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You could be immaterial (or not)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2023

Andrew M. Bailey Open the ORCID record for Andrew M. Bailey [Opens in a new window]
Andrew M. Bailey*
Affiliation:
Yale-NUS College, Singapore
*
Email: andrew.bailey@yale-nus.edu.sg
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Abstract

Materialists about human persons say that we are, and must be, wholly material beings. Substance dualists say that we are, and must be, wholly immaterial. In this article, I take issue with the ‘and must be’ bits. Both materialists and substance dualists would do well to reject modal extensions of their views and instead opt for contingent doctrines, or doctrines that are silent about those modal extensions. Or so I argue.

Keywords

materialismdualismpersonal ontologymodal argument for dualismphysicalism

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Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 60 , Issue 4 , December 2024 , pp. 580 - 597
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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