Since the 1800s, the politics-administration dichotomy has been a central question in public administration—perhaps the central question. What is the relationship between elected officials and the permanent bureaucracy? Can a strict line—a dichotomy—be drawn between them? And is that desirable?

Chris Cooper's At the Pleasure of the Crown: The Politics of Bureaucratic Appointments tackles this question in a fresh and original manner. Drawing from a massive database of all provincial deputy minister appointments in Canada since 1867, Cooper tracks the turnover of deputy ministers relative to changes in government and premiers. He then relates this to changes in governing parties, as well as to premiers within governing parties.

Cooper finds three broad eras or “bargains” between politicians and public servants. In the first spoils era, turnover is significant and blatant at the change of government, as governing parties appoint partisan supporters to replace the previous government's people. In the second Schafferian era (named after Bernard Schaffer, who documented this period), election-related turnover drops significantly and deputies remain in place. But in the third managerial era, beginning around 1980, turnover accelerates again. Cooper analyzes turnover from several dimensions, such as in relation to overall career patterns and longevity, to establish that change in government is consistently the significant variable. He also establishes that intra-party transfers of power, when a new premier from the same party takes office, do not see the same level of turnover—until the new premier wins an election, at which point there is a housecleaning.

These broad eras correspond with conventional wisdom. However, Cooper is particularly interested in explaining the current era, and this is the book's main novelty. Cooper suggests that most explanations of modern turnover focus on “the quest for control”—that political leaders want to bring in ideologically like-minded partisan sympathizers that they can control. Cooper suggests partisan control is not the objective—rather, it is policy responsiveness. Premiers want individuals that will carry out their vision, and this may be less about ideological leanings and more about personal competencies and orientations. Incoming premiers vowing change will naturally favour bureaucrats who are change agents (in the right direction). Stabilizers will bring in stabilizers, and so on. This is different from a century ago, when partisanship was king, regardless of personality. Modern appointments are political but in a policy, rather than partisan, sense. This does not disprove the overall quest-for-control explanation, but it significantly clarifies it.

Cooper is somewhat equivocal on the normative implications of this. The strength of the current managerial era is that bureaucrats are arguably more democratically responsive. When a government is elected to power, the new deputies see their role as implementing the new agenda rather than blocking or moderating it to suit existing interests. The downside is a possible reluctance to speak truth to power and to raise legitimate concerns and objectives. While there can be nostalgia for the Schafferian bargain of fearless permanent deputies serving governments that come and go, this could also risk stagnation, drift and an entrenchment of the status quo. The elusive ideal, then, may be bureaucrats that are highly responsive to the policy directions set by elected officials yet also brave enough to put their foot down when it is required. But this also requires politicians prepared to listen to things they don't want to hear and to not interpret every concern and doubt as obstruction. That is a complicated matchup.

One of the great strengths of this book is the comprehensive provincial focus. Cooper does not look at the federal government, partly because it has been better studied but also because the 10 provinces provide a much richer and more comparable set of data. This focus allows study of governing parties beyond Liberals and Conservatives and of a wider set of policy regimes. Unsurprisingly, new parties wanting to pursue bold policy directions, such as the Parti Québécois in 1976, make significant changes at the deputy level to facilitate them. This is also generally the case for New Democratic party (NDP) governments—though Cooper notes that the Manitoba NDP seems to clean house less than those in other provinces—as well as strongly neoliberal “change” regimes such as the Ontario Harris Conservatives. But it is the policy direction, not the party label, that most matters.

Another strength is Cooper's research design. His primary approach is quantitative, working with his exhaustive database to provide solid confirmation of these distinct trends. But the book also has a significant qualitative element, as he draws extensively from the literature on provincial bureaucratic turnover, including royal commissions from the 1930s and extensive quotes from past ministers and deputies. This material provides colour and confirmation of the trends yielded in the quantitative analysis. The qualitative evidence also informs his primary argument that modern turnover is not partisan but rather policy driven.

At the Pleasure of the Crown is a short book—only 107 pages of text, plus notes. Compliments must be given to the University of British Columbia Press for publishing such an excellent piece of analysis: shorter than a typical monograph but far more than a single article. This allows Cooper to build his argument carefully at length and to present both his quantitative analysis and qualitative context, all in a trim package. (In a sign that perhaps a certain television show has had its day, this study of ministers and deputies in parliamentary systems does not make a single reference to Yes, Minister.) At the Pleasure of the Crown is a very grounded study that will serve as an important reference going forward for the study of public management in Canada and as a new answer to a perpetual public administration question.