Why do people believe climate change conspiracy theories?

Douglas et al^{Reference Douglas, Sutton and Cichocka7} suggested that epistemic, existential and social motivations underpin conspiracy beliefs. Epistemic motivations relate to the extent to which individuals or groups hold knowledge of phenomena that affect their lives. Conspiracy beliefs are strengthened when events are significant and/or wide-reaching^{Reference Van Prooijen and Jostmann8} and mainstream explanations are simplistic or lacking emotional charge.^{Reference Leman and Cinnirella9} Conspiracy beliefs can provide a sense of understanding in the face of contradiction and uncertainty, and may offer closure when mainstream narratives do not provide satisfactory explanations.^{Reference Marchlewska, Cichocka and Kossowska10} Existential motivations relate to the experience of anxiety, threat or a perception of powerlessness in the face of danger. In such instances, conspiracy theories may provide safety.^{Reference Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig and Gregory11,Reference Newheiser, Farias and Tausch12} Finally, social motivations concern issues of power and hierarchy, with conspiracy theories more likely to emerge in those who have experienced oppression, victimisation or persecution.^{Reference Uscinski and Parent13} In such circumstances, groups can become insular and develop an ‘us versus them’ narrative.^{Reference Wood, Douglas and Sutton14} Safety is achieved through a narcissistic defence, whereby power is transferred from perceived ‘elites’ to the conspiracy belief holders.^{Reference Cichocka, Marchlewska and De Zavala15} Of note, such groups are predominantly single and isolated ethnic-minority males with lower socioeconomic status and educational achievement.^{Reference Freeman and Bentall16}

Holding one conspiracy belief increases the likelihood of believing another^{Reference Goertzel17} and individuals predisposed to general conspiracy thinking are more likely to deny climate change.^{Reference Lewandowsky, Oreskes, Risbey, Newell and Smithson18} An underlying tendency to prioritise counter-narrative explanations and to distrust institutions may be apparent. The notion of political socialisation is important (e.g.^{Reference Uscinski and Parent13}); climate change denial is part of the conservative rhetoric and conspiracy talk that is common among world leaders such as Trump^{Reference De Pryck and Gemenne19} and Bolsonaro.^{Reference Escobar20} Political polarisation of climate attitudes has been well-evidenced in the USA^{Reference Dunlap, McCright, Dryzek, Norgaard and Schlosberg21} and Europe,^{Reference McCright, Dunlap and Marquart-Pyatt6} among other regions. Climate change conspiracy theories might suggest allegiance to a particular conservative world view and be phenomenologically different from more emotionally charged beliefs such as the QAnon and COVID-19 conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theories, overvalued beliefs and delusions: challenges with definitions

Psychiatrists work with symptoms and diagnoses that are based on criteria set out by manuals such as DSM-5 and ICD-10. When criteria are met, a diagnosis can be made and a treatment plan devised. When thinking about conspiracy theories, the psychiatric terms ‘overvalued ideas’ and ‘delusions’ are challenged. Psychiatry defines ‘overvalued ideas’ as an erroneous response to an idea –‘an acceptable, comprehensible idea pursued by the patient beyond the bounds of reason. It is usually associated with abnormal personality’.^{Reference Oyebode22} The overvalued idea may be based on true evidence. The term was coined by Wernicke in 1906 and has further been explored by Jaspers and Fish, who made various suggestions of how to distinguish overvalued ideas from delusions.^{Reference Kiran and Chaudhury23} A delusion is defined as a ‘false, unshakeable idea or belief that is out of keeping with the patient's background; it is held with extraordinary conviction and subjective certainty’.^{Reference Oyebode22} Consequently, there can be a diagnostic dilemma as to which category climate change conspiracies – or any conspiracy theory beliefs – best align.

The evidence supporting climate change conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theory beliefs are widespread (e.g.^{Reference Drochon and Uscinski24,Reference Enders, Smallpage and Uscinski25,Reference Freeman, Waite, Rosebrock, Petit, Causier and East26} ). The internet is rife with ‘fake news’ and ‘misinformation’. Social media platforms, blogs and a whole range of other websites are dedicated to the mass propagation of ‘evidence-base-less’ theories that directly refute scientific findings.^{Reference Shao, Ciampaglia, Varol, Yang, Flammini and Menczer27,Reference Treen, Williams and O'Neill28} Bye Bye Blue Sky is one of many groups that promote and raise awareness of climate change conspiracy theories. For example, their mission statement describes ‘chemtrails’ and a government conspiracy to control the weather as ‘the toxic spraying of nano particulate metals which are further amplified by ionospheric heaters to steer, direct and control our weather for military purposes … we seek to apply the wealth of our knowledge, passion and talents to end the illegal spraying of our planet’ (byebyebluesky.com/). Alarmingly, the internet content and group demonstrations can be very convincing. Furthermore, some theorists have mastered the ability to navigate through such forums and use them to their advantage to disseminate their views to a large population.^{Reference Van den Bulck and Hyzen29}

An interesting quality of conspiracy theories is that the counter-evidence is shunned by theorists who claim that the refutation of their ideas by powerful figures is further evidence of truth suppression. This introduces an ‘us versus them’ dynamic.^{Reference Wood, Douglas and Sutton14} It may also have a directly proportionate effect – the stronger the evidence against the conspiracy theory, the more vehemently the counter-narrative is held.^{Reference Uscinski, Douglas, Lewandowsky, von Storch, Auer, Brooks, Claussen, Dolman and Grundmann30} This is further reinforced by computer algorithms that provide a feed of confirmatory evidence and omit counter-narratives from view.^{Reference Faddoul, Chaslot and Farid31} Curiously, it is evident that the scientific community's message on climate change does not have the same footing or far-reaching sustenance as the competing conspiracy theories.

Referring back to the traditional definitions of overvalued ideas and delusions, it seems that conspiracy theories about climate change could be categorised as either or neither. A diagnostic challenge is introduced when groups or ‘masses’ of believers share the same conspiracy theory and it almost has the constructs of a culture. Studies^{Reference Lewandowsky, Oberauer and Gignac4,Reference Cassino5} have found the existence of large populations that believe conspiracy theories, supporting the idea that such beliefs extend beyond the individual. This directly causes conflict with the definition of delusions. It emphasises the need for clinicians to consider the presence of additional psychopathology and/or functional impairment in order to make a diagnosis in an individual who is preoccupied with conspiracy beliefs. It could be postulated that this may divide psychiatrists. Some may consider that this group hold pathological beliefs, whereas others may frame the beliefs as in keeping with a ‘subculture’ and therefore not indicative of psychopathology.

Climate change conspiracies and mental disorders

Although there is an abundance of literature on climate change conspiracy theories in terms of their nature and spread, there appears to be very little on how such theories have had a clinical effect on mental health. In this section, the link between climate change conspiracy theories and mental disorders is discussed.

A psychological adjunct

There is an association between the cognitive and affective processes that underpin conspiracy beliefs and those evidenced in delusional thinking. For example, the jumping-to-conclusions bias has been observed in psychotic-like thinking.^{Reference Garety and Freeman52} This bias is associated with the overly rapid appraisal of stimuli to form a conclusion and has recently been evidenced in a sample of conspiracy theory believers.^{Reference Pytlik, Soll and Mehl53} Poorer analytical thinking is also implicated,^{Reference Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran and Furnham54} and cognitive distortions noted in depression could also be relevant.^{Reference Pierre35} Similarly, historical victimisation and a schematic view of the world as dangerous are risk factors for psychosis^{Reference Moulding, Nix-Carnell, Schnabel, Nedeljkovic, Burnside and Lentini55} and can provide a framework through which anomalous information is perceived. Individuals with schizotypal and paranoid personality disorder diagnoses are also likely to have experienced danger in their early lives^{Reference Perry, Lee, Spalletta, Janiri, Piras and Sani56,Reference Velikonja, Velthorst, McClure, Rutter, Calabrese and Rosell57} and such threatening experiences are also precipitants to conspiracy beliefs.^{Reference Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig and Gregory11,Reference Uscinski and Parent13} Distortions in human information processing are commonplace, adaptive and dimensional, with evidence to suggest that some individuals perceive ‘true’ information, whereas others omit, deny or delude as their environmental niche requires.^{Reference Crittenden and Landini58} Events that elicit threat responses are particularly relevant. Additionally, the demographic profiles of those who endorse conspiracies^{Reference Freeman and Bentall16} are similar to those found within psychosis cohorts.^{Reference Cornblatt, Carrión, Addington, Seidman, Walker and Cannon59}

Many theorists and clinicians support the concept of dimensional psychosis with phenomenological continuity.^{Reference DeRosse and Karlsgodt60,Reference van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul and Krabbendam61} Subclinical delusional thinking has been associated with conspiracy beliefs,^{Reference Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, Denovan and Parton62} as has paranoia.^{Reference Imhoff and Lamberty34,Reference Grzesiak-Feldman and Ejsmont63} Conspiracy theorists may not be delusional or paranoid. However, it is plausible that they exhibit similar genetic, psychological and/or social characteristics to those who are vulnerable to psychosis. The proneness–persistence–impairment model^{Reference van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul and Krabbendam61} and extended psychosis phenotype^{Reference van Os and Reininghaus64} are helpful frameworks for exploring the relationship. For many, a belief in climate change conspiracies could simply concern loyalty to conservative values.^{Reference Uscinski and Parent13} However, some may have an underlying predisposition to psychosis, with a tendency towards conspiracy thinking. Potential migration towards clinical thresholds could occur in response to greater perceived threat from significant events and exposure to, and preoccupation with, conspiracies. Individuals with diagnoses of paranoid or schizotypal personality disorder may fall into this position. The notion of the extended phenotype could explain why individuals who hold one conspiracy belief are more prone to believing others (e.g.^{Reference Goertzel17}); this has also been called ‘conspiracist ideation’.^{Reference Swami, Coles, Stieger, Pietschnig, Furnham and Rehim65,Reference Brotherton and Eser66}

Forecast

There is evidence to suggest that historical events have informed delusional content^{Reference Cannon and Kramer46,Reference Škodlar, Dernovšek and Kocmur49} and there are some indications that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a recent effect.^{Reference Larsen, Donaldson and Mohanty67} Delusions can be triggered by real-world events and the content can reflect genuine concerns about the world, anxiety and existential threat.^{Reference Longden, Madill and Waterman51} Notably, the conditions in respect to the above phenomena were opportune for the development of conspiracy theories. That is, these events generated real threat to individuals and communities (e.g.^{Reference Douglas, Sutton and Cichocka7}).

It can be hypothesised that the global reluctance/opposition to impactful climate policy change is actually protective with regard to the pervasive development of conspiracy belief psychopathology. That is, conspiracy theories emerge when a way of life is threatened. At present, climate policy has not had a tangible impact on freedoms, rights or lifestyle. Nonetheless, we forecast that this will likely change in the coming decades (e.g. as governments fall in line with the Paris Agreement). To our knowledge, there is only a single case study^{Reference Wolf and Salo43} to describe the interplay between climate change conspiracy beliefs and severe psychopathology. It is hypothesised that climate change has not yet become a common feature of delusional beliefs.

For those who have a predisposition to psychopathology, such changes may trigger migration towards clinical disorder. It is possible that climate change and associated conspiracy beliefs may affect mental health in the following ways: (a) dramatic societal changes (e.g. energy conservation policies, restrictions on existing freedoms) might precipitate an increase in climate change conspiracy theories, and individuals predisposed to conspiracy thinking (including those with underlying paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal traits) might migrate to delusion; (b) the increasing presence of climate change discourse in public conversations could lead to such content appearing in the content of pre-existing delusional belief systems; and (c) concerns and guilt about climate change could lead to presentations of depressive psychosis with nihilistic and/or climate-related apocalyptic delusions.

Concluding remarks

As climate change becomes more present in public consciousness, conspiracy theories are likely to become increasingly prominent and to manifest in the presentation of several mental disorders. This article has hypothesised that there may be a potential commonality between pervasive conspiracy thinking and mental disorders, particularly psychosis and certain personality disorders. However, it is proposed that clinicians approach individuals who hold conspiracy beliefs with diagnostic caution, given that conspiracy beliefs are widely held within the general population. Careful assessment is needed to identify those who are psychologically vulnerable to developing mental health complications due to exposure to conspiracy beliefs.

Further research is recommended to investigate whether a proportion of climate change conspiracy theory advocates do have underlying psychological risk factors for the development of concerning psychopathology; and also how such theories have featured in mental disorders, particularly as symptoms of psychosis or personality disorder.