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Great power competition for global leadership in artificial intelligence (AI): Reconstructing AI narratives of the United States, China, and the European Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2026

Jakob Landwehr-Matlé
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Chemnitz University of Technology, Chemnitz, Germany
Kai Oppermann*
Affiliation:
International Relations, Chemnitz University of Technology, Chemnitz, Germany
Daniel Lambach
Affiliation:
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chemnitz, Germany
*
Corresponding author: Kai Oppermann; Email: kai.oppermann@phil.tu-chemnitz.de

Abstract

The article examines artificial intelligence (AI) narratives of the three most important powers in the emerging global AI order – the US, China, and the EU. It argues that these narratives are central to constructing the meanings ascribed to AI in international politics and therefore to understanding the global competition for AI leadership. Specifically, the article uses a method of narrative analysis to reconstruct the AI narratives of the three powers from government documents and strategy papers. These narratives speak to the worldviews and AI images of the powers, how they view each other’s aspirations and behaviours, and what their objectives and motivations are to engage in AI competition. The relationship between the narratives sheds light on the scope for international AI cooperation and conflict. The results reinforce expectations of an intensifying ‘AI race’ between the US and China for global AI leadership. The EU comes out more as a bystander to this geopolitical competition, but strives to lead the development of international AI norms and standards. The article points to different potentials for cooperation and conflict on different aspects of AI and identifies status-seeking as a possible driver of AI competition.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The British International Studies Association.

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46 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this important observation.

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51 We owe this expression to an anonymous reviewer.

52 Lilach Gilady, The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations (University of Chicago Press, 2018).

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