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When Talk Trumps Text: The Democratizing Effects of Deliberation during Constitution-Making, 1974–2011

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2015

TODD A. EISENSTADT*
Affiliation:
American University
A. CARL LeVAN*
Affiliation:
American University
TOFIGH MABOUDI*
Affiliation:
American University
*
Todd A. Eisenstadt is Professor in the Department of Government, School of Public Affairs, American University, Washington, DC (eisensta@american.edu).
A. Carl LeVan is Assistant Professor in American University's School of International Service, Washington, DC and affiliated with its Comparative and Regional Studies Program (levan@american.edu; Twitter: @Dev4Security).
Tofigh Maboudi is Ph.D. candidate in the School of Public Affairs, American University, Washington, DC (tofigh.maboudi@american.edu).

Abstract

Under what circumstances do new constitutions promote democracy? Between 1974 and 2011, the level of democracy increased in 62 countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but decreased or stayed the same in 70 others. Using data covering all 138 new constitutions in 118 countries during that period, we explain this divergence through empirical tests showing that overall increased participation during the process of making the constitution positively impacts postpromulgation levels of democracy. Then, after disaggregating constitution-making into three stages (drafting, debating, and ratification) we find compelling evidence through robust statistical tests that the degree of citizen participation in the drafting stage has a much greater impact on the resulting regime. This lends support to some core principles of “deliberative” theories of democracy. We conclude that constitutional reformers should focus more on generating public “buy in” at the front end of the constitution-making process, rather than concentrating on ratification and referendums at the “back end” that are unlikely to correct for an “original sin” of limited citizen deliberation during drafting.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2015 

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