Aufstieg von einer diskreten Regional- zu einer kooperativen Führungsmacht, SWP-Studie S7 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004)Google Scholar .

21 See Burges, Sean W., ‘Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War’, International Relations, 22 (2008) pp. 65–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

22 Burges, ‘Consensual Hegemony’, p. 73.

23 See, for example, Alden and Vieira, ‘New Diplomacy of the South’, p. 1080; Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order’; Fuller and Arquilla, ‘Intractable Problem’, p. 610.

24 See Schirm, Stefan, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance’, European Journal of International Relations, 16 (2010) pp. 197–221CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Flemes, Daniel and Wojczewski, Thorsten, Contested Leadership in International Relations: Power Politics in South America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, GIGA Working Paper No. 121 (2010)Google Scholar .

25 See Pedersen, , Cooperative Hegemony, pp. 681–682Google Scholar .

26 See Miriam Prys, What Makes a Regional Hegemon?, Paper presented at ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki (May 2007); Prys, Miriam, Developing a Contextually Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and ‘Quiet Diplomacy’, GIGA Working Paper No. 77 (2008)Google Scholar .

27 See Frazier, Derrick and Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert, ‘Regional Powers and Security: A Framework for Understanding Order within Regional Security Complexes’, European Journal of International Relations, OnlineFirst (21 April 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar . Another approach, deriving from the German Development Institute, defines ‘anchor countries’ as states that have a particular economic and political influence in their regional context. This influence can be either positive, a sort of ‘locomotive function’, or negative, spreading stagnation and crises. See Stamm, Andreas, Schwellen- und Ankerländer als Akteure einer globalen Partnerschaft, DIE Discussion Papers, 1/2004 (2004), p. 7Google Scholar .

28 See Hurrell, Andrew, ‘Regional Powers and the Global System from a Historical Perspective’, in Flemes, Daniel (ed.), Regional Leadership, p. 25Google Scholar .

29 Hurrell, ‘One World? Many Worlds?’, pp. 140–1.

30 See Goertz, Gary, Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide (Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 34Google Scholar .

31 Similar forms of continuum with two poles and hegemony in the middle have been developed by Triepel, Heinrich, Die Hegemonie. Ein Buch von führenden Staaten (Stuttgart: Krauthammer, 1938), p. 140Google Scholar ; Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd edition (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002) [1977], pp. 207–212Google Scholar ; Prys, , What Makes a Regional Hegemon?, pp. 3–4Google Scholar .

32 For different perspectives on US hegemony or leadership see among many others, Hobsbawm, Eric, ‘War, Peace and Hegemony at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century’, in Chari, Chandra (ed.), War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century (London/New York: Routledge 2008), pp. 15–24Google Scholar ; Hinnebusch, Raymond, ‘The Iraq War and International Relations: Implications for Small States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19 (2006) pp. 451–463CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Nye, Joseph S. Jr., ‘Recovering American Leadership’, Survival, 50 (2008) pp. 55–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

33 See Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio, Empire (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2000)Google Scholar . See also section 2.1.

34 Lake, David A., ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?’, International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), p. 469CrossRefGoogle Scholar . See also, Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)Google Scholar .

35 See Münkler, Herfried, ‘Staatengemeinschaft oder Imperium – Alternative Ordnungsmodelle bei der Gestaltung von “Weltinnenpolitik”’, in Jaberg, Sabine and Schlotter, Peter (eds), Imperiale Weltordung – Trend des 21. Jahrhunderts? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 44Google Scholar .

36 See Kagan, Robert, ‘The Benevolent Empire’, Foreign Policy, 111 (1998) pp. 24–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

37 See among many others, Johnson, Chalmers, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2000)Google Scholar ; Chomsky, Noam, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (London: Hamilton, 2003)Google Scholar . For an overview of the debate see for example, Ikenberry, G. John, ‘Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order’, Foreign Affairs, 83 (2004), pp. 144–154Google Scholar ; the Forum on American Empire, Review of International Studies, 30 (2004) pp. 583–653Google Scholar ; or the Forum in International Studies Perspectives, 9 (2008) pp. 272–330CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed .

38 See Doyle, Michael W., Empires (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 30Google Scholar ; Take, Ingo, ‘(Schon) “Empire” oder (noch) “Hegemon”? Was uns die Hegemonietheorie über die gegenwärtige US-Politik zu sagen hat’, in Jaberg, Sabine and Schlotter, Peter (eds), Imperiale Weltordnung – Trend des 21. Jahrhunderts? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 116Google Scholar .

39 Doyle, , Empires, p. 19Google Scholar .

40 Wendt, Alexander and Friedheim, Daniel, ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State’, International Organization, 49 (1995), p. 695CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

41 See Lake, David A., ‘The Rise, Fall and Future of the Russian Empire: A Theoretical Interpretation’, in Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce (eds), The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 34–35Google Scholar .

42 Krasner, Stephen D., ‘Rethinking the Sovereign State Model’, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), p. 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

43 Lake, who suggests that the distinction between empire and other hierarchical relationships between polities should not be based on the analysis of the instruments of control but rather on the degree of control itself, is not able to deliver a clear demarcation or definition of the ‘substantial rights of residual control’ necessary to establish informal empire. See Lake, ‘Rise, Fall and Future of the Russian Empire’, pp. 33–6.

44 See Rapkin, David P., ‘Empire and its Discontents’, New Political Economy, 10 (2005), p. 393CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

45 See Take, ‘(Schon) “Empire” oder (noch) “Hegemon”?’, p. 117.

46 Krasner, ‘Rethinking the Sovereign State Model’, p. 18.

47 Wendt and Friedheim, ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy’, p. 697. Ikenberry proposes a similar understanding of what he calls ‘highly imperial hegemonic order’ (one more example of terminological ambiguity), which is based on the exercise of ‘coercive domination’ that the subordinate states cannot counter through a strategy of balancing. See Ikenberry, G. John, ‘American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy’, Review of International Studies, 27 (Special Issue) (2001), p. 196CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

48 See Münkler, Herfried, Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2005), p. 30Google Scholar .

49 Knorr, Klaus, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1975), p. 10Google Scholar .

50 See Rapkin, ‘Empire and its Discontents’, pp. 398–400.

51 See Habermas, Jürgen, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 136–140, 144Google Scholar .

52 Ikenberry, John G. and Kupchan, Charles A., ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, International Organization, 44 (1990), p. 289CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

53 See Rapkin, ‘Empire and its Discontents’, p. 396.

54 See Münkler, , Imperien, pp. 149, 189–200Google Scholar ; Rapkin, ‘Empire and its Discontents’, p. 396; Doyle, , Empires, p. 40Google Scholar . For a discussion on authority, legitimacy, and hierarchy, see Lake, ‘Regional Hierarchy’.

55 For an identification of hegemony with legitimate leadership see just to cite an example, Clark, Ian, ‘Bringing Hegemony back in: The US and International Order’, International Affairs, 85 (2009) pp. 23–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar . The undistinguished usage of hegemony and leadership goes back to the theory of hegemonic stability (see section 2.2.1). Hegemony is used as a synonym for empire, among others, by Wallerstein, , Politics of the World-Economy, p. 38Google Scholar ; Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy’, p. 469.

56 See for example, Rapkin, David P., ‘The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership’, in Rapkin, David P. (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 3–4Google Scholar ; Münkler, , Imperien, pp. 11–16Google Scholar .

57 See Gramsci, Antonio, Quaderni del carcere (Torino: Einaudi, 1975)Google Scholar .

58 Gramsci, , Quaderni del carcere, p. 1638Google Scholar .

59 Ibid., p. 1576.

60 Cox, Robert W., ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 12 (1983), p. 164CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

61 See Triepel, Die Hegemonie.

62 Triepel, , Die Hegemonie, p. 140Google Scholar .

63 See Triepel, , Die Hegemonie, pp. 39–40; 148–149Google Scholar . The idea of self-restraint with reference to hegemony has been adopted by several authors: the role of institutions in signalling strategic restraint is underlined by Hurrell, Andrew, ‘Pax Americana or the Empire of Insecurity?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 5 (2005), p. 173CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; for an analysis of the difficult situation of hegemonic states in managing a role conflict between their nature as great powers (and the corresponding inclination towards unilateral action) and as ‘responsible’ hegemons constrained by the roles they have established (‘paradox of hegemony’) see Cronin, Bruce, ‘The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the UN’, European Journal of International Relations, 7 (2001), p. 105CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

64 See Triepel, , Die Hegemonie, p. 144Google Scholar .

65 ‘Benevolent’ and ‘coercive’ are normative terms. However, since they have marked a broad debate, I will adopt them: ‘If it is impossible […] to purge concepts of their contested appraisive dimension, it is crucial that this dimension be explicitly acknowledged rather than swept under the illusory carpet of objective neutrality’ (Rapkin, David P., ‘The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership’, in Rapkin, David P. (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 4)Google Scholar . But what is really of interest for this study is the question of ‘whose goals are pursued by the hegemon, its own ones or those of a group of states?’ The answer to this question, as we shall see marks the difference between hegemony and leadership.

66 See Kindleberger, Charles, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press)Google Scholar .

67 See Snidal, Duncan, ‘The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, International Organization, 39 (1985), p. 581CrossRefGoogle Scholar . As Waltz, Kenneth N. put it in his Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), p. 198Google Scholar : ‘The greater the relative size of a unit the more it identifies its own interests with the interests of the system. […] Units having a large enough stake in the system will act for its sake, even though they pay unduly in doing so’.

68 See Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

69 See Snidal, ‘Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, p. 587.

70 See Snidal, ‘Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’; Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy’.

71 Snidal, ‘Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, p. 614.

72 See Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy’, pp. 460–2, 469–78.

73 Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy’, p. 469.

74 See Bussmann, Margit and Oneal, John R., ‘Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods? A Test of Power-Transition Theory’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51 (2007), p. 89CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

75 Cox, Robert W., ‘Labor and Hegemony (1977)’, in Cox, Robert W. and Sinclair, Timothy J. (eds), Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 421CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

76 See Ikenberry, John G. and Kupchan, Charles A., ‘The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, in Rapkin, David P. (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 50–51Google Scholar .

77 Gilpin, , War and Change, p. 29Google Scholar .

78 Ibid., p. 31.

79 Ibid., p. 36.

80 See the article by Dirk Nabers in this special section.

81 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 286.

82 Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, p. 171.

83 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 287.

84 See Cronin, ‘Paradox of Hegemony’, p. 112; Hurrell, ‘Pax Americana’, pp. 172–3; Hurrell, Andrew, Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas, Global Law Working Paper 05 (2004)Google Scholar ; Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, pp. 285–6.

85 Hurrell, ‘Hegemony and Regional Governance’, p. xxix.

86 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 55.

87 See Snidal, ‘Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, p. 614; Joseph, Jonathan, Hegemony: A Realist Analysis (London/New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), p. 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, p. 682.

88 Ikenberry argues that three kinds of hegemonic order exist: the first corresponds to what I have defined as empire, since it is based on coercive domination; the second displays a certain, sometimes minimal, convergence of interests and is held together by the provision of useful services to subordinate states (security protection and access to the hegemon's market); the third, defined as ‘open hegemony’, is more benevolent and acceptable to subordinate states, since the hegemon's power is restrained by rules and institutions. See Ikenberry, ‘American Power’, pp. 196–7. In his article on ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, on p. 682–3, Pedersen distinguishes four possible strategies for regional powers: unilateral hegemon (strong realist element and low institutionalisation), cooperative hegemon (soft rule and high degree of institutionalisation), empire (strong realist element and high level of institutionalisation), and concert (division of privileges and responsibilities among a group of great regional powers). In his model of cooperative hegemony, on p. 686 Pedersen identifies two further ideal types: The offensive type is centred around the realisation of advantages of scale (access to markets in the region), advantages of inclusion (access to raw materials), and advantages of diffusion (propagation of the hegemon's ideas). The defensive type of cooperative hegemony, in contrast, primarily aims to stabilise the system. Hurrell identifies three models for the hegemonic diffusion of norms and values: ‘progressive enmeshment’ (developed by liberalism), based on emulation, learning, and normative persuasion; ‘hegemonic imposition’ (developed by neo-realism and neo-dependency theories), based on coercion and, as the name says, imposition; and ‘coercive socialization’, an intermediate model combining coercion and consensus to induce the incorporation and internalisation of the hegemon's ideas, norms, and practices. See Hurrell, ‘Hegemony and Regional Governance’, pp. xxv–xxvi. Other classifications of hegemony relate, for example, to the actors exercising it (collective, singular, coalitional hegemony). See Clark, ‘Bringing Hegemony back in’.

89 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’ and ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’.

90 Wendt and Friedheim, ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy’, p. 700.

91 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 56.

92 See Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, p. 682.

93 Pedersen, Thomas, ‘State Strategies and Informal Leadership in European Integration: Implications for Denmark’, in Heurlin, Bertel and Mouritzen, Hans (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 91Google Scholar .

94 Ibid.

95 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 287.

96 Ibid.

97 See Pedersen, ‘State Strategies and Informal Leadership’, p. 91.

98 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 287.

99 Knorr, , Power of Nations, p. 7Google Scholar .

100 Ibid., p. 8.

101 In this case, I will not follow Knorr, who argues that ‘Noncoercive influence, no matter how one-sided, can bring about leadership but not hegemonial supremacy’. (Knorr, , Power of Nations, p. 24)Google Scholar . Since what I have identified as the prominent feature of leadership is the pursuit of common interests and goals (in contrast to the ‘one-sidedness’ of hegemony), I believe that one-sided non-coercive influence should be subsumed under hegemony, thereby admitting the existence of a cooperative, ‘soft’ form of hegemony. In his book, Knorr himself later emphasises that the essential features of leadership are non-coercive influence and the ‘mutual flow of benefits’, thereby excluding the hypothesis of one-sidedness for leadership.

102 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 57.

103 Ibid.

104 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 290.

105 Ibid., ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 57.

106 Ibid., ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, pp. 290–2; ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, pp. 57–8, 65–8.

107 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 58.

108 Of course the distinction between these three forms of hegemony is ideal-typical and tentative: in reality dominant states most probably follow strategies lying somewhere between the three kinds outlined above. What will be relevant for analysis, therefore, is a ‘prevalence’ in the use of coercive/threatening, coopting/rewarding/inducing, or convincing/persuading means.

109 For a critique of this aspect of the theory of hegemonic stability see Wiener, Jarrod, Making Rules in the Uruguay Round of the GATT: A Study of International Leadership (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995)Google Scholar .

110 For an overview on this early literature see Paige, Glenn D., The Scientific Study of Political Leadership (New York, NY/London: The Free Press, 1977)Google Scholar , especially chap. 3; Stogdill, Ralph M., Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York, NY/London: The Free Press, 1974)Google Scholar ; Goethals, George R., Sorenson, Georgia J. and Burns, MacGregor James (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Northouse, Peter G., Leadership: Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997)Google Scholar .

111 For an overview, see Northouse, , Leadership, pp. 32–73Google Scholar .

112 See Burns, James MacGregor, Leadership (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1978)Google ScholarPubMed .

113 See Northouse, , Leadership, pp. 130–158Google Scholar .

114 Goethals, , Sorenson, and Burns, (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership, p. 870Google Scholar .

115 Northouse, , Leadership, p. 3Google Scholar .

116 Knorr, , Power of Nations, p. 311Google Scholar .

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Young, Oran R., ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society’, International Organization, 45 (1991), p. 285CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

120 On the distinction between ‘transactional’ and ‘transformational’ leadership see Goethals, , Sorenson, and Burns, (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership, p. 870Google Scholar . The focus on a commonality of gains between leaders and followers could be misleading in defining leadership: in fact, a state following an intermediate – or soft – hegemony strategy might also reap joint gains with its subordinates. As the theory of hegemonic stability tells us, subordinate states take advantage of the collective goods provided by the hegemon – and gain even more than the hegemon itself since they act as free riders. But this does not necessarily mean that they willingly follow the leader in the effort to reach common goals.

121 The theory of hegemonic stability, for example, is focused on the capabilities possessed by the hegemonic power and on the provision of public goods. In this context, the secondary states are merely taken into consideration as free riders or, as Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal point out, ‘to ascertain that such states do not possess attributes of power quite like the hegemon and, therefore, can be safely ruled out as “contenders” or “challengers” to the leading state’. See Cooper, Andrew Fenton, Higgott, Richard A. and Nossal, Kim Richard, ‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict’, Political Science Quarterly, 106 (1991), p. 394CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

122 See Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 399.

123 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 408. For an interesting analysis on the responses by small regional states to the power of the dominant states (regionally and globally) see Acharya, Amitav, ‘The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics’, World Politics, 59 (2007) pp. 629–652CrossRefGoogle Scholar . See also, Schirm, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers’.

124 See Wiener, Jarrod, ‘Hegemonic Leadership: Naked Emperor or the Worship of False Gods?’ European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1995) pp. 219–243CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

125 Burns, , Leadership, p. 19Google ScholarPubMed .

126 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 57.

127 Instead of endogenous ‘learning’ we should, however, talk about endogenous ‘adaptation’. Learning implies an active, conscious process, while in this case we are dealing with an almost automatic and unconscious reaction to a given situation or context.

128 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 398.

129 Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, p. 683.

130 See Tucker, Robert C., Politics as Leadership (Columbia, Mo/London: University of Missouri Press, 1981), pp. 15–18Google Scholar .

131 Tucker, , Politics as Leadership, p. 15Google Scholar .

132 Wiener, ‘Hegemonic Leadership’, p. 223.

133 See for example, Wiener, ‘Hegemonic Leadership’, pp. 225–6; Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 398; Rapkin, David P., ‘Japan and World Leadership?’, in Rapkin, David P. (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 196Google Scholar .

134 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 398.

135 See Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, p. 683.